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0. Introduction
Do we normally look at the sky above our heads? Do we notice the ever changing colors of
it at all times in our everyday life? For most people nowadays the answer is no (except maybe if
you are thoughtful, and check the weather to dress accordingly); however, there are many other
reasons for this which we will be exploring in the following chapters. For example, unlike us, some
major characters in  The New York Trilogy by Paul Auster and  London Fields by Martin Amis do
look up; they have no option left but to do so. Moreover, the titles of these novels are telling us that
these are the stories of two cities, two very populated ones, and it is well known that in cities such
as these it is sometimes hard to even see the sky and harder still to watch the stars at night; the
buildings are so tall, the rhythm is so fast, the luminescence so bright, the soil so nonexistent, not to
mention cloud cover and pollution. But the characters that both Auster and Amis have created are
facing the end of the world, at least the end of their world, which they are forced to contemplate:
when they look up and elsewhere they are looking for signs and what they see is more frightening
for us than it is for them. Nature is not accessible for us anymore and we ask, therefore: what is the
nature of the world they are forced to contemplate? What kind of reality do they face and, for that
matter, and more importantly, what is reality? To answer these questions, these characters will all
put their own identity to the test in search of something real and stable. During this journey of self-
determination,  they will  learn the importance of  other  people in  this  process too and they will
struggle to actually find any trace of reality in what they once called themselves, which is a situation
they will either succumb to or totally reject, as we will see.
Ultimately, these characters will be searching for their true identities, for the others who are
the  same,  and  for  those  who  are  different  from  them,  and  all  these,  combined  with  the
circumstances in which they find themselves,  will interact in the novels in the most bizarre and
sometimes unnatural ways. However, the novels are telling us that it has become clear that finding
Rueda 5/209
Identity as Alterity
one's identity is not all only about one's self (or oneself), as there is no way to be one without the
others, an attitude that is highly influenced by the theories of Derrida, Levinas, Lacan and others,
which testify to that1. We will explore their ideas and relate them to the representations of character
in  the  text.  We will  also  be  analyzing discourses  of  ‘identity’,  ‘othering’ and  ‘alterity’,  which
inherently complement notions of the subjective formation of the self, notions that have  perhaps
inevitably become displaced and even dismissed as no longer feasible in a postmodern universe,
replaced by the certainty that our sense of self comes from without and not from within. People are
meant to be with other people, characters are bound to mingle with other characters and the absence
and/or  presence  of  interlocutors,  the  impossibility  of  really  connecting  with  those  ‘others’ and
therefore  with  themselves,  will  drive  our  characters  into  homelessness,  oblivion,  solitude  and
madness. Nevertheless they are postmodern fictional characters, they inhabit a dystopian present (in
the second half  of the already past 20th century),  which,  although represented through striking
techniques and meticulous linguistic choices made to bring about a sense of defamiliarization or
even brechtian alienation, paradoxically seems very realistic to us living our life after the end of
their world. As it will be argued throughout this paper, there are serious impediments for twentieth-
century individuals  (and even more  so  today)  to  find  the  means  to  satisfactorily  achieve  self-
definition,  or  identification with or  by anything that  can  be  called  ‘real’ (furthermore,  we will
examine whether this has ever been possible in history).
Related to this search is our interest as a species for the earthly elements, which are utterly
necessary for our survival,  such as water,  earth,  air  or something so human as fire,  which has
always, as the evidence suggests, been parallel to our curiosity about those entities, physical or
‘divine’, above the clouds, and looking at the sky has brought more than one epiphany to the human
race. Cities have expanded all over the world designed to contain our lives and interactions, tons of
1 Lacan suggests that we only come to know ourselves through the gaze of others; alternatively, Derrida points out the
subjective self is a linguistic construct, and Levinas argues that the notion of the self is only known through the other
but is always outwith our reach. We will provide further references in chapter 1.
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concrete and cement covering original soil. Every trace that we once were animals in the wild has
been erased from the city except for the sky; the forest, shore and land in general have disappeared
from our sight, but the sky is not removable by the concrete giant. It is there and it reminds us of
our ancient, true nature. No matter for how long these characters have looked the other way, the sky
has presented itself to them, and it carries meaning. In Amis's end of the millennium London, and
worldwide, the sun is  “out of joint” (LF: 202), diseases and allergies run wild and the weather is
literally burning. The heavens reveal an apocalyptic message; they say the earth is on the edge of
collapse and Samson, the character-narrator-author, is sure humanity is to blame: “all this stuff was
man-made, not acts of God but acts of man” (276). The New York in Auster's trilogy is, on the other
hand, a far more peaceful place. It seems so like the real twentieth century New York we all know
(mostly from TV, films and magazines) that it should not imprint such a feeling of displacement on
the readers at  all,  as  London Fields clearly does.  Nonetheless it  proves  to  be as hostile  to the
characters inhabiting it as Amis's London. The sky here conveys a different message, though. It only
catches the characters' eyes in moments of extreme isolation and distress and it is in this solitude
that  the  city,  as  part  of  a  larger  system, unfolds  itself  to  the  characters  as  unnatural,  and also
inescapable, in ways it had never appeared before. For them, it becomes a matter of stopping and
trying to grasp the real or the true, only to discover they had never been there, or at least that they
are  not  there anymore.  Keith,  Guy,  and  Samson  in  London  Fields,  and  Quinn,  Blue  and  the
unnamed  narrator  of  The  Locked  Room (the  Trilogy)  are  all  on  a  quest  to  find  their  selves.
Moreover, Nicola Six (LF) and Stillman, Black and Fanshawe (NYT), their anti-selves, are most
likely on the same journey. The readers will not be surprised that their shared destiny is deletion,
dissolution and disappearance albeit in several distinct ways.
But how did they get to that point? To answer this question we will first rephrase it: how did
we  get  here?  Because  it  doesn't  feel  like  home2;  as  Amis’s  narrator  reflects  about  one  of  the
2 In his article "How did I Get Here? This is not my Home..." (my translation, "¿Cómo he llegado hasta aquí?: Esta no
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characters: “perhaps he was wondering why, in the fantasy, you felt at home in places like these,
whereas of course you never did, and never would” (LF: 421). In order to engage with the texts and
contextualize these apparent nihilist and apocalyptic representations of what we call the real world
now we will have to turn to “parasitic citation” in search of authority (Docherty: 78), because that is
how serious research is done. And, although we do not trust in language either anymore because it
turns out to be a totalizing element and a creator of its own meanings3, we will try to put into words
how the humanities and sciences are worried about identity and subjectivity. In Stuart Hall's words,
and he had a  life-long career  in  criticism on identities  and alterities,  “This  so-called  ‘crisis  of
identity’ is seen as part of a wider process of change which [is] dislocating the central structures and
processes  of  modern  societies  and  undermining  the  frameworks  which  gave  individuals  stable
anchorage  in  the  social  world”  (Hall  MI:  596).  We  will  discuss  how  the  influence  of  this
predicament is palpable in the fiction of Paul Auster and Martin Amis, both nearly obsessed with
the issue at every stage of their work. But it is not only them, as we will see; identity is a critical
issue for all postmodernist authors and artists in general (although it had always been problematic in
representation) and we will dig for the stylistic devices that these and other authors have been using
in characterization to represent this loss of anchorage.
Although separated by space and talking to us from different cities, Auster and Amis are
contemporary and share the same American-European literary heritage. Both of them, as well as
their characters in these and other novels, tend to fly back and forth, both literally and figuratively,
between Europe and America.  Not only do the two novels share this  enactment of postmodern
characters  in  the  immemorial  journey of  self-recognition  on the stage of  the  twentieth  century
es mi Casa"), Manuel Almagro contemplates this in a light-hearted manner echoing the Talking Heads's song “Once
in a Lifetime” and reflects on the postmodernist subject's discomfort with everything traditionally considered stable
and safe and how this presents an issue in self-definition.
3 Spivak, Lyotard, Derrida, Hall and other critics from different fields agree language is an ontology, a construct with
no relation to anything beyond itself, that legitimates itself; i.e. according to Lacan the real is nowhere to be found
as it is always mediated by language: “we can never know if the real lies beyond language...A reality we must
assume although we can never know it” (Sarup: 24-26).
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megalopolis,  but  they  also  share  a  fetish  about  particular  objects  or  objectivized  people,
highlighting  the  notebook  (and sometimes  a  diary),  as  a  means for  recognition  and ultimately,
existence. This will bring us to consider the historic formation of the city and the importance of
objects and language nowadays as vectors for meaning in an otherwise alienating society which
promotes  “the  evident  degradation  of  being into  having,  [which]  drives  us  to  a  generalized
displacement of having into seeming” (Debord, my translation: 42-43), and how this state of affairs
affects literature in every level: “Characterization in fiction, authorship and intention, readership,
narrative point of view, style,  genre and thematics all reflect the concern with this ‘question’ ”
(Wheeler: 15). Also, because of the meta-literary complexity brought by the notebooks and the
superimposition of layers and ‘authors’ in these books, we will take interest, as Auster and Amis do,
in the character and thematization of authorship and agency, another key point in postmodernist
critique and artistic production. 
These characters are not real people; they live in a fictional world which has become a
fragmented collection of impressions; nothing complete or real is available to their senses and their
subjectivity will be also incomplete and always in the making. We will argue that they have but a
few options in behavior that are available for them to ‘perform’,  a finite number of models or
archetypes/stereotypes; therefore, for example, Keith will represent the ‘macho’, Guy will struggle
to adapt to the standards of the old-fashioned gentleman, and meanwhile, Nicola Six will try to fill
the shoes of more than one male fantasy of the female stereotype, to satisfy and deceive all of them.
Could it possibly be the same for real people? Are we limited by our own societal creation? Critics
say we are: “The language of autonomy, identity, self-realization and the search of fulfillment forms
a grid of regulatory ideals” (Rose: 145). Our today globalized consumerist society is made up of
what Baudrillard calls ‘simulacra’ 4, Debord calls it ‘the society of the spectacle’5; and we seem to
4 “A world of simulacra without depth, center, or meaning” (Spariosu: 61).
5 “An accumulation of  spectacles.  Everything directly experienced has turned into a representation” (Debord, my
translation: 37).
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be calling it ‘life’. These characters are therefore just a representation of what subjectivity has come
to be: “subjectivity, today, has characteristic and novel features such as uncertainty, reflexivity, self-
scrutiny, fragmentation and diversity” (Rose: 144). Some of the characters we will be analyzing are
‘players’ and embrace ‘the game’ in all its plenitude in a conscious (Nicola) or unconscious way
(Keith),  and  we will  be  comparing  them to  Don Quixote  of  La  Mancha,  so  immersed in  the
postmodernist romance  are they, that they perceive windmills where  there are monsters. Another
range of characters (Quinn, Blue, Fanshawe), also becoming conscious of the deceitful life they are
attempting to live, pursue total isolation, contemplation and austerity, dissolving their self in their
one  person  imaginary  Walden  Pond.  This  is  postmodern  escapism  in  its  essence  and  its
consequences are fatal. 
We have already mentioned some of our protagonists but should briefly consider what, at
least on the surface, takes place in the novels. In the Trilogy, we will find three apparently unrelated
stories, that we will discover are connected in different ways later. It starts off as a detective novel
but as City of Glass develops, we soon notice it turns into a reflection upon identity, others, solitude
and literature itself. The same structure is repeated in Ghosts and the cycle is closed in The Locked
Room,  where the narrator of the whole Trilogy makes himself  more present as the protagonist.
Although all of the protagonists work on a case of espionage at some level, none of them will be
able to successfully solve their quests, nor will the reader know the end at the end. Suspense is
replaced by contemplation and confusion, the same way as in London Fields we are again denied
suspense; we know from the very beginning it is a murder story, even who the victim, the murderer
and the fall-guy are. All roles are assigned from the start, thence by this initial move, again the
author  forces  us  to  focus  on notions like identity,  agency or  the fake foundations  under  social
conventions. Although that is more or less what we get on the surface,  The New York Trilogy and
London Fields are still worth carrying on with until the end; they constitute hundreds of pages of
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word  game;  the  irony  is  overwhelming.  We  are  bound  to  watch  and  be  accomplice  to  these
characters'  foreseen  self-destruction,  and  the  result  is  tragicomic.  We assume social  critique  is
implicit and accept the literary game as it is in these novels: an extreme catalog of postmodern types
in  motion,  implying  an  inherently  incoherent  nature,  therefore  never  meeting  the  reader's
ontological  expectations,  which  are  preconceived,  as  we  will  later  examine  closely.  
Unfortunately,  some critics,  and particularly  feminist  critics  have  been  upset  about  one
particular category of representation that has been very controversial up until today in relation to
London Fields  and Amis himself:  ‘gender’ or the feminine.  In  London Fields  and The Trilogy,
women are virtually invisible, yet there is one character who is very visible, active and actress,
manipulator and player: Nicola Six, pronounced /'siks/, misheard ‘sex’ (LF: 37). For us, the mistake
lies in analyzing her as if she were a real woman, which she is not, or  only as a display of the
profound chauvinistic ideas of the author himself, which she might be. If we assume Amis's hatred
for women makes him depict them this way, we might as well equally state that he deeply hates
men, and that, too, could be perfectly possible. Either way, Nicola should be analyzed as another
(an other) de-centered fictional representative type of our times and we will try to contextualize her
(horrible)  actions  in  the  frame of  the  novel.  Besides,  Nicola  has  one  final  goal:  to  die,  more
specifically to be killed by one of the male characters in the symbolic act (as all her steps are
willingly symbolic) of exterminating all the male fantasies she has been enacting. We will dig into
the ideas of death and rebellion, and even death as a form of rebellion in these novels and their
entanglement as forms of evasion. Does she succeed? Well, partly she does not. She does die, but
because actual  rebellion is not an obtainable goal, just as escapism for the characters left alive is
impossible,  physically  and mentally  the  system re-accommodates  the  characters  in  their  empty
place. This is taken to the literal realm in Auster's trilogy, for instance with Quinn lying on the floor
of an empty room, almost with an empty mind, accompanied by no one and fed by who knows who
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in the last (known) days of his life. On the other hand, many authors think, as we will see in chapter
4, that violence and death are conceptually an intrinsic part of the idea of revolution or rebellion,
and that is the route that Amis's characters take. They all lose everything (they play many roles, they
live a lot of different lives); most of them essentially disappear, but yet are still unable to fulfill their
escapist attempt.
This is the landscape of the era; it is the end of the millennium, possibly the end of the
world, and the end of all these characters we try so hard not to identify with. Identity has been
unseated by alterity, no matter if one behaves as one thinks one is, or one should be, or looks for
belonging  in  place,  time  or  the  others:  one  is  essentially other,  recalling  Rimbaud's  words
(Docherty: 180). Therefore some characters will try to be in actual control of the image they project,
players  in  a  game  they  know  is  extreme,  a  game  they  might  lose;  quoting  Nicola's  song  of
‘freedom’: “What I am I wish to be, and what I wish to be I am. I am beyond God. I am the
Motionless Cause. Extremity upon extremity, and then more extremity, and then more” (133). In
fact, reading these novels we will observe how characters are many others, and we will analyze the
intriguing uses of literary doublings. The point is that through these literary experiments the ‘I’ has
been proven to be other, so unreachable to itself as alterity had been before; therefore the only
possible identity, according to Amis and Auster,  is alterity, and, to use the quantum jargon these
authors really enjoy too, identity and alterity cancel each other in the manner in which particles are
canceled in contact with anti-particles into the void.
Rueda 12/209
Identity as Alterity
1. Identities and Alterities
To understand the ways in which the notions of identity have changed in postmodernity we
should consider what the nature of identity has been for humanity in the past. As we will see in this
chapter, although there have been many different and specific approaches to the topic of identity,
there have been mainly three kinds of subsequent notions of ‘modern subject’. First there was the
Enlightenment subject, a compendium of all the previous traditions and the special confidence of
the Enlightenment's thinkers: he is a male subject, unified and capable of reason with a center of
stable identity. In the 20th century, the sociological subject will appear, more open to the world: a
modern  subject,  not  autonomous  but  formed  through  significant  others,  creating  values  and
meanings through these relationships.  He has got also an identity core,  but it  is flexible and in
continuous formation: identification “stabilizes both subjects and the cultural worlds they inhabit,
making both reciprocally more unified and predictable” (Hall MI: 597). As we will see, eventually a
new postmodern subject will take over: previously experienced as unified, it (to avoid the gender
mark in this case) is “becoming fragmented, not of a single, but of several, sometimes contradictory
or unresolved, identities at the same time. The world is fragmented and not possible to grasp so it
has no permanent identity, but it changes depending on how we are ‘addressed’ by society” (598).
And this third type of individual is clearly the kind of subject depicted through the characters in our
novels. As Peter Stillman Senior tells Quinn, it is very important to take into account the plain fact
that: “You see, the world is in fragments, sir” (NYT: 75). While the Trilogy's characters display their
many  doppelgangers  and  their  own  doublings  in  every  page  and  fragmentation  in  personality
becomes obvious, the characters in  London Fields  are overwhelmed by the many ways in which
society is addressing them, demanding for them to play roles that are sometimes contradictory or
empty but that they feel in need to enact. 
There are many factors that interact within the process of identification, which demonstrates
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it is not just a natural process but it depends mostly on the different social spheres and constructs
experienced and learned at an early age and reinforced through the rest of one's life. This, too, is a
very important topic in these novels. It is a fact well known by Amis's central character, Nicola Six,
the woman who perfectly understands how social  and sexual relationships are  constructed,  and
therefore can predict and manipulate the future reactions of the rest of the characters. In Auster, the
importance of socialization at the early stages of life is a central topic of the plot, mainly in City of
Glass through Peter Stillman Jr., the man that had been locked up and isolated by his own father in
the endeavor to find the true language of God, who has no knowledge at all of these conventions:
“Little by little, they taught me how to be Peter Stillman. They said: you are Peter Stillman. Thank
you, I said. [...] You are a human being, they said. It is good to believe what doctors say” (17). This
is  also  a  recurrent  idea throughout  the whole Trilogy— Auster-Quinn introduces  the stories  of
different wild boys found by civilization through history, their difficulty in ever learning how to
speak and behave as their fellow humans and their lack of interest in sex or money (33-35). As we
will see in this chapter, self and identity are not confined only to the internal realm but they depend
more on outside factors than we are able  to  imagine;  there are national and cultural  identities,
discourses of power to justify them, minority discourses to subvert them, religious identity, Science,
History and Politics,  they all  play a  major  role  in  the way people define themselves  and their
communities. There is, so to say, a system of everything we experience: ‘the System’, a designation
that we will use from now on in order to refer to the compound of societal constructs the subject is a
part of, or simply a synonym for ‘reality’.
That we are an entity, a beating heart and a thinking brain is all we normally would need to
assume we are ourselves, we are all ‘I’. The feeling of self-preservation walks hand in hand with the
feeling  of  self-identification.  Self-consciousness  is  something we share with some animals,  but
unlike any other creature, our functional organism, self-contained and separated from the outside
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world by our skin, thinks  ‘I am’ and, more importantly: it verbally proclaims  ‘I am’. As Derrida
brings to our attention, quoting Benveniste, the linguistic capacity of the subject to posit itself as
subject is subjectivity itself: “‘Ego’ is he who says ‘ego’ ” (7). Therefore language is a determinant
acquired skill in order to translate our self-consciousness into existence, and thought, the fact that
we think in linguistic terms, stands for both the tool and the evidence itself of the existence of an
active subject— as in Descartes's ominous ‘cogito, ergo sum’6. Language and instinct also make us
social beings, humans are meant for life in community, consequently, virtually everywhere you look
for a definition of ‘identity’ you will find one or more synonyms for ‘belonging’. We will examine
in this chapter how this  apparently logical approach as to how people self-define in relation to
themselves and the others has been deconstructed and torn to pieces by twentieth century thinkers,
just like, in Lyotard's terms, every other  ‘grand récit’ (Calinescu  "Postmodernism...": 5). We will
see how every grand truth is seen as a human construction kept through time as a heritage, in order
to  reassure  the  supremacy or  the  monopoly of  reason,  progress,  power,  and other  key notions
reinforced since the Enlightenment project, as some call it (Haidu: 597; Donald: 178)7. However,
there is another crucial characteristic of subjectivity, and it is  ‘difference’, a decisive concept in
Derrida's  or  Levinas's  view of  identity  and  alterity  that  has  marked  all  the  so-called  minority
discourses of our times (feminist, ethnic, postcolonial, and so on). However, the oldest entry found
in the Oxford English Dictionary Online under ‘identity’ is P. Holland's 1603 translation of Plutarch:
“That the soule of this universall world, is not simple, uniforme and uncompounded, but mixed of a
certaine power of Identitie and of Diversity”. This is an indication of the degree to which alterity
and identity have always incorporated each other.
From this, it seems the search for identity and its definition has always been a subject of
6 Thiher, however, argues that the appeal that the cartesian model represents for writers such as Nabokov, Sartre or
philosophers like Wittgestein or Heidegger precisely resides in its negation of language as part of the pure and stable
experience of the subject: “Descartes'[s] thought offers a model of representation that breaks out of language. In
securing the self as the stage of representation, Descartes refused to allow language to disrupt his thought” (101).
7 Lyotard talks about this ‘system-subject’ project as an ideal that is still present in the philosophy of Habermas, for
example, but insists this project has failed in postmodernity (77).
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study for philosophy, religion, science, and also for anthropology, sociology, psychology and all
branches of knowledge we could possibly imagine, on the grounds that if we were to reduce all of
them to a common end, they all are in the continuous search of ways of explaining ‘reality’ as it is
perceived,  either  inside our  brain or through studying our  surroundings,  by scrutinizing all  the
layers of our planet or by the inexhaustible observation of celestial bodies. The eternal quest is for
answers  to  the  ontological  question,  ‘why?’ But,  for  Amis, “There  is  no  why”  (TA:  119). In
philosophy, the contraposition of internal and external realities soon found it difficult to reconcile
the experience of the subject's reason and his relationship to his senses. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas or
Descartes, whose “cogito is only one of the summits— even the highest— of a chain of  cogitos
which constitute the reflective tradition” (Ricoeur: 236), all in all, highlighted internal reality or our
perception of external nature as the closest we can come to a graspable truth and they distrusted the
experience of the senses. Spinoza, Leibniz or most predominantly Kant, started to consider reality
as  the  external  world  unfolded  to  us  by  experimentation  and  positivist  science,  which  is  the
beginning of modern thinking (Spinosa and Dreyfus: 100). Therefore a dialogical relationship starts
between  these  two  irreconcilable  ‘real’ sets  of  experience,  a  relationship  in  which  enlightened
humans  apprehend  the  laws  of  nature  and  use  them  to  alter  the  environment,  to  improve it,
promoting a belief in infinite positive progress. The emphasis is on the notion that experience of
reality is fundamentally subjective, but nonetheless truthful. This idea makes progress possible; in
fact, the idea of progress has installed itself so strongly as to persist nowadays as a predominant line
of thought, very influential in the description of identity and our relationship with the environment
in  science  and  technology:  for  example,  we  must  not  forget  that the  problem created  by  the
irreconcilability of these modes of experience still persists in the field of science nowadays, while it
is impossible for scientists to find their way into a  ‘theory of everything’ that could incorporate
quantum theories and relativity, both  ‘real’ and incompatible. However scientists still believe we
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will be able to answer the ultimate questions about life, its beginning and its fate, and the universe
in the near future, partly because our intellect is seen as cumulative through time, and therefore it
gets sharper, partly because technology seems also to be an incombustible ally8.
As we move into the 20th century, rapidly changing and overlapping ideas of the real and
the self will coexist; some will reconsider the overwhelming importance of the internal perception
of the real as more determinant of the actual experience of the subject,  a trend that Freud and
psychoanalysis reinvigorated by, among other postulates, taking into account memories and dreams,
the unconscious, as determinant for the present status of the subject. Although the relationship with
the  world  is  important,  the  way in  which  the  individual  processes  it  is  the  most  real  field  of
experience. Some others will consider, on the other hand, that there are also extremely important
outside factors that can alter the subject's core inevitably. Following the positivist tradition of the
nineteenth century, in the need to determine which of the experiences was to be considered more
real, Husserl founded the school of ‘phenomenology’, which, as its name suggests, found ‘reality’ in
everything that experiments in nature revealed, later influencing Derrida or Levinas (Haidu: 682-
684). Another philosopher that would deeply influence later trends of thought is Heidegger, who
was the first to critique the Enlightenment notions for failing to be universalist.  Incorporating a
strong sense of ‘difference’ (Gingrich: 6-9), he started to look at language and other great discourses
with distrust, which is a fundamental idea our authors are still exploring in their work. Earlier than
Heidegger, Hume had categorically denied the existence of the world outside human experience at
all. So did Nietzsche, he who confidently said: ‘God is dead’, a nihilist motto that has been applied
almost to every one of the Enlightenment's big, nature/God-given truths, catapulting the work of,
for example, Foucault, Deleuze or the already mentioned Derrida and Levinas: metaphysics is dead,
8 As an illustration for this belief, note for example the positive tone of the following quote by Stephen Hawking: “I t
is likely that answers to these questions will be found over the next few years, and that by the end of the century we
shall know whether string theory is indeed the long sought-after unified theory of physics” (165). Of course he
meant the end of the past century.
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language  is  dead,  the  artist  is  dead,  the  author  is  dead.  Amis  recalls  these  affirmations,  while
describing Nicola as a soon to be dead character (she calls herself a Murderee and is plotting her
own death):
She welcomed and applauded the death of  just  about  anything.  It  was  company.  It
meant you weren't quite alone. A dead flower, the disobliging turbidity of dead water,
slow to leave the jug. A dead car half-stripped at the side of the street, shot, busted,
annulled, abashed. A dead cloud. The Death of the Novel. The Death of Animism, the
Death of Naive Reality, the Death of the Argument from Design, and (especially) the
Death of the Principle of Least Astonishment. The Death of the Planet. The Death of
God. The death of love. It was company. (LF: 296)
Conceptual death combines with the death of the environment for Amis, and out of all this death,
only one common point stands out in the work of the twentieth century thinkers: the relationship of
the self with the other seems to be the only bridge between the self and the real, thence the only
possibly stable way of self-definition. That is the starting point of the twentieth century, and we
must keep in mind that “this [was] indeed a century full of visions we would like to forget, but
which we have nevertheless relentlessly recorded, analyzed, and amplified” (Berger, J: 394). 
Structuralism also appeared at the beginning of the century as another type of universalism,
recognizing  the  necessity  of  a  common  bond  among  all  the  diversity  of  human  experiences.
Saussure, who would categorize all reality as mediated by language with his famous dichotomy
signifier/signified, emphasized that all reality was created by humans and that neither language nor
the signifier  itself had an intrinsic meaning; it  was only through interpretation and naming that
things acquired their meaning (Strathern: 43-45). Lévi-Strauss would incorporate Saussure's ideas
into anthropology, insisting on the importance of kinship and relationships as constructs related to
power and historical heritage; as Strathern observes: “when people draw on kinship as a source of
identity, they evoke both old and new forms of relating, as well as the tension between them” (45).
Towards  the  second  half  of  the  century  post-structuralists  moved  away  from  structuralism's
universalism, focusing on the one thing that seemed for them to be consistent when referring to a
global  definition  of  culture:  difference,  or  alterity.  Semiotics  then  appears  to  challenge
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Hermeneutics, which was based on tradition and heritage (Haidu: 689), and thus frees identity from
its historical constraints, letting it embrace otherness:
The experience of alterity was foundational and constitutive of what was once called
structuralism,  whose  present  forms  are  primarily  deconstruction,  semiotics,  and
foucaldian discourse analysis. Without this experience [...], the formalization typical of
these intellectual currents would have no reason to exist.  Without the interruption of
subjectivity represented by alterity,  the phenomenological relation between cognitive
subject and object of knowledge could remain the perfectly and adequate matrimonial
relation.  [...]  Semiotics  and alterity are  inextricably bound up together,  not  only by
cause of origin, but constitutively. (684)
When post-structuralist thought enters the intellectual scene and even time as a constant becomes
fragmentary and inapprehensible, all modes of identification are found to be historical lies, as we
will  argue later.  Hence,  more  than  a  single  angle  must  be  applied  to  understand  experience:
“subjectivity as internal time consciousness; identity as the temporal construction of difference and
agency as the temporal displacement of difference” (Grossberg: 100-101). 
It has become clear that, to understand the nature of the self and of the other, it is not enough
to identify those factors that constitute our inner world with regard to our own subjectivity or even
our more immediate interaction with those others who allow us to know ourselves— an ‘inner
circle’ constituted by the cares of the mother, the authority of the father and other family bonds—,
which are very important, as studied for example by Lacan. His perspective on the formation of
identity  implied  an  ‘other’ who  resembles  the  self  and  is  like  a  mirror  for  our  self-reflexive
consciousness, and a non-reflexive unconscious ‘Other’; so identity is not only self-consciousness,
and difference can be part of identity and vice versa “at least prima vista” (Gingrich: 9-11). Even
when we consider our relations beyond the family and the possible role we play with spouses,
friends, lovers, colleagues, or other ultimately public  relations, these are not enough to determine
the nature of the self  and the relation with the other.  There are communal factors too,  like the
notions of national, cultural or even religious identity, and of course the real possibility of being the
outsider or part of a minority as a defining characteristic. These factors have been determined by the
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powers acting in and writing History and we must take them into consideration for being of great
importance in the process of identification historically. In Amis's view:
Countries go insane like people go insane; and all over the world countries reclined on
couches or sat in darkened rooms chewing dihydrocodeine and Temazepam or lay in
boiling baths or twisted in straitjackets or stood there banging their heads against the
padded walls. (LF: 367)
National identity as a form of self-definition which is shared by the members of a given
community persists through history, and is both temporal and spatial, as it is related to territory and
the passage of time. National identification comes from ancient “tribe, people, religion and region”
(Strathern: 612), basic concepts for human civilization that are reinterpreted through time up to our
days. This type of collective identity has existed as long as there have been societies. According to
Homi Bhabha, a representative of postcolonial discourse, the narrative of the modern nation comes
from the  ontological  and medieval  perception  of  the  world,  and he  reminds  us  also  about  the
medieval taste for visual and aural imaginary in representation (157). Therefore, symbolic national
or  nationalist  identification  is  still  very  important  for  the  cultural  determination  of  people;  as
Hägglund points out, without national identification the modern subject would “experience a sense
of  subjective  loss”  (612).  However,  postmodernism  has  brought  into  consideration  that  any
definition  considered  essentialist  must  be  discarded,  and  even  national  identity  is  not  safe.
‘Essentialist’ is an adjective applied to the doctrines that assume a ‘thing’ has a ‘meaning’, inherent
and immutable, and this is under extreme scrutiny by critics. 
In consequence, the notion of cultural identity, in all its now considered essentialist variants,
has  been under  attack in  the belief  that  “any claim to identify citizenship in  terms of  cultural
identity […] undermines democratic popular sovereignty and the rights of citizenship by drawing a
line  separating  those  who  are  members  of  this  political  community  from those  who  are  not”
(Donald:174). In other words, the discourse of the nation is anchored in traditional values that, by
definition, imply the existence of other people outside of it. Hobbes in the 17th century already
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reckoned that when confronting others, one could never know whether the other is violent or even if
he is going to kill us, so collective identity was practical for national unity against invaders and
enemies (Abizadeh: 54). To Hobbes, men have to repress their instinct for violence towards each
other in order to be a part of a non-violent model of society (Pristed: 28). Although homogeneity is
sought to reinforce national unity, the enemy is not only outside the frontiers of the nation; the
paradox inherent in legitimate state authority will always be that the possibility of war comes as
much from outside as it does from inside the nation, thence the possibility of war is always latent
(Abizadeh: 49-53). So, to prevent individuals from collapsing the unity of the nation, numerous
devices have been designed to control the dynamics of power historically. Foucault notices that
since  the  16th century,  although the  state  prevails  as  a  social  ‘unity’,  “most  of  the  time [it]  is
envisioned as a kind of political power which ignores individuals, looking only at the interests of
the totality or, I should say, of a class or a group among the citizens” (782). Therefore, it is sensed
that  through  a  fixed  common  identity,  a  minority  in  power  can  speak  for the  citizens  as  a
homogeneity of subjects (Donald: 176).
Let us continue with Foucault's thoughts on this. In  The Subject and Power, he provides a
deep analysis of the concept of agency through history. As Marx had done before, he realizes how
power  is  exercised  through discourse,  and the  question  of  who exactly speaks  for  the  citizens
becomes a central issue from this point on in criticism. The dynamics of power have been mutating
through history but do follow a thread thanks to tradition and History. For him, “the relationship of
power can be the result of a prior or permanent consent, but it is not by nature the manifestation of a
consensus” (788). Therefore, where are the dissidents? Apart from the official revolutions that have
been recorded by their fathers or their offspring in history as key to the success of mankind and to
its progress (such as the American or the French), the voices of minorities and the powerless have
been silenced, and it is through History, as a discipline, that this sad fact has been reinforced. Under
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these  powerful  discourses,  as Foucault  unravels,  individual  identity  is  mixed  up  with  or  even
suppressed by notions of national identity and consequently also by religious identity, all of them
imposed on individuals by power centers alien to them. As we will see in chapter 2, Mumford
analyzes the historical formation of the city, and notices that its development as a power center
parallels  the  enrichment  of  religious  elites  because,  among  other  reasons,  kinship  turned  into
oligarchy naturally very early, the king sharing power and agency in exchange for support with the
members of the social and religious elites. 
This is a relationship between power and religion that persists up until today, as Auster, who
is concerned about how and by whom History is written in the Trilogy, makes visible in  City of
Glass:  when the private eye Quinn investigates Stillman Sr., he learns that among his ancestors
“there  were  several  governors  back in  the  nineteenth  century,  a  number  of  Episcopal  bishops,
ambassadors, a Harvard president. At the same time, the family made a great deal of money in
textiles,  shipping and God knows what  else”  (25),  thus  observing the  latent  blood relationship
between  political,  scientific,  commercial  (the  exchange  of  goods  and  probably  people)  and
economic elites in society, a society rooted in a religious tradition as well. Before projecting our
anxieties  for  self-definition  on  reason,  as  the  Enlightenment  or  the  Renaissance  geniuses  did,
religion had come to determine what kind of knowledge and modes of identification were possible
and available and this persists at the core of every civilization. Religion is no more than another
way of expressing our need for subjectivity and meaning: “The self, Mark Taylor tells us, is an
essentially  theological  concept;  […]  the  conceptual  figure  of  God  was  also  elaborated  in  a
relationship with one's effort to conceptualize the structure of one's own spirit” (Lingis: 529). As we
know, religious elites have acquired power throughout history partly because they stand for this
‘spiritual’ human need.
Religious consciousness is mostly ontological and that makes it vitally important for the
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formation of the subject; searching for the meaning of existence seems to be a universal need for
human beings of all  ages and eras as well.  Even when the empirical sciences turned out to be
incompatible with religious texts,  this  ontology did not disappear from the intellectual  plain of
discourse,  but  it  was  transferred to  science.  Although the  sun does  not  move around the earth
anymore and the universe seems ever bigger,  man still remains the center of ‘creation’ and that
makes it all meaningful. He has a unique spiritual relationship with the designer, now also mediated
by science, as we will see. Amis, through his narrator Samson Young, questions this shift of focus in
religious  beliefs  and  mysticism from nature  into  the  human  realm:  “Why didn't  more  people
worship the sun? The sun had so much going for it. It created life; it was profoundly mysterious; it
was so powerful that no one on earth dared to look its way. Yet humans worshipped the human. The
anthropomorphic. They worshipped promiscuously: anybody” (148). The way or the place in which
we find meaning has changed, but not the fact that we need sense and identification in order to be.
As Calinescu notices, all the current metanarratives have in common the notion of “a universal
finality”: “All the major stories of emancipation of modernity are essentially secularized variations
on the Christian paradigm” (FF: 274). Here causality is re-adapted, therefore history is bound to
push us further and further into scientific discoveries that will better explain the cosmos in non-
religious terms, reinforcing the notion that progress is always bound to go further, and so are the
human skills and the technology that will eventually help us find the ultimate answers, available for
us  but  not  yet  obtained.  In  this  light, history  is  somehow  ‘Sacred  History’ because  there  is
transcendence in this quest; and so there emerges a “new trinity,” formed by “History, Humanity
and Progress-Freedom” (Marín-Casanova, my translation: 37).
Although progress  and freedom come together  in  this  positive  sacred  interpretation,  the
negative implication is that freedom might not really be a possible part of the equation, because the
assumption of positive progress may take us to justify (and  accept) the horrible acts of mankind
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through History as inevitable, as ultimately necessary sacrifices for our improvement as a species or
a society. Stillman Sr. is a symbol of this trend; he goes as far as to invent a historical character,
Henry Dark, a previously unknown assistant to Milton. He uses this character because “I had ideas
at the time that were too dangerous and controversial. So I pretend they had come from someone
else” (79). In Stillman's pamphlet that he attributed to Dark (The New Babel, 1690), he talks about
how language is corrupted and outdated, leading to the fall of man, which justifies the experiment
that isolated his son for the first half of his life: “If the fall of man also entailed a fall of language,
was it not logical to assume that it would be possible to undo the fall, to reverse its effects by
undoing the fall of language, by striving to recreate the language that was spoken in Eden?” (47).
This point of view brings with it the concept of inevitability: if human progress is also historically
bound to involve violence, then it is a sacrifice to take on as part of our present and our future.
Inevitability in our System is something we will go into in further detail when talking about Debord
and Baudrillard towards the end of the chapter. Inevitability is a vital part of Amis's novel as well,
with a ‘Murderee’ who is known to be going to die from the very beginning, combined with the
apparent forthcoming end of the world, both because of environmental and political decay: “We
used to live and die without any sense of the planet getting older, living and dying. We used to live
outside of history” (197).  But history as a continuum must have a start  and an end, and Amis
presents to us the inevitable End of History.
History is at the very center of postmodernist critique for being a rearrangement of the past
into coherent, linear facts that tend to justify the present state of affairs, creating a sense of positive
evolution, or, as Vattimo argued in the 80's: “only if History exists can we talk about progress”
(Marín-Casanova, my translation: 43). Nowadays, Benjamin's assertion that history is a narrative
always written by the winners of any battle has become a commonplace (47). Hence, part of the
information will always be missing and primary sources are never available (Aguilar: 241), ergo
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“the past cannot be recovered; the cohesion and coherence of the culture— always an imaginary
ideal— cannot be reconstituted” (Robins: 63). By imposing a single hegemonic discourse, history
“effectively  [collapses]  all  heterogeneous  powers  into  the  same  mythic  form,  usually  that  of
‘oppression’ ” (Docherty: 73); in other words, History is seen as violent and oppressive as the state
itself, because it ultimately is its discourse of propaganda. However, before its consolidation as a
discipline comparable to science or philosophy, under the influence of the positivist mood of the
19th century, curiously enough, history belonged to the realm of literature; therefore, fictitious and
realist  elements  in  the  narrative  were  not  distinguishable  and  it  was  not  conceived  to  be
authoritative  or  realistic  in  its  beginning  with  Herodotus—  who  Auster  calls  “a  notoriously
unreliable chronicler” (NYT: 33)— and Thucydides in the west, and Sima Qian in the orient. It was
not until the positivist historians such as Leopold von Ranke and McKenzie, that historians started
to change this perspective. They wanted to make a science out of History by drastically separating
themselves  from literature  (Aguilar:  230-231).  As  a  consequence,  all  previous  historical  texts
needed to be reinterpreted and reconstructed into a continuum in search of the representation of a
coherent evolution of mankind in a kind of ‘historiographic meta-fiction’, as Linda Hutcheon calls
it (Aguilar: 255). 
Primary sources are never available; since usually historical entries are recorded from years
to centuries after the supposed events happened; even the first recordings are already reinterpreted
and  the  resulting  discourse  is  normally  manipulated  for  particular  ends.  As  Foucault  noticed,
mechanisms of incursion and excursion of information (and the subaltern) from this discourse are
practiced deliberately; he calls on his contemporaries for “a refusal of these abstractions, [...] which
ignore who we are individually, and also a refusal of a scientific or administrative inquisition which
determine who one is” (780-781). Nowadays, because of the lack of objectivity in this process of
rewriting history, critics are interested in reading history as literature again. In Haidu's words: “the
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dialogue form of ‘tradition’ is a metaphor: it is equally well narrative fiction” (674), and for Said,
the coiner of the term ‘Orientalism’, “all historical writing is writing and delivers figural language
and representational tropes, be they in codes of metonimy, metaphor, allegory, or irony”. For him,
all  these  devices  are  used  as  tools  for  promoting  cultural  hegemony (368).  Amis  introduces  a
sarcastic criticism as to how History is used deliberately to prove  any point— this quote comes
from a book about darts that Keith Talent reads; the only book he reads: “Those Pilgrim Fathers are
said to have thrown darts while sailing to America in 1620 on the so-called Mayflower. [...] King
Arthur was also said to have played some form of darts” (313). With no hesitation, the author keeps
on introducing “some form of darts” in every relevant historical period, stating even that darts must
be  related  to  the  meaning of  Stonehenge (396).  It  is  hilarious  every time  Masters  of  Darts  is
introduced in the fiction but apart from the humorous function of it, it is Amis's artifice for pointing
at the way in which  anything  can be said about historical moments because, contrary to what is
intended by historians, every description of them can be placed in the realm of fiction . Under the
postmodernist view, history is not seen any more as a reconstruction; there is nothing to reconstruct:
“it is exclusively and rigorously construction” (Oakeshott in Calinescu "Postmodernism...": 8).
Philosophers like Nietzsche, Bergson or Heidegger had anticipated this distrust of history
and had questioned humanity's attachment to time, as we have said (Stevenson: 105-109). They
started to see the strong bond between these forces and the definition of the self; they started to feel
that external reality was mediated by human reason, which catalogs and names its experiences in
the process of self-definition. They saw, and so did the historian Jacob Bruckhardt, that logic and
language were being used on the subjects as a means of control (Aguilar: 232); control over the
countries, control over the masses, control over the feelings of individuals were practiced in a subtle
way. A crucial example of the logic of discourse justifying violence on others is, for example, the
way eugenics successfully installed itself in the European public's mind, influenced by the most
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important theory of the century, Darwin's evolution. The atrocities of WWII were yet to come partly
based on these strong concerns of racial superiority in relation to the evidence that western society
had come further in evolution. Also, massive cuts in the population of the world after WWII have
not ended, but they have evolved up until the nuclear crisis and the post-crisis we now live in, as
Nicola reflects in London Fields:
Hitlerian hubris. From what she knew about events in the Middle East, from what she
gathered  from  what  remained  of  the  independent  press  (contorted  comment,
speculation),  it  seemed possible  to  argue that  Hitler  was still  running the century—
Hitler, the great bereaver. Although they were entering November now, there was still
time for him to reap exponential murder. Because what he had done you could do a
thousandfold in the space of half an afternoon. (395)
The idea of racial superiority is also present in City of Glass through the albino child who is
isolated in order to be the future of the human race and there is a persistent mentioning of the color
white “The city was entirely white now, and the snow kept falling, as though it would never end”
(130). Stillman, in Dark's disguise, interprets the Bible's migratory tendencies— “Dark stated that
this passage proved the westward movement of human life and civilization” (47)—, America being
the last step of human evolution, as well as paradise on earth, as the conquistadors found it. There
was a strong logical reason why western society should keep expanding and imposing itself over
other less advanced cultures. Homogenization is always the goal of globalization of any kind: “You
see,  the  world  is  in  fragments,  sir.  And  it's  my  job  to  put  it  back  together  again”  (75).  The
conception of America as the culmination of progress is not original in Auster or Amis,  it  is a
tradition embedded in the American discourse of self-definition from the beginning and it has been
exported to the rest of the world. This idea still  plays a very important part in American pride,
inevitable  for  Samson  Young:  “Somewhere  else  in  More  Die  of  Heartbreak Bellow says  that
America is the only place to be, because it contains the  ‘real modern action’. Everywhere else is
‘convulsed’ in some earlier stage of development. That's true. But England feels like the forefront of
something, the elegiac side of it” (101); or “Nobody in their right mind wants to come to Europe,
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not just now, not for the time being” (1). Nevertheless Young reflects: “Maybe the American dream
was a farewell to dreams. And to much else” (263), which corroborates his fears for the end of
civilization, embodied by the extremities of America: “Most places just are something, but America
had to mean something too, hence her vulnerability — to make-believe, to false memory, false
destiny. And ﬁnally it looked as though the riveting struggle with illusion was over. And America
had lost” (367). Our authors, and many other contemporary thinkers show their concern for this
idea; in Olderman's opinion, the previous distrust of the  ‘American dream’, has given way to the
“controlling  metaphor  in  the  image  of  the  waste  land”  (my emphasis).  Taking  T.S.  Eliot  as  a
referent, he argues that: “for writers born in the years of the Depression, or raised under the shadow
of World War II, the image of a promised land has lost its creative potential. We are an age weaned
on tension and silent despair” (8-9).
Although the Enlightenment spirit is inspired by the search of good and truth, as we have
seen, there are so many elements that point against good and truth as highly manipulated concepts,
if  not completely nonexistent.  Progress,  or the progress that some consider  themselves to have
achieved, usually brings dark implications with it (Said: 231);  ‘dark’ because it is the antonym of
‘light’, and the world has ultimately been reduced to the simple opposition of “the enlightened and
the benighted” peoples  (Robins:  62).  For Kant,  societies  “outside culture [are]  outside sublime
experience and cannot think the final purpose” (Mishra and Hodge: 386); or as Quinn reflects while
investigating Stillman's paper: “if you don't consider the man before you to be human, there are few
restraints of conscience on your behavior towards him” (42). In this investigation, Quinn also refers
to the Pope's bull in 1537 that declared that Indians were human beings with a soul, although they
were  always  considered  animalistic  even  after  Rousseau's  and  Locke's  ‘noble  savage’.  Even
nowadays, according to Cabezón, “nonwestern religions […] occupy for European and American
intellectuals a preeminent position in the hierarchy of otherness” (27). This observation brings us
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back to the traditional bond between cultural recognition and religion, and the intrinsic conceptual
relationship between religion, expansionism, and cultural imposition on the other. 
Along similar lines,  Modernity defines itself as being in contrast to or opposing the pre-
modern in  order to exist  beyond the realm of ideas and to consolidate the purpose of History:
positive human progress. Also,  the notion of “geographical polarization” appears:  the “dynamic
West” vs. the “immobile Orient” (Robins: 62), and it is very clear which of the two owns modernity.
It is assumed that cultures that exist and identify themselves in connection to a more natural way of
living are “backward” (Said: 367) and therefore must be civilized in order for humanity to achieve
global  progress.  This  is  another  idea  that  has  come with  civilization  since  its  dawn.  Since  its
beginning, the city as an entity (remember our novels take place in and are even about the city
sometimes), had the will of incorporating as much territory as possible, expanding its web of power
in the form of hierarchies. Expansion was both direct and indirect —spatial and cultural: on the one
hand the walls of the city tend to expand, while on the other the customs and way of life of the city,
its culture and societal constructs (its religion included) were also meant to be imposed and shared
by as many people as possible. We can agree that most of the content of history books is about wars
and that all civilizations canonically encumbered are described as successfully expansionist and in
constant search for cultural homogeneity: the Egyptians, the Greeks, and predominantly the Romans
are some representatives of the ancient attempts at globalization. They all described themselves as
more advanced than their contemporary others, therefore naturally having to fulfill the goal of a
universal  culture;  a  common “cultural  future  and even destiny”  (Robins:  62)  has  been since  a
justification for colonization, western supremacy, the extermination of every type of other and the
imposition of the language of a few and their way of life. This process appears as a cycle in the
history of humanity always in the disguise of different ideologies, for example, Romanization, the
crusades, the Spanish, British or French empires, the US quest to the west, or the spread of fascism
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and communism in Europe. Apart from the positive charge given in the interpretation by traditional
historians  of  the  advance  of  our civilization  through  these  and  others  highlighted  historical
milestones,  there  is  also  a  common collateral  effect:  the  death  of  millions  and  the  systematic
absence of the survivors' voices. This serves to remind us how political power and its discourse
have been determinant for identity and alterity as the world sees them nowadays.
We are not to talk about colonialism in depth in this paper, but although it is not central in
the novels (as all major characters, except for Nicola in London Fields, are white males around their
thirties), these characters live in a postcolonial world. In City of Glass, we have Stillman's obsession
with the installment of a modern tower of Babel; for him, a universal language must be found and
spread in order for humans to reconnect with God and with their true destiny and nature. He echoes
the  racial  purification  sought  by  intellectuals  and  state  chiefs  alike  during  the  19th  and  20th
centuries and the persistence of these old concerns in the cultural mosaic of today's cities through
‘schizophrenic’ characters  like him.  He also echoes attempts at  globalization through territorial
expansion, particularly British Imperialism. We shall not forget that English is the official language
in dozens of countries in all five continents, an overwhelming number of them in Africa, and that is
due to Britain's imperialist achievements. Let us take Keith's very first description in London Fields
to observe the kind of heritage young British men have received from this historic practice:
Keith wasn't  that bad.  He had saving graces.  He didn't  hate  people for  ready-made
reasons. He was at least  multiracial in outlook— thoughtlessly, helplessly so. Intimate
encounters with strange-hued women had sweetened him somewhat. His saving graces
all had names. What with Fetnabs and Fatimas he had known, the Knetchis and Iqbalas,
the Michikos and Boguslawas, the Ramsarwatees and Rajashwaris— Keith was, in this
sense, a man of the world. These were the chinks in his coal-black armour: God bless
them all. (4)
Keith, a barely educated drunk, has of course been a racist and will inevitably be so sometimes in
the  novel  but,  in  his  fantasy,  every  sexual  conquest  listed  appears  under  the  veil  of  historic
conquests:  he sees himself  as an armed knight,  a crusader.  But Imperialism is  closer and more
present than the Crusades in Keith's life as, we only have to take a look at the names on the list,
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these  are  all  immigrants  from  former  English  colonies,  now  residing  in  London.  That  is  a
characteristic post-colonial tendency, border-crossing (Grossberg: 99), as we will see later in the
chapter. Large sections of population from former colonies emigrate and try to integrate in the new
society, despite the cultural shock. If the way Keith treats these women in any way resembles the
way society alienates these immigrants in real life— and it does— we must say that they continue
to  clearly  be  subaltern  for  their  hosts.  In  another  instance,  Nicola  refers  to  a  former  Shah,
emphasizing how some men relate imperialism and sex in their fantasies: “The whole world was his
brothel. Now that's imperialism” (199). Nevertheless, every topic related to femininity will most of
the time be kept out of the discussion until chapter 4, thence we must go back to imperialism and
globalization and their historical development.
“Making society into a project, not the polis, or a kingdom or the state, but society— is
where Euro-Americanism began” (Strathern: 41), and this project is an ongoing one; it is not over
yet. Although colonialism per se is no longer practiced by the western superpowers, a new form of
cultural globalization arises every now and then and it is more through “hybridization, rather than
repression” that the imposition of colonial power persists (Wurgaft:  81). Critics say that although
many grand deaths have been announced, we have not yet witnessed the death of postcolonialism
(Mishra and Hodge: 375).  We still  live in a postcolonial  western world,  all  around us we find
struggles over multiculturalism and ‘political correctness’ (particularly in the States), the rise of
ethnic nationalism,  the resurgence of fundamentalism happening around the globe,  the tensions
between both consolidating and disintegrating a new European identity, and so on (Dean: 910). We
will see how deeply this impacts on the process of self-identification for people also around the
world because, minority or not, man or woman, more or less educated, for people from any cultural
background, it is growing harder to apprehend the purpose of the individual in this world, and this
affects  the Nicolas,  Keiths,  Guys,  Blues,  Blacks and Fanshaws living in  it.  This is  the broader
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context in which we see how notions of identity and otherness are also shaped and formed from
without, not only from within the individual.
Later we will continue to consider the effect of new tendencies both in globalization and
criticism against it, but we must not lose track of the individual, the subject, and its most intimate
relationship with the other(s). Derrida, Levinas and Lacan are some of the most prominent authors
interested in the way our relationship with our immediate or remote others shape our conscience of
our  own self,  as  we have  said  before.  In  psychology,  Lacan,  revisiting  Freud's  theories  in  an
unorthodox way, sees the other as a double of oneself and a means for interpretation of the subject,
so he develops the simile of the mirror as the way of watching the real, being the other (and the
memories and dreams of the others) a mere mirror of oneself9. This idea persists in Auster's trilogy,
as practically every character has an anti-self with an obscure relation to themselves. One of the
most prominent examples of this reinterpretation of lacanian motifs is the story in Ghosts, where a
man named Blue has been hired to watch a man named Black for an indefinite period of time. As all
he has to observe is this man writing through his window across the street, soon Blue turns to his
own thoughts and finds time to digress and think about how his subjectivity makes sense in the
world: “For in spying out at Black across the street, it is as though Blue were looking into a mirror,
and instead of merely watching another, he ﬁnds that he is also watching himself” (142).
Since the 1980's, Derrida and Levinas are the number one quoted and reinterpreted authors
when it comes to discourses of othering, alterity and difference10. We will be coming back to them
every once in a while, particularly in the chapter about femininity. They both state that only by
experiencing the other, the self appears as a meaningful being. However, on the other hand, they
both recognize that the other is never fully reachable and remains unknown to the subject, therefore
9 We will only refer briefly to psychology , as chapter 2 and 4, about characterization and femanle characterization
respectively, will rely more on particularly Freudian and Lacanian sources in relation to these topics than chapter 1.
10 In discourses of alterity, this term incorporates both ‘difference’ and the French term ‘différance’, which Derrida
specifically uses to refer to the relationship with the other, as we will explain it in the following paragraph.
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the  subject  remains  incomplete  too.  Similarly,  Levinas  takes  the  other  as  a  constituent  part  of
identity, at least, he recognizes the other as the only source for self-recognition: “the other seems to
be established as a complementary function of the subject, even if an overrated and idealized one”
(Gondek: 33). There are a lot of shades in the implications of his ideas. Once texts like Time and the
Other are analyzed in depth many questions arise, as we will discuss later in chapter 4. However,
generally, he has a revolutionary perspective that acknowledges that the other is more important in
self-definition than our own conception of our selves. An individual's identity will not make sense
until the self is confronted with the other; the  sight  of the other,  his gaze, give meaning to our
actions. In Ghosts, the relationship between the characters Black and Blue is utterly based on this
prerogative:  “He needs  my eyes  looking at  him.  He needs  me to  prove  he's  alive”  (178).  For
Levinas, the moment of connection happens by looking at the face of the other and we can see this
happening in London Fields: Amis, as Auster did in the previous quote, focuses on the eyes of the
other as the bridge for exploring him, a source of empathy, but even more as an ultimate mirror for
the self;  Guy Clinch, for whom Keith Talent is  a (poor) other,  manifests his empathy when he
admits “Keith always made Guy think of eyes” (217). There is a similar use of the eyes throughout
the  Trilogy, for  example,  the  moment  the  private  eye  sees  himself  in  the  eyes  of  Gold,  the
investigator that gave his life up out of his obsession for a case: “The look in his eyes is so haunted
and imploring that Blue can scarcely turn his own eyes away” (141). Derrida will develop a similar
approach to Levinas's, and he ultimately gets to identical problems: the other, although the source of
meaning  and  a  constituent  part  of  the  self,  is  definitely  unreachable,  inapprehensible.  He
emphasizes difference as the only predictable constant in the encounter with any other. In Haidu's
words:
The ‘Entirely Other’ designates a substance (in the Aristotelian sense) simultaneously
irreducible to the substance of the enunciator and unknowable precisely because of the
radical  difference  between  the  two  substances.  Hence  the  necessity  for  a  negative
theology basing itself on the inability of man to say that which he is not. [It] is not
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absent from Derrida's thought, nor that of Levinas. (683)
This is the horrifying peak of the conflict of interpretation of the other: even assuming that we need
to discover and understand the other in order to interpret ourselves there is a point at  which it
remains  impossible,  there  is  an  unbreakable  wall.  Even  Derrida  recognizes  the  impasse  this
produces in the relationship with the other, understandable only through “negotiation” of meaning
(Haidu: 683). The assumption is that “the category of the other appears derived from a notion of the
self and of identity […]. Discovery, however, does not necessarily imply an identification of the
other” (Derrida: 23). 
There  are  many philosophers,  sociologists  and  anthropologists  that  follow this  wave of
resignation to différance, and the “incommesurable translation” when facing total alterity (Povinelli:
321). They all assume there comes a stage in the search for understanding of the other, with whom
one  does  not  share  the  same  cultural  values  or  the  same  language,  in  which:  “an  undistorted
translation cannot be produced between two or more denotational texts”, or two or more readings
can be considered as equally true, therefore “two phenomena [...] cannot be compared by a third
without producing serious distortion” (Povinelli: 320). So alterity is doomed to be misunderstood
when it comes to the interpretation of the other and although no author seems to really give any
alternatives,  that does not mean there is  no opposition to this  assumption.  As it  is  common in
postmodernism,  both  partly  adjusting  these  notions  and  subverting  them,  a  lot  of  trends  have
developed against this categorical negativity applied to interpersonal or intercultural relationships.
Since  the  end  of  the  19th  century,  several  forces  have  been  in  motion  arguing  against
universalism and essentialism. As Foucault observed, his contemporaries fought in “opposition to
the power of men over women, of parents over children, of psychiatry over the mentally ill, of
medicine  over  the  population,  of  administration  over  the  ways  people  live”  (780).  For  him,
feminism and other movements are actively against the historical mechanisms of power, as we said
previously. Even so, he recognizes that only those in the subaltern's position should be enabled to
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represent their own experiences and justify them, because sometimes the subaltern is not in the
position of agency over the content of the discourse, which makes any sense of belonging rare.
Minority discourses, mostly of the ethnic and sexual kind, have flourished in every corner of the
planet, in search of visibility and eager to vocalize their own story. It is necessary to notice that,
nevertheless, “often this oppositional literature develops dominant discourses of its own” (Pristed:
36), and they can be stigmatizing and stereotyping for their ‘own people’. This may happen, for
example through essentialist and revisionist attempts that seek for the same status as History: 
The proliferation and multiplication of histories since the 1960s,  and the theoretical
reflection of their status and their relationship to mainstream history as well as to the
Enlightenment and to poststructuralist critiques on the Enlightenment since the 1980's,
has come to form part and parcel of postmodernist culture just as much as Lyotard's
analysis of the demise of grand narrative. (Heise: 17)
The subject of a grand discourse, a collective subject, is annulled by the distrust of the discourse
itself, which happened with Nazi propaganda, the Communist discourse in a more recent past and is
currently  happening  to  Western  Democracy  itself  (Marín-Casanova:  40).  Nevertheless  the
reconstruction of History yet again in the twentieth century seems not to be pushing individuals any
closer to success in their search for identity: for example Parry or O'Hanlon, already in the eighties,
criticized revisionist minority discourses for “ignoring the fragmentary and conflictual nature of
discourses” and also for fictionalizing the subaltern's position (Grossberg: 99). As Kyung-Won Lee
argues, in searching for the same status as History,  they also fail in just  the same way in their
attempt  at  representing  a  “true  past”  (109)  which  is,  as  it  has  been  argued  elsewhere,  truly
irrecoverable.
Although it is paradoxical that minority discourses may turn essentialist, it is our opinion
that there is an impending need for them as a counterpoint to traditional hegemonic ideas, and their
historically direct and indirect oppression upon individuals. As we hinted before, there are new and
different ways in which globalization has been promoted, even more than it was during colonial
times, through much more subtle practices resulting in western expansion and the imposition of
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their (our) culture. Because of this, postcolonial and feminist discourses focus often on the negative
implications of the lacanian mirror: among them are Said, Bhabha or Spivak and Kristeva, and most
of  the  post  60's  criticism  on  discourses  of  globalization  (always  increasing  and  very  much
influenced by them) (Krishnaswamy: 113). For instance, in Said, ‘Orientalism’ brings about the
process in which western individuals find a negative mirror in the ‘Other’. These authors claim the
common perspective on the formation of identity implies an ‘other’ who resembles the self and is
like a mirror in the self-reflexive conscious realm. For them, it implies a non-reflexive unconscious
‘Other’ as well, which is culturally different and consequently obscure to the self: thus, identity is
not only built of self-consciousness but also from antithesis. Therefore, as we have been arguing,
difference can be a direct and necessary part of identity and vice versa (Gingrich: 9-11). Some
authors see globalization and universalism as a good concept,  something that ideally integrates
homogeneity and heterogeneity into one; some are very influential such as Habermas or Chomsky,
who  believe  in  universality  beyond  the  different  cultures—  Said  nevertheless  questions  these
“reconstitution[s]  of  ideology”,  because  they  are  based  on  western  triumphalism,  the  orient's
backwardness and western canonical authors and ideas (367). Lyotard himself, who writes against
the grand discourses,  is  also considered universalist  by some critics.  He has  been attacked for
example by Spivak, one of the well-known known heads of feminism, for his idea of the ‘global
village’ which implies for her the “fictionalization of the world, or globalization” (Krishnaswamy:
109).
Hence, in postmodernism, the tendency is for these discourses to contradict, to overanalyze,
to simplify and, at the same time, to coexist. Derrida, Levinas or Lacan were soon criticized by
Evans-Protchard, Dumond or the above mentioned post-colonial and feminist authors for placing
the other in “a zone of  irreducible alterity” (Dean: 916), which makes it impossible to ultimately
connect with the other and even enter into a negotiation: “[any] thinker [who] takes his or her
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categories to be more stable than the imposition of temporary political tactics [is] criticized for
faulty reasoning but also for the ethical lapse of becoming complicit in the excursion of other”
(Spinosa and Dreyfus: 735). But the multiculturalist or plural-realist approaches will be criticized
too, as mentioned before, for partly denying difference as an insurmountable characteristic when it
comes to interpretation or interaction with the other's culture. It is true, as Bourdieu and again Said
have affirmed, that universally the cultural canon has been “affirmed through negation” (Docherty:
77)  of  the  subaltern's  texts  and  that  permanent  opposition  has  reinforced  the  simplistic  and
essentialist relationship between the so-called more advanced cultures and the  less civilized ones.
There are now few options left for this second set of countries, which are either violently rebelling
against  this  global  imposition  or  smoothly  giving  in,  while  aspiring  for  some  ‘progress’ and
prosperity for themselves. For them, western cultural values are no longer just an outside imposition
but  also a  goal  in  order  to  be advanced and participate  in  the global  game played by western
industry,  politics,  bureaucracy and ultimately consumerism itself  which,  to keep in  motion and
permanent expansion, is always in need of conformism and the sensation of freedom. 
The  “not-yet-modern”  cultures  have  had  the  compulsion  to  emulate  ‘modernization’,  in
search of this sensation of freedom, but this process has “resulted, not in cultural creativity and
emancipation,  but  in  conformism and dependency”  (Gondek:  62),  which  is  the  proper  soil  for
capitalism to develop and remain as the only possible option, as we will see later in this chapter. In
Donald's words: “the cost of universal citizenship is always and inevitably cultural assimilation. A
unitary state cannot tolerate alternative centres of value, legitimation and loyalty” (173). For many
anti-globalization  authors  such  as  Spivak  the  key is  that,  nowadays,  culture  and  economy are
interchangeable  and  assimilated  in  globalization  (Krishnaswamy:  115);  you  are  free  to  select
products that distinguish you from others (Debord: 11). So, in a new form of imperialism, cultural
homogenization  has  hardened  mostly  through  a  common  value:  “the  spread  of  consumerism”
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(Strathern:  622)11.  Appadurai  also  notices  electronic  media  may  also  allow  the  creation  of
transnational  identities,  because individuals  are  exposed to  many cultures in  the planet  without
physically moving, so far as to identify with values or ideas originated far from them. However, as
Grossberg argues, a process of “indigenization” or reinterpretation of the cultural customs adopted
always happens as well (Grossberg: 116); thence negotiation and difference are always on display
even in the intended global village: “our world is a world of others” (Terdiman: 7).
In order to install the idea that western culture is the most advanced culture, there is not only
the idea we have inherited from the Enlightenment that we have gotten further in evolution than the
rest, but as a collateral effect, there are also discourses of “deformation”, as Said calls them; these
have been developed about others such as ‘Islam’, ‘Communism’ or ‘Japan’, that together with the
whole idea of the ‘West’, have been very effective as “gigantic caricatural essentializations” (371).
In effect, it is implied that they successfully accomplish their purpose of creating an enemy in the
collective  mind.  These  simplified  and  utterly  negative  representations  are  disseminated  mostly
through school syllabuses and by the media, by manipulating what the masses perceive as real.
Amis, for example, is well aware of this: “The title headline varied. YANKS: &@Φ *! or RED
NYET or GRRSKI! Or, once, in unusually small type TOWELHEAD DEADLOCK” (LF: 359).
This way, western powers have carried out and justified innumerable wars and such immoral attacks
as those of Nagasaki  or  Vietnam, by forcing an invented flat  cultural  enemy into the subjects'
private and collective feelings. This also kept the flame alive during the Cold War and is still in
progress today, for instance in the vast cuts on personal freedoms undertaken by the United States
Government implementing heavy surveillance on individuals and countries alike inside and outside
its borders, in the name of anti-terrorism, since 9/11. There is a particular example in London Fields
11 For a particular case read Robins, who deeply analyzes the ‘europeization’ of Turkey during Attaturk's mandate, a
more or less successful assimilation process that certainly brought them closer to Europe but at the same time was
traumatic for the original cultural and religious diversity and the many minorities in Turkish society (for example,
the kurds, among others) and has been a source of social tumult ever since.
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of exactly this kind of racist deformations in the media that involves Japan and the lost memory of
WWII. In the passage we are going to read, not only does it become patent that the masses are
highly influenced by the media's simplification of these collective enemies, but it is stressed also
that people will accept these images without hesitation, having forgotten (also collectively) the facts
of the very near past, to replace them by empty and flat stereotypes:
‘Is he Japanese?’
‘I got respect for every man I play’
‘A very determined people’
‘Fucking loansharks’ said Keith, assaying, for once, a racial slur.
He could think of nothing worse to say about them, having, for example, barely heard of
World  War  II.  Keith's  father,  who  had  certainly  heard  of  World  War  II,  and  had
successfully deserted from it, might have asked if everyone knew the terrible things they
did to some of our boys back then; But Keith was reduced to a few half-remembered
grumbles from the fillers in his tabloid. (378)
No doubt nationalism itself, also called patriotism, participates in these deformations in order to
strengthen  our identity vs.  their alterity.  As Crews notices in  his  article  "Martin  Amis  and the
Postmodern Grotesque", Amis attacks the discourses of TV and tabloids in other works, such as
Yellow Dog: “The way it works is that there is a positive presentation of ‘one of us’ combined with a
negative presentation of the other[...].  The tabloids,  then,  present a world divided into ‘us’ and
‘them’ ” (654).  This  idea  takes  us  to  the  other  major  consequence  of  globalization  nowadays
because, although the nation had never been a homogeneous place in time and space, its cultural
borders are becoming more and more difficult to delimit already in the second half of the 20th
century; cross-cultural migration is a widespread practice, as we have previously noted, and now
national identity is a compound of not one but several very different cultural identities coexisting in
the same space.
Anthropologists  such as  James Clifford or  Smadar  Lavie and critics  like Paul  Giroy or
Appadurai are using the term ‘diaspora’ to refer to those communities that originate inside very
different and definitely bigger communities because, either as a result of special treaties with former
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imperialist countries or simply of wanting to follow the first-world capitalist dream of a better life,
and lately because of  greater  issues;  whole segments  of  non-western communities  are  crossing
borders. These groups normally live, develop and identify within the tensions originated between
their  original  culture  and  their  hosting  one;  their  identity  forms  around  the  whole  idea  of
displacement. The presence of this other is not always welcome in the nation, as we all know. If
minorities are characterized by perceiving the other as the one who took what was theirs (Dean:
917), much more for the indigenous population, the presence of the other is a constant danger for
the destabilization  of  homogeneity  in  the  ideal  nation.  We have  very  recent  and  controversial
examples of events in politics that reflect these increasing fears today, such as the policies (and
democratic election!) of President Donald Trump or the overwhelming triumph of Brexit in the UK,
not to mention the rejection of thousands of refugees standing on the border of our Union. Political
and economic classes, mainly through the media, are known to trigger mechanisms of othering in
order to reinforce the general public's ideas about immigrants, as Puškin or Starc  denounce12. As
there is to the day no scientific proof of white racial superiority, and also because of the tensions
with ethnic minorities it would detonate, racism is not to be displayed openly in the media, as it is
considered  politically  incorrect;  hence  it  evolves:  “modern  racism  is  not  primarily  racial,  but
cultural” (Starc: 149), and it is disguised as national identity. The consequences of this narrow-
minded  reduction  of  the  others  to  minority  groups (be  they  women,  ethnic  groups,  religious
communities,  and  other  collectives)  are  normally  riots  and  violence  against  plain  and  bald
inequality.
“Xenophobia and racism, ethnic wars, prejudice and stigmas, segregation and discrimination
based on race, ethnicity, gender, age and social class are widespread phenomena involving high
levels of violence” (Jelin: 101). This is a fact at a planetary level, and it is more shocking that all
12 In their essays included in Multicultural Dilemmas: Identity, Difference, Otherness (see bibliography) both Maruša
Puškin and Gregor Starc condemn the treatment that immigrants receive in the media in easrtern Europe.
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this  violence  coexists  with  the  officially  accepted  moral  discourse  of  the  UN's  Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, issued in 1948. The problem again is cultural relativism because, as
Jelin notices, in many cases the right of a people to live in its own way can mean cruelty and the
denial of basic human rights to certain social categories within that same culture. So, either Human
Rights  can  be  considered  ethnocentric  or  some  (defining)  aspects  of  other  cultures  should  be
prosecuted; actually some are, such as fundamentalism and tyranny in several so-called Third World
countries. This way military powerful countries such as the US and its allies use cultural markers to
justify wars for democracy that certainly go far beyond the aim of achieving global peace by means
of war, a terrible paradox of logical discourse; in every case, the importance of economic expansion
is implied:  a point  of no reconciliation is  found— yet  again— between cultural  relativism and
Universal Human Rights (Jelin: 109-112). From all this, it becomes clear that cultural tensions are
the building blocks  of the current  political  global  situation.  These underlying tensions between
cultures that we have been describing are not only latent but evident, and any attempt to predict the
future implications of them can bring to some authors' minds only images of an apocalyptic future.
For Amis the path is set down for nuclear destruction: the technology is widely and globally spread
and  the  tensions  are  permanently  increasing.  In  this  light,  consider  that  London  Fields  was
published in 1989 and portrays the city of London, and the world's situation about ten years later. As
an apocalyptic author, Amis is particularly worried in this novel about nuclear warfare and biblical
weather: “Of course, in these days of gigawatt thunderstorms, multimegaton hurricanes and billion-
acre bush fires, it was easy to forget that there were man-made devices— pushbutton, fingertip—
which would cause equivalent havoc” (276). The political situation he portrays is one of intense
heat, like the weather; the sun, which in the novel is lower than it should be, is literally burning life
on earth: “the sun was right there at the end of the street like a nuclear detonation. [...] The sun
shouldn't be coming in low at us like this” (365). That the end is coming for political and natural
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reasons is a constant in Amis's fiction, it is not  accidental that in the short story “Bujak and the
Strong Force”, included in God’s Dice (1987), the main character is described as follows:
Einsteinian to the end, Bujak was an Oscillationist,  claiming that the Big Bang will
forever  alternate  with  the  Big  Crunch,  that  the  universe  would  expand  only  until
unanimous gravity called it back to start again. At that moment, with the cosmos on its
hinges, light would begin to travel backward, received by the stars and pouring from
human eyes. If, and I can’t believe it, time would also be reversed, as Bujak maintained;
will we move backward too? Will we have any say in things? (God’s Dice: 23)
Bujak describes his belief that the end of the world will come at a point in time where time itself,
and light as an observable traveller, will need to start running backwards; therefore Amis finds that
the  situation  in  London  Fields  is  irreversible  as,  even  if  we  survive  our  own  crimes  to  the
environment, universal expansion will be contraction at a point in time, which symbolizes the end
of logical experience for human beings, and we will succumb to entropy. This post-experience of
the world backwards will be magically explored in his following novel Times Arrow (1991).
Given all the circumstances we have  described, it is hard for the characters to access the
information about the world, partly because of the deliberate exclusion in the media, partly because
of their lack of interest—“The sky pulsed blue, blue, blue. Whereas the cyclones and ball lightning
in Yugoslavia and Northern Italy had even made it on to the pages of Keith's tabloid” (103), and we
know this is the only source of information that Keith does pay attention willingly. Our characters
would rather deny or ignore “the fact that on account of the political situation they and their loved
ones might all disappear at any moment” (238). As readers, we get to know that there is a so-called
proxy war involving Japan and Germany “(and China?)” (142), that the main focuses of tension are
The Gulf,  “Israel  of  course,  Germany of  course”  (115),  Hungary,  and many others,  especially
Cambodia, which appears as a recurrent topic because of the magnitude of the destruction. There
are even  dead-lines for the release of nuclear weapons already,  and so the end of the world is
imminent: 
That at the moment of full eclipse on November 5, as the Chancellor made his speech in
Bonn, two very big and very dirty nuclear weapons would be detonated, one over the
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Palace of Culture in Warsaw, one over Marble Arch. That until the cease of the ﬂow of
fissionable materials from Baghdad, the Israelis would be targeting Kiev. (394)
Here, Amis presents an imagined future end of the millennium (the end of the past millennium, for
we have long passed 1999),  but  it  is  certainly based on the real  world; in fact,  it  could easily
correspond to a possible outcome if one considers the geopolitical situation in the eighties, still red-
hot in the present. As Mumford argues, it is a fact that national security or survival in times of
nuclear threat, imply that leaders are aware that fifty to seventy-five millions would die the first day
of a nuclear war (556) and yet, many countries in the world are equipped with innumerable nuclear
heads (innumerable because official reports are known to obscure the truth about exactly how many
there are). Observing the tendencies followed in the last century, or millennium, all odds point to an
end. So certainly not then, and not even now do we have any plan B for humanity, for the world, for
the System. The world in Amis's novel is at the edge of destruction because of political, cultural and
moral decay, and also because of the intrusion of humans in nature and the extreme manipulation of
the mechanics of nature that we have undertaken as a species. So is ours.
This is the main problem the reader will find when confronting postmodern theory and art in
general: the alarm is always on, and it is relatively easy to identify the problems of our civilization,
describe and analyze them; we have denounced in many ways the inequalities of our System and
made them visible, but the solutions are delayed, both theoretically and literally; they are yet to
come if they are to come at all. After all, nearly nothing has changed: after more than a century of
‘petit histoires’, capitalist production still intervenes in the natural processes, altering and worsening
climatic issues, while the ones in control of the capital are still the same people as they used to be:
“After a thousand years of war and revolution, of thought and effort, and history, and the permanent
millennium, and the promised end of mine and thine,  Guy still  had all  the money,  and all  the
strength” (LF: 464). Guy, as we commented before about Stillman, was born in a traditionally high-
class white British family, with money and possessions; he is a stock trader and he even has an
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aristocratic title. Guy is historically powerful and rich. All kinds of specialists have definitely made
the threads of the puppets more visible and yet, there are no clear alternatives for the System. As a
consequence, the subject in our novels foresees an extreme end, death, isolation, or dissolution, for
the individual and the planet. 
Given this outlook, authors like Auster and Amis are interested in the extreme moves that
characters can make in such a world. They see that, individually, people are part of the societal big
picture and that, although technologically we have advanced faster than the speed of love13, our
humanity has  remained the same;  we have not  changed  physiologically,  nor  in  our  most  basic
emotional needs, therefore the subject still needs a sense of identity in order to  exist.  As Wurgaft
notices “identity appears as impossible to justify conceptually or experimentally” while at the same
time “it also seems indispensable as a measure of agency or internal cohesion” (82). As we have
been arguing, the subject will always find alterity where there were once possibilities for selfhood
and collective recognition, which are now exhausted. It is his or her due to find new strategies to be
in the world or else surrender to the impossibility of overcoming alterity, which would deeply affect
the  subject's  agency and  internal  cohesion,  as  Wurgaft  suggests.  Povinelli  poses  the  following
question: is it possible to infer anything in such alterity (321)? There is not a unique answer to the
questions of postmodernism, but for some authors like Auster and Amis the answer to this one is
negative. No truth can be inferred in such alterity.
Theories of identification, alterity and othering, as we have seen up until now, leave us with
more problems than solutions, and certainly more questions than answers. But there are descriptive
philosophical theories that try to explain how this inevitability makes itself apparent in the System
and the mechanisms that the System has in motion in order to not only introduce a global economic
system of oppression but also to redefine the notion of what ‘reality’ is. Among the critics that have
denounced that the System is completely alien to the subject of experience, two authors stand out in
13 "At the Speed of Love" is the title of Chapter 21 in London Fields (413).
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the  defense  of  an  extreme conception:  we  are  so  detached  from the  experience  that  we  were
supposed to naturally have of the world,  that we cannot perceive the ‘real’ anymore or we are
simply unable to differentiate what is real from what is not. The authors in question are Guy Debord
and Jean Baudrillard, who refer to a society made up of ‘spectacles’ and ‘simulacra’, respectively.
In  The Society of the Spectacle  (published in 1967) Debord attacks capitalism as a value system
with a clearly marxist tone. For him “the entire life of those societies in which modern production
conditions  prevail  manifests  itself  as  a  collection  of  spectacles.  Everything  that  is  directly
experienced has been turned into a representation” (my translation: 37). Images and objects have
not only taken nature's place, but they also condition the attitude that human beings have toward
nature  and  among  themselves.  This  system  of  images,  of  forgeries,  of  illusions,  needs  to  be
maintained in order to also maintain consumerism at a global level. Reality then only arises from a
spectacle and, as a consequence, only the spectacle is real because it is the only experience we are
able to grasp, the only experience available to our senses. The spectacle leads subjects to nowhere
but itself, and also in every case justifies itself (39-42) and Debord insists that there is no way out,
mostly because we cannot distinguish true from false anymore.  He argues that there is nothing
beyond the spectacle,  except  for one thing:  if  critique upon the System may exist,  it  is  placed
outside the spectacle, therefore it is invisible (175).
Debord, by means of what he denominates spectacles, is describing our society today in
postmodernist terms; true experience has become inaccessible, and although his position seems too
extreme, it has been considered clairvoyant by the many authors he has influenced. For example,
the power of spectacles fascinates Baudrillard, who describes the System as a hyperreality whose
fabric  is  made  up  of  ‘simulacra’ or  simulations:  “Simulation  is  no  longer  that  of  territory,  a
referential being or a substance. It is generated by models of a real without origin or reality:  a
hyperreal” ("Simulacra...": 166). Therefore, Baudrillard makes clear that a simulation is not even a
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symbol of the real; it is generated within the System and it is the System. To clarify this, he uses a
beautiful simile: “The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the
map that precedes the territory” (166). The simulation displays itself and substitutes reality through
what he calls ‘seduction’, which turns the forgery into “trompe-l'oeil or the enchanted simulation”
("On Seduction":154).  The  simulation's  only  limitation  is  that  it  is  unable  to  be  equivalent  to
anything in itself (C: 78). Its images and objects (its products) are a trap for subjects, who inevitably
give in and start identifying with these products; therefore objects must proliferate indefinitely so
that the System can be regenerated forever (25). These notions are reflected in our novels, where
some  characters  become aware  that  the  experience  of  reality  itself  seems  to  be  deceiving;  its
inevitability is called ‘fate’ by Blue (183) and Quinn (108). These characters even call it a ‘spell’
respectively on pages  143 and 91,  which reminds us  of  Debord's  words  “Identity is  not  in  an
offensive relationship with itself, but it is an enchantment to itself” (my translation: 55). The ghost
of identity is obsessively referred to in The Trilogy; it goes in circles around the same perception
that Blue has in Ghosts: “We are not where we are, he finds, but in a false position” (165). In this
second part of the Trilogy, Auster specifically reflects upon the representation of one's as well as the
other's  identity,  which  postmodernist  critics  also  relate  to  phantoms,  for  example  in  Terdiman:
“revealed as fantasmatic,  [it]  tantalizingly recedes as we get  closer to  it.  Sometimes we fail  to
represent it at all” (6); or Hall,  who thinks belongingness of any kind is “partly constructed on
fantasy, or at least within a fantasmatic field” ("Who needs...?": 4). Auster will let us see in how
many ways characters' identities evade them, as we will discuss in chapters 2 and 3.
Another  invaluable  characteristic  of  the  simulation  is  that  it  is,  as  Debord  previously
underlined,  capable  of  absorbing  everything  in  reality;  there  is  nothing  on  the  margins  of  the
simulation: “there is no such thing as ‘margin’ ” (Baudrillard C, my translation: 68). Moreover, in
the society of spectacle that Debord depicts, money is the greatest of all simulations and the most
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self-justifying element within the System. Notice that money cannot be turned into any mercantile
value, but “it has to be put into play within the same game” (my translation: 25). It is not surprising
then that money appears in the Trilogy as something the main characters are starting to disconnect
from, as apparently these characters have been granted the gift of detaching themselves from the
System — “Quinn never stopped giving thanks for his luck” (113)— and, as we will see in chapters
3 and 5, that implies abandoning money and other commodities in the city that come with it. On the
other hand, the characters in  London Fields are part of the System right to the end; they  are the
System, and Amis is interested, throughout the novel, in denouncing money as an actual weapon:
“Was there any clean money on earth? Had there ever been any? No. Categorically. Even the money
paid to the most passionate nurses, the dreamiest artists, freshly printed, very dry, and shallowly
embossed to the fingertips, had its origin in some bastardy on the sweatshop floor” (255). For him,
and we will see more examples towards the end of this paper, money will always represent the evil
acts undertaken for money, a symbol of Imperialism and oppression: “Pecunia non olet was deadly
wrong. Pecunia olet” (251).
For Baudrillard, humans have an immemorial feeling of being in debt with God, but ‘capital’
has  taken  God's  place  and we are  always  in  debt  to  capital  now (C:  78).  As  for  the  political
situation, he observes that it is also deeply mediated by capital: “Anatomy is not destiny, nor is
politics: seduction is destiny” (Baudrillard "On Seduction": 164). Capital no longer corresponds to
the order of political economy; it uses political economy as a simulation model ("Symbolic...": 121)
until  “only the  fiction of  a  political  universe is  saved” ("Simulacra..."181);  power then  can be
considered as a commodity, because people need the illusion of political power. As a corollary of
these views, London Fields refers to the consequences of the lack of real politics in the international
realm; as we have seen before, the political tensions are about to culminate with military nuclear
attacks that could destroy the world. Nevertheless, the media omit this information on purpose and
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the characters could not access the real state of affairs even if  they wanted to:  “‘They've been
cheating,’ said Kath. ‘Both sides. They've been cheating for fifteen years.’ ‘Who says?’said Keith.
There was nothing about it in Keith's tabloid. ‘TV?’ ” (105). Instead, internationally, the media are
overwhelmingly filled with ‘stories of human interest’ and everyday reports of the state of Faith's
health. Faith is the US President's wife. The media talks about her incessantly “as if the First Lady
was the only lady. Or the Last Lady” (207). The strategy is for people to utterly focus their attention
and empathy on that— “It's serious. But we feel we're in good hands. Much depends on Faith's
health” (207)— and avoid any worries about the real political situation, which may result in riots
against the Government. Nevertheless, as the only reliable source of information, there is Guy's
boss in stock marketing (and his brother) Richard, who tells Guy “the President's wife [is] already
dead” (394). Now that is simulation.
For  Baudrillard,  in  order  to  maintain  the  illusion,  the  simulation  “demands  unqualified
people more than the French Revolution demanded qualified men” (C, my translation: 116); and the
mass  media  have  helped  create  the  illusion  of  information  while  actually  educating  people  in
shallowness, being a source of untruthful ‘seduction’. In this regard, for Amis, TV is a direct target:
“The expansion of  mind,  the communications revolution:  well,  there had been a contraction,  a
counter-revolution.  And nobody wanted  to  know...”  (LF:  141).  He recognizes  that  even in  the
‘information era’,  although we have experienced an expansion of communications,  “[t]he mind
doesn't expand. It stays the same. Other things fill it” (368); and these other things are simulations,
in Baudrillard's terms. While Auster's characters will be practically cut off from the information
media, Amis's are swimming in them, particularly Keith, for whom reality is TV and tabloid shaped:
He watched a very great deal of TV, always had done, years and years of it, aeons of TV.
Boy, did Keith burn that tube. And that tube burnt him, nuked him, its cathodes crackling
like cancer. ‘TV’ he thought, or ‘Modern Reality’ or ‘The World’. It was the world of TV
that told him what the world was. [...] TV came at Keith like it came at everybody else;
and he had nothing whatever to keep it out. He couldn't grade or filter it. So he thought
TV was real…. (55)
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Keith, like the majority of people (because it is a  mass medium), believes TV is real; he cannot
apply any filter to it. He cannot identify what is unreal because, as Baudrillard believes, “it is not
possible to apprehend the real and its sign: we will never be able to dominate both things at the
same time” (C, my translation: 81). Hence, as he is only exposed to the portrait that the media show
of the ‘real’, this directly affects also the way in which Keith sees reality outside of the screen:
“When Keith goes to a football match, that misery of stringer's clichés  is what he actually sees”
(98); it is not him imposing the discourse on what he sees but the other way round. 
In a world where experience is monopolized by simulations, alterity is not an option. For
Baudrillard, it is “the perfect crime against alterity and the other. It is the kingdom of the identical”
(C, my translation: 68). Nevertheless, alterity is impossible to eliminate conceptually, as we have
seen previously in this  chapter,  but it  has certainly been eliminated from the official  discourse,
which grows more and more marked by high levels of ‘political correctness’. We must remember
that everything that is invisible is out of the simulation, therefore outside the System. Derrida and
Levinas  already  talked  about  the  broken  bridge  between  the  self  and  the  other  but  they  also
acknowledged that without this other, self-definition was impossible. Auster and Amis do agree
with them in these novels, but they also incorporate the notions that Debord and Baudrillard brought
up: these characters have absolutely nothing to hold on to as real any more, neither themselves, nor
the other (who they desperately struggle to understand and connect with), nor the world around
them:
We all want to be told stories, and we listen to them in the same way we did when we
were young. We imagine the real story inside the words, and to do this we substitute
ourselves for the person in the story, pretending that we can understand him because we
understand ourselves. This is a deception. We exist for ourselves, perhaps, and at times
we even have a glimmer of who we are, but in the end we can never be sure, and as our
lives go on, we become more and more opaque to ourselves, more and more aware of
our own incoherence.  No one can cross the boundary into another— for the simple
reason that no one can gain access to himself. (NYT: 243)
For Amis, all we can aspire to get in life is “always the simulacrum, never the real thing” (LF: 131),
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while  for  Auster's  characters,  life  is  a  pilgrimage  that  leads  them  nowhere,  as  if  they  were
“somehow living a posthumous life” (5). These authors are trying to represent the unavoidable
problems that human beings who have to endure life conditions in the present face by means of
these characters. 
To  bring  this  section  to  a  close  let  us  consider  the  following:  for  Sven  Birkets,  three
historical conditions have been influential for subjectivity in the twentieth century: the existence of
the actual and psychological fact of the nuclear age and the possibility of human annihilation that
has dominated power relations and political agendas since WWII; the cumulative effects of the
western world's shift from industrial mechanization to information processing; and the saturation
of western societies by electronic media,  particularly television (Diedrick: 18), and they have all
been analyzed in this first chapter. In their search for their identity and their mission in life, our
characters will be tempted with the possibility of escaping the System, but that will only turn out to
be part of the ‘seduction', a ‘simulation’ of freedom with fatal consequences, as we will see. As the
narrator of The Locked Room, whose name we never know, concludes in the quote above, identity
is alterity and we “can never be sure” (243); or as Samson Young, the narrator of London Fields
states:  “Nothing  divides  us—  just  a  screen  of  rain”;  an  obscure,  insurmountable  screen  of
radioactive rain that stands between us and the other. The world, the other and the self are alterity
in Auster and Amis: “we hug ourselves to hold what warmth remains and because no one we love
will” (LF: 368). 
Throughout this chapter we have been talking about identity and alterity, and next we will
see  the  different  obstacles  our  characters  encounter  as  they  embark  on  their  quests  for  self-
definition, for a true self and how they will deal with the resulting contact with alterity. We have
talked  about  an  increasing  distrust  in  the  great  discourses  such  as  history,  science,  religion,
discourses about nation, culture or race that impress identity upon subjects. Even language as a
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medium has  been proved deceitful.  We have commented  on the  dangers  of  simplification  and
deformation in the media, and of logical discourses that imply violence on others; on the dangers of
money, as well. We have depicted a life that does not resemble reality, but has substituted reality for
our characters; that is, the project of a unified, heterogeneous global city. Because the world is
fragmented, their (our) experience of it is fragmented. Auster and Amis will use the postmodern
conception of identity as fragmentation and total alterity as a starting point for characterization in
the Trilogy and London Fields and also the relationship of mankind with nature and the city, as we
will see in the subsequent chapters. These authors will explore inexhaustible possibilities of literary
doublings, pseudonyms and absences; their characters will play different roles but also become
different people, therefore highlighting the discontinuity of identity as alterity through these literary
devices in characterization. In the following chapters we will see how the authors also play with
agency and with the ultimate identity of the writer himself, so that the literary game of simulation is
taken to its extreme, a common tendency in postmodernist literature. We will comment as well on
the literary referents the authors themselves make evident in these texts and their predisposition to
complex  intertextuality,  later  focusing  on  the  reinterpretation  of  motifs  from  Walden and  El
Quixote. Moreover, we will end our discussion referring to the situation of the category of gender
in these novels, as part of the study on the representation of identity as alterity.
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2. Postmodernist tendencies: Auster and Amis
There is certainly nothing new under the sun, nothing original, but there does seem to be a
different perspective of the real itself taking shape, as we have discussed in chapter one. From the
19th century onward, the very notion of what is ‘real’ is at stake and “the liability and the fugacity of
the referent [becomes] a commonplace” (Terdiman: 5). This culminates in the twentieth century's
progressively growing distrust of any traditional concept that had been formerly connected with the
process of self-identification (and difference), such as, as we have seen, all essence attributed to
race,  gender,  culture,  nationality  or  religion,  together  with  the  discourses  of  science,  history,
psychology and other  disciplines.  According  to  Sarup,  the  twentieth  century brought  with  it  a
“tendency to  reduce  all  truth-claims  to  the  level  of  rhetorics”  (150).  Furthermore,  the  present
consumerist  process  of  globalization  is  also  criticized  for  not  taking  into  consideration  the
differences  among  the  subjects  and  the  cultures  in  its  attempt  to  eliminate  otherness  by
homogenization (Debord: 68). As a consequence of all this, as Derrida, Levinas or Lacan explain,
the self as such will never be fully present or understood, because true connection with the other is
necessary for the process of identification but it has proven to be impossible to apprehend; alterity
prevails in every attempt. Moreover, the experience of this consumerist society's reality is mediated
by total alterity as well; as Debord and Baudrillard posit, the System is no longer connected in any
way to the real; on the contrary, as we will show at the end of this chapter, it has substituted it
leaving no trace of natural life behind, or beyond: “The cohesiveness of reality, which has been the
goal of writers for centuries has not materialized – or rather, has evaporated under the heat and
pressure of a world dominated by science and technology” (Wood: 151). For Auster and Amis, this
is the intellectual scenario for their fiction, and the novels we are discussing are clearly the product
of experimenting with new ways of representing this incohesive reality of ours: “ ‘Where to?What
for?’/‘See some life’/‘Oh. Life! Oh I get it. Life’ ” (LF: 86).
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So, how are writers supposed to cope with the unreality of reality? Baudrillard considers that
“no consistent or cohesive life strategy emerges from the experience which can be gathered in such
a world” ("The System...": 25); therefore consistency is not to be found in postmodernist literature
because such a fragmented reality cannot be represented: “  ‘You tell me. What's it all about, eh?
Because  I  don't  fucking  get  it.’/‘Come  on  in,  look  at  us.’/‘Because  I  don't  fucking  get
it’/‘What?’/‘Life’ ” (LF: 270). This is, no doubt, a deeply uncomfortable state for a rational mind
(Baudrillard, C: 44) and it is a manifest conflict particularly for writers because language, the very
medium of literature, is at the top of the most distrusted entities from the postmodernist point of
view, as it has historically been used to  ‘fooling’ the subject and shaping his or her perception of
reality  and/or  reality  itself.  Words  as  a  medium constitute  one  of  the  greatest  oxymorons
postmodernist authors cannot solve: “By congealing the fluid processes of thought, [words] express
something that is different and must be untrue, no matter how acceptable conventionally they may
be to others. And yet paradoxically little can have meaning for us except to the degree that we can
find words to express it” (Mendilow: 147). Already for modernist authors, the gap between the
conventions of fictitious mimesis for the representation of what is real and reality was a problem,
because of the certainty that the facts of reality had outgrown imagination (Stevenson: 96). In a few
words, reality has gone beyond fiction, and nowadays there is no discrimination between realism
and surrealism:
The facts in contemporary experience are constantly beyond belief; calling those facts
absurd does  not  seem to  subdue  them.  The  unbelievability  of  events  is  no  longer
reserved for large world affairs. We have moved beyond the enormities of Buchenwald
and Auschwitz and Hiroshima to the experience of the fantastic within what should be
the firm shape of everyday life. The growth of mass society, the increased discoveries
about the world of the unconscious, and the supremacy of scientific relativism make us
no  longer  sure  that  our  own  idea  of  reality  will  be  recognizable  to  anyone  else.
(Olderman: 1-2)
After all, writers will have to write, even if meaning has departed from an insane planet, “leaving
but a feeling of dereliction and absurdity” (Bernard: 131). They have to find an escape from this
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absurd, and the novel as a form is bound to evolve, as well as its content, in order to represent this
vision of a hopeless world that had gone beyond belief already by the second half of the twentieth
century14.  Authors must cope with the empty core of identity and reality in their  novels, which
Auster and Amis will always take into account.
To illustrate this, we will start with Paul Auster, who often writes about  nothing, as Little
convincingly explains in his essay "Nothing to go on...". But nothingness turns out to be something,
its own entity, as we will continue to point out. As Lavender argues,  City of Glass, or the whole
Trilogy in  fact,  is  against  the  romance,  realism and autobiography.  As  we will  say elsewhere,
nothing happens most of the time and there is no story: “The illusion, then,  is one of infinity”
(Lavender: 223); that is, by not presenting to us a story with a resolution but instead a series of
reflections or illusions from his (dysfunctional)  characters,  we certainly get a picture of human
nature on a larger scale, as we will see. Auster is said to be philosophical in the way of Samuel
Beckett's Watt15 and to explore self-reflexivity as in Barth's Lost in the Funhouse16 (Lavender: 220),
although we will later drain the authors' literary influences from the texts themselves given that, in
their metaliterary style, both Amis and Auster quote and refer to other authors and texts almost
incessantly. At the same time, “Thematically Auster's trilogy is a meditation on the problematic of
self-identity, in which a ‘textual’ sense of the self undermines our commonsense, essentialist notions
of selfhood” (Alford: 615), and the impossibility of connecting with their self at all, as we have
argued, ultimately lures characters towards total alterity. It is important to pay attention also to the
lacanian/derridian/levinasian problem regarding true connection with the other as a means to reach
14 As Olderman hightlights, the facts of WWII deeply influence the post-war authors' belief that our society is actually
a post-apocalyptic society already (8-9). According to Calinescu: “World War II with its unprecedented savageness
and destruction, with its revelation of the brutality of the core of high technological civilization, could appear as the
culmination of a demonic modernity, a modernity that had finally been overcome” (FF: 267).
15 In Watt, the main character satisfies the extravagant wishes of an unseen master named Watt, which connects with
every story in the Trilogy, as there is one or more actors in each who are unseen or have dissapeared: Stillman Jr.
and Sr., Black, Fanshawe, etc. and unseen employers too (Virginia, White).
16 A collection of  short  stories  intricately related displaying metalepsis,  multiple layers  and frames in  a  way that
influences Auster and others such as Beckett himself.
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the  self,  which  is  latent  in  both  novels,  and  the  extreme  turn  towards  isolation  that  Auster's
characters  take  in  their  being  unable  to  reach  this  connection.  To  quote  Auster  himself  in  an
interview: “You don't begin to understand your connection to the other until you are alone. And the
more intensely you are alone, the more deeply you plunge into a state of solitude, the more deeply
you feel that connection”. On the other hand, though, he considers it impossible to totally isolate
oneself as well, because “you are inhabited by others” (Auster in Peacock: 6); therefore the other is
both unreachable but ghostly present “[t]o the degree that Fanshawe became inevitable, that was the
degree to which he was no longer there” (295), an utterly lacanian image that finds itself truncated
when an understanding of Fanshawe escapes the narrator at all times, he is an invisible reflection
(although the narrator cannot escape or forget about Fanshawe, or the other, as an inevitable key
element for self-definition).
From his first autobiographical work, The Invention of Solitude, the topics of mortality, the
difficulty of knowing another person, the importance of the father, and father and son relationships
are a constant in Auster's work (Peacock: 1-2); of course, the “missing person” (42) is also a very
important motif for him, which is why he transgresses the genre of detective novels in the Trilogy.
Brooks  considers  the  Trilogy  anti-detective  because  it  does  not  satisfy  in  any  way  the  key
characteristic  of  detective  novels to  resolve  the  mystery,  as  we  will  see  in  the  next  chapter.
However, he also clarifies that there is  a critical trend that identifies in detective novels a special
relationship between plot and story that surely has been of interest to Auster. Todorov, “for example,
posits the crime and the work of its detection as the fabula and syuzhet, thus making the detective
novel an allegory for narratives in general17” (25). For Brooks, the detective's unraveling of the
crime is analogous to the reader's deciphering of the plot, which must happen regardless the genre.
Plot, then, in contemporary critical theory, tends to be seen as an enigma to be resolved, as much as
17 This is sometimes referred to as langue and parole: the fabula is the underlying or deep structure, the narrative
material, and the syuzhet is the specific plot organization in a particular work
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the aristotelian “sequence of actions” (Brooks: 24-25). But Auster makes it clear in the first page
that,  in  this  story,  there is  no causality:  “In the  beginning,  there  was simply the  event  and its
consequences. Whether it might have turned out different or whether it was all predetermined with
the first word that came from the stranger's mouth, is not the question” (1).
Auster is in fact very repetitive in his work, and he generally does not give preeminence to
plot in his novels. We will see the same situation over and over if we open ourselves to Auster's
universe outside of the Trilogy as well. In some later novels, for example  The Book of Illusions
(2002), a man who has lost his wife and children in a plane crash (like Quinn) obsesses over the lost
silent film actor Hector Mann. In this novel Auster once again brings a character to paper who
becomes lost during a consuming search that nobody else cares about; the following is a passage
from it that could easily apply to the main characters in all the stories in the Trilogy:
I had no telephone, no TV, no social life of any kind. Once in April and once again in
August I traveled by subway to Manhattan to consult some books at the public library,
but other than that I didn't budge from Brooklyn. But I wasn't really in Brooklyn either. I
was in the book, and the book was in my head. And as long as I stayed inside my head, I
could go on writing the book (47).
Most of his characters are writers or eventually become writers “by changing their attitude to the
language” (Peacock: 6).  As we will  soon see with Amis,  these authors pay special  attention to
language; they display a difficult,  intricate and defamiliarizing kind of language,  in the case of
Auster “to the extent that an unattentive reader might forget which character is actually speaking”
(Peacock: 11). As an illustration, we will take the beginning of Ghosts, where Auster uses colors as
names as a successful device to shock the reader and to make more difficult their understanding of a
“simple enough” introduction:
First of all there is Blue. Later there is White, and then there is Black, and before the
beginning there is Brown. Brown broke him in, Brown taught him the ropes, and when
Brown grew old, Blue took over .[...] The case seems simple enough. White wants Blue
to follow a man named Black and to keep an eye on him for as long as necessary. While
working for Brown, Blue did many tail jobs, and this one seems no different, perhaps
even easier than most. (133)
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The use of colors, while clearly distinguishable for most of us, actually makes the identification of
these characters more problematic. As they are all reduced to a color (other characters like Gold,
Green, Gray or Red are to come up later) a sort of generic specification is being used, one that
could have us confusing the identity of one with another, or labeling the character erroneously right
from the beginning, a deliberate ploy that highlights once again the elusive,  unstable nature of
identity.
In this  regard,  Martin  Amis  is  known to be very interested in  defamiliarizing language;
Tredell says his fiction “flamboyantly parades its own artificiality” (112). In relation to this, he is
considered by some critics to be deeply influenced by the so-called “Martian School” that Craig
Raine and Christopher Reid started in the late 70's (Tredell: 135). The most representative poem of
this tendency is the very well-known “A Martian Sends a Postcard Home” where Raine describes
everyday  objects  and  interactions  in  utterly  defamiliarizing  ways:  “Rain  is  when  the  earth  is
television /It has the property of making colours darker” (1); here is a description comparable to this
one in London Fields: “It was raining all over the world. The biosphere was raining” (193). Amis
undoubtedly  explores  this  “bizarrely  figurative  expressiveness”,  usually  compared  to  the
metaphysical style of the late 16th and 17th centuries (135); for example, in London Fields, we find it
in this very poetic description of 20th century London by an  alien such as the American Samson
Young when he first  walks around the streets  at  the beginning of the novel,  after  ten years of
absence: 
The  first  thing  I  noticed  in  the  street  (I  almost  stepped  in  it)  struck  me  as
quintessentially English, a soaked loaf of white bread, like the brains of an animal much
stupider than any sheep. So far, though, it doesn't seem as bad as some people like to
say. At least it's intelligible, more or less. Ten years I've been gone, and what's been
happening? Ten Years of Relative Decline. (14)
Not only is he an alien, but the world itself is alien to him, most evidently through the condition of
the weather:
Right  now,  the  weather  is  superatmospheric  and  therefore,  in  a  sense,
Rueda 57/209
Identity as Alterity
supermeteorological (can you really call it weather?). It will stay like this for the rest of
the summer, they say. I approve, with one qualification. It's picked the wrong year to
happen in: the year of behaving strangely. I look out at it. The weather, if we can still
call it that, is frequently very beautiful, but it seems to bring me close to hysteria, as
indeed does everything now. (14)
And this is a feeling that intensifies along the novel: just as the weather grows worse, so does the
emotional situation of the characters, in a spiral of entropy. The world escapes more and more from
previously conceived parameters as a consequence of the ‘death of love’; even loving animals might
become an endangered species: “The dogs are not living as long as they used to. Nothing is. It's
weird. I mean, one expects snow-leopards and cockatoos and tsessebes to buy the farm eventually.
But dogs? I have an image of fat Clive [Keith's dog], sitting in a zoo” (97). 
This martian style is not an innovation in Amis at this point; both Auster and Amis are very
recursive writers, novelists that are hyper-coherent and almost obsessed about certain ideas such as
identity or the relationship of the subject with a reality that presents itself as such an alter. Let us
take a passage from Amis's Other People: A Mystery Story (1981):
The streets were full of display, of symbols whose meaning was coolly denied to her.
Through an absence of power or will— or perhaps simply of time— no one bothered to
stop her joining the edgy human traffic, though many looked as though they would like
to. They stared; they stared at her feet; they had all grown used to their own devices—
and where were hers supposed to be? It was her first mistake, she knew: no one was
intended to be without them, and she was sorry. (16)
In this passage the main character, Mary, has just been released from hospital suffering what seems
as an extreme case of amnesia. For her, everyday conventions have lost their meaning; having come
back to her senses, they are not recorded in her mind anymore, which is why she does not even
know what shoes are in the quote above. It reminds us of de Certeau's appreciation that to go out on
the streets is to enter “a network of social  signs that preexist” you (12);  therefore you learn to
behave in society for the rest of your life, something Mary has forgotten (and that we will discuss in
depth in the next chapter). Also, in the work that would follow  London Fields, the masterpiece
Times Arrow, Amis retakes this situation of an amnesiac patient waking up in hospital but with a
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huge difference, that the action, or this character's life will happen the other way around, from old to
young. The approach to reality will then be even more shocking on the grounds that, not only will
this character look at the world as an outsider who has to interpret every tiny piece of input, but he
also will apprehend everything the other way around, creating a new reverse logic: 
Eating is unattractive too. First I stack the clean plates in the dishwasher, which works
okay, I guess, like all my labor-saving devices, until some fat bastard shows up in his
jumpsuit and traumatizes them with his tools. So far so good: then you select a soiled
dish, collect some scraps from the garbage, and settle down for a short wait. (11)
Again, this interpretation is clearly wrong for the readers, stuck in their causal logic: we see that the
fat man is the one who usually comes to fix devices, and, may we add, the attractiveness of eating is
clearly underrated in his experience of life too.
These novels break with our given understanding of everyday events;  they question any
acceptance of reasons or causality, and even problematize the notion of recognition (that goes not
only for objects or bodily functions, but even for one's self and other people), and we can find
similar  defamiliarizing  strategies  elsewhere  in  postmodernism.  Both  Auster  and  Amis  have  in
common  the  aim  of  exploring  different  realities  or,  better  said,  of  doing  so  from  unusual
perspectives in order to better capture this nihilist stage in the subject's self-identification. In 1999,
Paul Auster did something Amis had already done in 1987; he took the point of view of a dog in his
novel Timbuktu, while Amis had already published the short story “The Puppy That Could” as a part
of the compilation God's Dice. In both cases, the narrators tell us the stories in a manner that is no
different from the examples where a protagonist is human; they do this in order to both criticize
human behavior toward animals and to create a parallelism between their (the dogs') experience of
life and ours. In  Timbuktu,  Auster tells  us the story of the Puppy and Mr. Bones; notice in the
following quote how the word  ‘shelter’,  underlined in the original text,  stands for a society or
civilization that is distrusted by the individual: “A dog alone was no better than a dead dog, […] and
Mr. Bones knew the drill by heart: how to avoid the dogcatchers and constables, the paddy wagons
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and unmarked cars, the hypocrites from the so-called humane societies. No matter how sweetly they
talked to you, the word  shelter meant trouble” (4). Amis, who tells the story from a lost puppy's
camera-eye, is able to detach himself from his characters to be able to represent how any being tries
to make sense of its surroundings, which we will go back to in chapter 4. He underlines how every
subject's  perspective  of  reality  can  be  both  real,  because  it  is  the  only  one  available,  and
untrustworthy at the same time, because it is mediated by the senses: “:Now, the puppy probably
sniffed or sensed the village before he saw it- the fires, the crescents, the human place. In truth, his
eyesight  was not  all  that  reliable,  floppy,  tousled,  subject  to  passionate  distortions  of  fear  and
desire” (25). Amis is actually arguing how emotion and the senses intervene in an experience to the
extent they distort our perception, be us humans or dogs. In this way, a completely alien perspective
of reality, a description of reality so far from our own a priori, feels paradoxically familiar again.
Objects, people, situations are somehow familiar but we no longer recognize them; meaning
has gone out of the world; we live in a world to which we no longer belong, and in which some of
our characters no longer want to live. Moreover, it should be emphasized that these descriptions of a
familiar/unfamiliar world reflect how the characters find it difficult (or impossible) to self-identify
or identify with their surroundings and other people. In relation to this somehow nihilist stage, we
find that, according to some critics, the postmodernist novel has undergone “a shift of emphasis
from content to form or style; a transformation of reality into images” (Bauman: 26), and this is
certainly the case with the Trilogy and  London Fields. These novels do not feature content over
form, in fact, the plot is not the main focus in either of them; the emphasis is on language itself as
well as solitude or death as a means of self-redemption for the characters, as we will see in chapters
3 and 4. Our novels are, like Baudrillard's reality, “a form without content” ("On Seduction": 164).
In this regard, in  Ghosts, Blue reads  Walden, a reference introduced by Auster in the Trilogy to
emphasize the parallelism and differences in the experience of solitude that characters give in to,
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and while reading from it, he gets easily distracted and bored: “Blue thought he was going to get a
story, or at least something like a story, but this is no more than blather, an endless harangue about
nothing at all” (160). Paradoxically enough, this also applies to his own case and reports, and to the
Trilogy as a whole. The intricate relationship with  Walden will be left to be analyzed in the next
chapter,  but  we  can  say  confidently  that  both  characters'  as  well  as  readers'  expectations  for
resolution in the Trilogy are frustrated, as we will see throughout this paper.
Similarly, in Amis the story is not preeminent either, since from the very beginning it is
apparent that he introduces a thriller with no suspense:
This is the story of a murder. It hasn't happened yet. But it will. (It had better.) I know
the murderer,  I know the murderee.  I  know the time, I know the place.  I  know the
motive (her motive) and I know the means. I know who will be the foil, the fool, the
poor foal, also utterly destroyed. And I couldn't stop them, I don't think, even if I wanted
to. The girl will die. It's what she always wanted. (LF: 1)
In a veiled allusion to García Marquez's title Chronicle of a Death Foretold, within the first pages,
the narrator will share all this information with us readers, and will quickly release us from the
pressure (and motivation) of not knowing what the end will turn out to be. Readers like Blue may
be  upset  by these  revelations  and  may dislike  this  kind  of  fiction  because  it  is  not  based  on
traditional cohesive patterns nor does it show linear plots which develop up until a climax followed
by a  resolution.  However,  other  readers,  like  us,  might  develop  a  taste  for  the  uncertainty  in
characterization and agency, and above all, a taste for the irony and the layers of information carried
by the language in  these books.  Experience is  unrepresentable,  therefore our  authors  recall  the
‘kantian  sublime’;  “that  is  to  say,  intuitions  that  cannot  be  ‘brought  under’ adequate  terms”
(Diedrick:  150-151).  Therefore,  as  Povinelli  observes,  in  postmodernity,  “the  concept  of
incommensurability is closely related to linguistic indeterminacy” (320). Amis's narrator reflects on
the consequent unavoidable problems that writers face and clarifies that, although he is conscious of
the paradoxical place that language occupies in the process, he is still trying to write under the same
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terms; realism is forcing him to avoid the issues of reality: “Perhaps because of their addiction to
form, writers always lag behind the contemporary formlessness. They write about an old reality, in a
language that's even older. It's not the words: it's the rhythm of thought. In this sense all novels are
historical novels. Not really a writer, maybe I see it clearer. But I do it too. An example: I still go on
as if people felt well” (239). Samson Young will try to capture the postmodernist experience in
modernist terms, therefore he is bound to fail and it is his own fiction that will turn against him, as
we will see.
Language games dwell on every page of London Fields and the Trilogy; according to Sarup
and other critics, they constitute one of the most favorite postmodernist literary tools (150). Auster
reflects  directly  on  the  fact  that  although  language  might  be  deceiving,  as  we  have  argued
elsewhere, it is also fundamental for self-identification; this relation between language and what it
refers to, the nature of reference, is problematized and can be considered as another postmodern
characteristic; in Sarup's words, he represents “the self as the interaction of all the language games
in which it participates” (150), something taken to the extreme by the character who is the most
fond of language in the Trilogy, Stillman Sr.:
‘My name is Quinn.’
‘Ah,’ said Stillman reﬂectively, nodding his head. ‘Quinn.’
‘Yes, Quinn. Q-U-I-N-N.’
‘I see. Yes, yes, I see. Quinn. Hmmm. Yes. Very interesting. Quinn. A most resonant
word. Rhymes with twin, does it not?’
‘That's right. Twin.’
‘And sin, too, if I'm not mistaken.’
‘You're not.’
‘And also in—one n—or inn—two. Isn't that so?’
‘Exactly.’
‘Hmmm.  Very interesting.  I  see  many possibilities  for  this  word,  this  Quinn,  this...
quintessence  ...  of  quiddity.  Quick,  for  example.  And quill.  And quack.  And  quirk.
Hmmm. Rhymes with grin. Not to speak of kin. Hmmm. Very interesting. And win. And
ﬁn. And din. And gin. And pin. And tin. And bin. Even rhymes with djinn. Hmmm. And
if you say it right with been. Hmmm. Yes, very interesting. I like your name enormously,
Mr. Quinn. It flies off in so many little directions at once.’ (73-74)
It is a game; it is also poetry, although it is the most homeless, grotesque, kind of poetry, which
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Amis also represents in London Fields through the character of Keith. He is at the edge of poverty
but at least  he does have a profession: he's a cheat,  a professional burglar among other things.
Amis's  use  of  the  English  language  is  considered  by many to  be  exquisite;  language  for  him
“becomes a kind of character”, by being “self-conscious, virtuosic, vying for attention with the plot
and the other characters” (Diedrick: 14). As an example, we will take this paragraph, brilliant in its
repetition of the same idea:
Little did they know that the place they were about to burgle— the shop, and the flat
above it— had already been burgled the week before: yes, and the week before that. And
the week before that. It was all burgled out. Indeed, burgling, when viewed in Darwinian
terms, was clearly approaching a crisis. Burglars were finding that almost everywhere
had been burgled. Burglars were forever bumping into one another, stepping on the toes
of other burglars. There were burglar jams on rooftops and stairways, on groaning fire-
escapes. Burglars were being burgled by fellow burglars, and were doing the same thing
back. Burgled goods jigged from flat to flat. Returning from burgling, burglars would
discover that they themselves had just been burgled, sometimes by the very burglar that
they themselves had just  burgled! How would this  crisis  in burgling be resolved? It
would be resolved when enough burglars found burgling a waste of time, and stopped
doing it. Then, for a while, burgling would become worth doing again. But burglars had
plenty of time to waste— it was all they had plenty of, and there was nothing else to do
with it— so they just went on burgling. (248)
Amis  focuses  in  this  passage  on  the  resonance  of  language,  on  its  beauty  and  the  many
combinations possible; beyond the ugliness of reality, words arise as carriers of beauty (and humor).
But underlying this he also reminds us how the power of words can sometimes be altered by the
overuse of terms; by saying them too much, words begin to lose their meaning, just as burgling and
so much else becomes meaningless in the passage and throughout the novel.
Against  the distrust  in  words  as  bearers  of  truth,  modernist  writers  and  their  literary
descendants have reinvigorated the novel over and over in their attempts to “transcend [the temporal
and spatial limitations] to convey effects and illusions beyond the strict capacities of the limiting
media” (Mendilow: 27). This impulse takes literature beyond realism and the chains of language or,
as here, draws attention once again to those limitations: “Then why does he feel so dissatisfied, so
troubled by what he has written? He says to himself: what happened is not really what happened.
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For the first time in his experience of writing reports, he discovers that words do not necessarily
work, that it is possible for them to obscure the things they are trying to say” (NYT: 145), which
manifests  this  incommesurability  that  we  have  already  talked  about:  “For  when  anything  can
happen— that is the precise moment when words begin to fail” (295). One cannot reproduce reality
in verbal terms, one can only “create new conventions which can more satisfactorily create the
illusion of real life by closing a little more the gap between a symbolized representation of the real
world and the real world itself” (Mendilow: 36). In postmodernist novels, as it happens in life, the
parts or fragments of the whole picture are not always “in harmony” and sometimes the result is
“cacophony” (Bauman: 26). 
In an era where the uncertainty principle18 can be applied to everything (Baudrillard C: 80),
there are many voices raised against realism as mimesis, criticizing those writers who pretended to
reproduce the totality of human experience, because such representation is not possible. According
to Mendilow, modernist writers “by breaking up the categories of language and syntax, [...] strive to
express  their  sense  of  life  as  a  sequence  of  non-causal  impressions  in  which  direction  can  be
predicted only for the larger units, never of the smaller components” (Mendilow: 8); meanwhile the
narrator in London Fields goes further by losing control of both the smaller components (Nicola and
the rest of the characters) and the larger units (the novel, the plot itself). Young will nevertheless
deceive himself into believing he is achieving a harmonious realist novel: “I've never been braver. It
empowers me-I can feel it. Like looking for the right words and finding them, finding the powers”
(11). Postmodernism thus differs from modernist ideas in several ways, but we agree with Fokkema
or  Lavender  that  the  postmodern  attack  is  more  on  realism than  on modernism (238 and 236
respectively), and that postmodernist authors are influenced by previous innovations. For example,
modernist  writers  had  already  started  to  explore  new  ways  of  breaking  with  tradition  in
18 The uncertainty principle:  in  quantum physics,  the  impossibility to  predict  both the  position  and  the  speed  or
trajectory of a subatomic particle.
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representation. Modernist authors such as Virginia Woolf or Joyce were already experimenting with,
for  example,  psychological  time  as  the  actual  true  time,  and  they  were  starting  to  challenge
causality and teleology as a given (Szegedy-Maszák: 43-46). In fact, the building blocks of these
novels are precisely impressions of time and images of space,  which can be tied together only
through language .Similarly, in the Trilogy, in particular, characters are continually confused about
the length of time that has elapsed— “Apparently, a whole day had gone by. At some point during
Stillman's monologue the sun had set in the room, but Quinn had not been aware of it” (23); or “A
long time passed.  Exactly how long it  is  impossible  to  say.  Weeks certainly,  but  perhaps even
months” (111).
As well as these impressions of time and space, we had already talked about the fictitious
nature  of  History  in  chapter  1,  and  how “the  inherent  ambiguity  of  analytic  material  and  the
associative  character  of  linguistic  referents  creates  an  interpretive  space  where  the  desire  for
narrative coherence imposes order on the otherwise fragmented data” (Wurgaft: 71). Our authors
are also interested in this constant need for meaning that human beings display; in our need for
meaning, we interpret, and as long as we support our ideas on the text, the text itself becomes
meaningful. There is an illustrative example of this in  City of Glass; Quinn records Stillman Sr.'s
every move in  a  very fragmented  reporting  style,  and tries  to  figure  out  their  purpose,  which
remains unreachable: “ ‘picks up pencil in middle of block. Examines, hesitates, puts in bag... Buys
sandwich in deli... Sits on bench in park and reads through red notebook.’ These sentences seemed
utterly worthless to him” (65). Desperate for a justification for the old man's apparent directionless
wandering and for his own case, he realizes that by drawing Stillman's trajectory on the map of
Manhattan, he has in fact been composing, letter by letter, the following message: OWEROFBAB
(70). Since he had started his records four days late, he concludes that, in all logic: THE TOWER
OF BABEL is the message, that Stillman is definitely going after his son to fulfill his project. If he
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can foretell all this, then resolution can at least be close in the narrative and the case; nevertheless
we know his expectations will not be fulfilled. In this passage, Auster trivializes the foundations of
literary interpretation, history or religion; interpretation and consensus always precede meaning, but
it is not the only instance of this parallelism we will find during this paper. Contrary to what is
expected (the climax and resolution of the case), the message is probably the outcome of Quinn's
own obsession and craving for meaning. Stillman Sr. disappears right after this; so do Virginia and
Stillman Jr., and therefore the case is bound never to be resolved. However, that is not the end of
City of Glass; rather, it feels more like the beginning, as we will see later. 
To move on from here, it should be considered how postmodernists are often criticized for
being  radically  anti-allegorical  in  their  fictions,  “either  building  then  destroying  allegorical
structures within their own fictional framework, or by postulating a world of simulacra without
depth, center, or meaning, where events are governed not by necessity or causation, but by pure
chance” (Spariosu: 61); and this is true, superficially, in the novel as, for example, Auster begins the
Trilogy by giving all credit to chance: “Much later, when he was able to think about the things that
happened to him, he would conclude that nothing was real except chance. But that was much later”
(NYT: 1). However, contrary to what these critics suggest, we believe our writers can go beyond the
surface by presenting a greater problem regarding human purpose; the possible deletion of meaning
from the equation of life and literature: “The question is the story itself, and whether or not it means
something is for the story to tell” (NYT: 1); Auster is asking the readers to dispose of pre-conceived
ideas that will not work in the Trilogy and encourages critics to not go beyond the text in their
interpretations. Furthermore, Auster places the whole idea of identity on a textual level, following a
postmodernist trend Sarup describes as follows: “There has been a move to ‘textualize’ everything:
history, philosophy, jurisprudence, sociology and other disciplines are treated as so many optional
‘kinds  of  writing’ or  discourses”  (132).  History,  Literature,  and  Fiction  are  all  equal  in  the
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postmodern mind. Everything is bound to be reduced to a narrative, and no text is to be considered
authoritative/true/final:
Jameson argues that it is hard to think of the world as it would exist outside narrative.
Anything we try to substitute for a story is, on closer examination, likely to be another
sort of story. Physicists, for example, ‘tell stories’ about subatomic particles. Anything
that presents itself as existing outside the boundaries of some story (a structure, a form, a
category) can only do so through a kind of ﬁction. In Jameson's view, structures may be
abundantly useful  as  conceptual  ﬁctions,  but  reality  comes  to  us  in  the  form of  its
stories.  Narrative,  just  by being  narrative,  [requires]  interpretation,  and  so  we  must
always be aware of the difference between manifest meaning and latent content. (Sarup:
179)
Notwithstanding this certainty of uncertainty, the narrators in both novels insist that the facts in the
fiction have happened in real life, that they are doing nothing but record them, thus playing with the
presumption of make-believe, as contemporary readers know they are not real. In fact, these might
be novels that portray the most accurate picture of reality possible in our days. The first sentence in
London Fields is: “This is a true story but I can't believe it's really happening” (1); and the last one
in the Trilogy is:  “I  came to the last  page just  as  the  train was pulling  out”  (308)  (he means
Fanshawe's diaries, which he used to write the Trilogy). Therefore, these writers are insisting that,
although realism is not an aim, our reality is not unlike the world the characters inhabit, although
we already know that what is real and true is unreachable.
Auster  and Amis  (or  shall  we say the  nameless  narrator  and  Young?)  no  doubt  pursue
innovation; the reader can feel there is something different in these pages, although literature  has
been said to be exhausted (as stated in John Barth's famous essay The Literature of Exhaustion) and
in spite of the language seeming, as it were, average and close to contemporary readers. This notion
of renewal is common in literary history, which has been characterized as the succession of ‘literary
systems’ differentiated  according  to  the  various  semiotic  communities  participating  in  the
production and reception of literature. This theory of a succession of trends “explains the current
innovation of semiotic means in the production of literary texts, and more particularly the difference
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between Postmodernism and the preceding trends, such as Modernism and the historical Avant-
Garde” (Fokkema:  238).  Moreover, History is  cumulative and the novelists  from the twentieth
century  on  are  constantly  aware  of  the  impossibility  of  innovation  concerning  either  plot  or
character.  While on the one hand the avant-garde destroys the past,  on the other modernism is
characterized by a strong romantic or melancholy view of it. Postmodernism also tries to revisit it
but “with irony, not innocently” (Eco in Calinescu "Postmodernism...": 4). All generations tend to
find  a  way to  continue  to  innovate  and  to  deliver  a  product  characteristic  of  their  times  and
postmodernism uses and abuses hypertextualization as a device, displaying its richness in an intra
and intertextual manner, in order to maintain a constant dialogue with literary tradition. We might
say that postmodern literary production, and our novels, are defined by their transvestism19; by their
appropriation  and  re-interpretation  of  traditional  conventions  and  by  their  interdisciplinary
character. As we will see later, Auster “quotes liberally from philosophical and literary antecedents”
and makes use of allusiveness “as recognition that stories, like identities, are created collectively,
that there is a community of storytellers transcending individual authorities and historical eras”
(Peacock: 2), which we think equally applies to Amis; they look, not for originality but for the
representation of different points of view. While these writers agree with the postmodernist premise
that “[t]he overall result is fragmentation of time into episodes, each one cut from its past and from
its  future,  each  one  self-enclosed  and self-contained”  (Hägglund:  25),  they also  convey that  if
“taken outside its relationship to past and future the present loses its integrity, breaks down into
isolated phenomena and objects, making of them a mere abstract conglomeration” (Bakhtin: 146);
hence our novels will not exclusively show a self-contained present, because they incessantly refer
to the past and past cultural references; as we will later see, these novels are extremely metaliterary,
and that not only shows their connection to their literary antecedents, but also their respect for them.
19 This word is used to recall Tom Stoppard's 1974 play Travesties, where historical figures such as James Joyce or
Lenin are fictional characters. This is an example of comic revisionism of the past, characteristic in postmodernist
literary and artistic production.
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Most of what has been considered up to now has been placed within the context of the
postmodern. Now, the term postmodernism is, in terms of literary fashion, not equal to Baroque,
Renaissance or Gothic in its uniformity, but is what Anderson calls a ‘portmanteau’ concept, which
references diverse aesthetic  practices because they are contemporary and interrelated (Szegedy-
Maszák: 42). Moreover,  postmodernism is transnational (Mishra and Hodge: 377), but does not
show itself under any fixed rules; its boundaries are not as clear as previous literary or artistic trends
and, because its sources are extended into the past without restrictions, it is said that some ideas
now called postmodernist have been present  off and on throughout literary history. As Docherty
argues, the term postmodernism is not “determined by chronology but by mood”; as an example, he
quotes  Duns  Scotus  ‘haecceitas’20 as  a  postmodern  antithesis  for  Aquinas's  modern opposition
between faith and reason (22). Consequently, the ‘postmodern condition’ 21 is more or less free from
space and time boundaries and certainly free to re-use and revise any previous literary convention.
It is a condition marked by a paradoxical manifesto: “Among the faces of modernity postmodernism
is perhaps the most quizzical: self-skeptical yet curious, unbelieving yet searching, benevolent yet
ironic” (Calinescu FF: 279). 
Twentieth  century  critics  agree  that  literature  in  traditional  terms  is  exhausted,  but so  is
identity22.  The  feeling  is,  in  Harris's  words,  that  “Modernism  being  the  terminus,  everything
afterwards is counted out of development. It is after; stuck in the post” (88); this is the only certain
meaning of the locution post-modernism: ‘after  modernism’.  Also,  for some critics,  modernism
marks the death of the novel: “our current tiredness results from the invention of the same and from
the possible, [...] so we have to reinvent invention, to let the other come” (Derrida: 341). In this
20 Scotus rejects the platonic and aristotelian legacy found in Aquinas's philosophy, denying universals and focusing in
the invidualization of the subject, who exists for him in the material world beyond the realm of ideas.
21 The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge is a celebrated collection of essays by Jean-François Lyotard
first published in 1979. It was the first succesfull attempt in coining the term ‘postmodernism’ and encompassing its
general philosophical features.
22 In "The Death of the Author" Barthes says the first “I” has been traced to an Egyptian papyrus “where the scribe
complained literature was already exhausted” (Hormung: 175).
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light, therefore, we can state that Amis and Auster are trying to incorporate the other on the page;
moreover, they are also trying to re-define the position of the self in the world, although they are not
trying to capture reality inside a truthful portrait; while the narrators might insist on the reality of
the facts depicted, the overall impression that is achieved is one of absurdity. For example, Tredell
says this about London Fields:
The novel's self-reflexive dispelling of fictional illusion does not signal the unreality of
the text in relation to the ‘real’ world. It bespeaks, rather, a mimetic intention to reﬂect,
with a good deal of parodic and comic exaggeration, the culturally constructed nature of
what we conventionally think of as psychological and social reality. In the ﬁn de siécle
climate of Amis's  London (which seems as  much a satiric  comment on present-day
London  as  an  admonitory prophecy of  its  future),  the  only available  narratives  for
constructing  the  self  and  interacting  socially  are  either  debased  and  shallow  or
hopelessly anachronistic.  They are the products of mass consumerist culture and the
remnants of older patterns of behavior which no longer have currency in the society
which Amis depicts. (113)
Hence, although realism is not their aim, the impression these authors make on the reader is one of
familiarity out of unfamiliarity, these are broken novels that correspond to a broken world which
realism is unable to capture, being, as these authors see it, stuck in time: “In common with Leo
Tolstoy, Keith Talent thought of time as moving past him while he just stayed the same. In the
mirror every morning: same old Keith. None the wiser” (LF: 172). 
 It is clear that these novels raise many questions for the reader. In fact, Tredell considers
Amis's  London  Fields as  “a  text  that  functions  as  much  as  a  textbook  (designed  for  the
undergraduate  seminar  requiring  neat  examples  of  the  metafictional  and  postmodern)”  (101);
similarly, Lavender believes that, within the Trilogy, Auster poses the question: “How many of the
normally assigned qualities of the novel, especially those qualities that have become attached to it
through critical exegesis, formulation and application of theory, and scientific or semiotic analysis,
can be abandoned, mutilated, ruined in and by a narrative that remains identifiable as a novel?”
(219) We agree with these critics that both Amis and Auster have succeeded in adapting so-called
postmodernist ideas and techniques into the novel, in an attempt to close the gap that Mendilow
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referred to between the world (nowadays) and its representation in literature. Moreover, they both
consider  the  gap  existing  between  the  subject  and  his  or  her  inner  truth;  a  stable  self  is
insurmountable in the real world, and in literature or, in Sarup's words: “stable ego is illusory” (13).
Because of this, identity will turn into absolute alterity in their fiction as literary authors need to
cope with the uncertainty of the referent, because the referent is never the real itself; rather, all we
know are the discourses  and representations  of  it  as  we saw in  chapter  1:  a  “reality in  which
reference has been replaced by make-believe” is impossible to describe in mimetic terms (Bernard:
143). 
While words can only capture a very small portion of what would be the real (chunks of
reality,  so  to  speak),  the  novel  is  not  exclusively  about  what  we  once  understood  as  ‘reality’
anymore. Invention is experiencing a rebirth; the tendency is “not so much [to] create, imagine,
produce,  institute,  discover”  but,  because  of  fatigue,  weariness  and  exhaustion,  the  novel  is
undergoing a reconstruction in an “apparent contradiction” (Derrida: 116-117). Both narrators refer
to  this  exhaustion  several  times  throughout  London  Fields and  the  Trilogy,  because  they both
struggle with literary creation, truth and lies; what is more, as we will see later, their own position
as omniscient narrators will be compromised. On the one hand, Samson states he is unable to invent
what he considers lies, so he is committed to realism: “I’m not one of those excitable types who get
caught making things up. Who get caught improving on reality. I can embellish, I can take certain
liberties. Yet to invent the bald facts of a life (for example) would be quite beyond my powers” (39).
However, on the other hand, the Trilogy's narrator, who shares the same concerns with Samson, as
he is unable to invent, is shocked by Fanshawe's last piece of work; he says this about F's bio: “The
book was a work of fiction. Even though it was based on facts, it could tell nothing but lies” (242).
Therefore Amis and Auster both agree in that a new type of novel must reject mimesis and freely
cross the line between truth and falsehood. To clarify just what is meant here, Mendilow describes
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the different levels of mimesis writers had traditionally considered:
 Of the four degrees of relationship of truth to life into which works of fiction might be
graded, the impossible, the improbable, the possible and the probable, the novel proper
claimed from the beginning to have eliminated from its field the first two, and so to
have clearly marked itself off from the romance. The third was at first held by many to
be legitimate, but the greater novelists maintained that they were writing within the
limits only of the fourth. (40)
However, limitless, postmodernist authors, and particularly Amis and Auster, will transcend the first
two levels of reality, to allow all four of them to coexist, interweave and mix, and still create in
their novels an openly artificial and metaliterary world that, paradoxically, resembles, and therefore
represents, a realistic setting; moreover, this also applies to identity and the fragmentary image of it
readers are going to receive, as we will discuss in chapter 3 when we talk about characterization.
And why should this  be the case? The most successful  writer  in  London Fields,  Mark Asprey
sentences: “The truth doesn't matter any more and it's not wanted” (452).
It becomes clear then that postmodernism opens the door for surrealism and puts it on the
same level as realism: “To the postmodern statement that fiction is not truth, it  imposes a new
paradox:  fiction cannot  lie” (Lavender:  236).  Coming after  modernism (and everything else)  in
time,  postmodernism considers  itself  incapable  of  originality;  the  idea  of  the  genius  has  been
“replaced by the assumption that art can only be repetitious” (Sarup: 132) and therefore our authors
will make the best use of repetitions and lies to create an effective ‘black mirror’ for our society.
This idea that “there is no progress only repetition” is explored by such authors such as Robbe-
Grillet  in  Dans le  Labyrinthe,  Nabokov in  Pnin,  Gertrude Stein,  Raymond Roussel,  Borges  or
Proust (46-47), and our novels are themselves rooted in this assumption: The New York Trilogy is
composed by the repetition of the same story, as the narrator himself confesses at the end of  The
Locked Room:  “These three stories are  finally the same story” (NYT:  287).  Repetition is  a key
element in London Fields too because, although it is composed of twenty-four successive chapters,
each of them is complemented at the end by an entry including notes and the thoughts and feelings
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of the narrator. Most of the times these asides have the same length as a chapter, and the narrator
discusses  openly  how  the  completion  of  the  novel  is  going,  and  how  he  is  acquiring  all  the
information for it from the characters themselves, who exist in real life. Consequently, many scenes
appear twice, even complete sentences appear twice; once on the first level of the fiction, and again
on the second level, the novel the narrator is writing. Also, and openly, both narrators are very clear
about the metafictional  character of their  work,  when they interact  with the reader— “The red
notebook, of course, is only half of the story, as any sensitive reader will understand” (NYT: 129)—
or their characters themselves— “ ‘[Nicola,]what are you?’/‘Christ you still don't get it, do you.’ ”
(LF:  260).  As  we  can  see,  postmodernism  features  continual  references  to  metafictional  self-
reflexivity or self-referentiality like these and the Trilogy and London Fields are obsessively self-
referential, as we will have a chance to discuss later, when we center on characterization and the
narrators  in  the  next  chapter.  Auster,  for  instance,  chooses  the  so-called  “Russian-doll
constructions”  (Peacock:  11)  in  order  to  create  more and more stories  within the  frame of  the
Trilogy; on some occasions the parallelism is clear (it refers to an earlier part of the story) but
sometimes it is yet to come: chapters 4 and 6 in City of Glass are a good example, as they introduce
information that apparently does not belong to the story but it is at the same time relevant; they are
made up of P.I. reports about real cases of speechless children as well as Stillman/Dark and the
philosophical and moral foundations of his plans. 
Because  originality  is  considered  impossible  by  these  writers,  self-referentiality  and
intertextuality are boundlessly manifest throughout the novels. They take advantage of the devices
that  Sarup enumerates  such as  quotation,  artifice,  randomness,  anarchy,  fragmentation,  parody,
irony, playfulness and allegory that are considered common in postmodernism (132). The intention
of such devices is to disengage readers from the novel as they used to know it, and in order to do so,
these writers use strategies that imply “distancing, demystification, eclecticism— the death of not
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only individual styles, but also of local traditions and of a sense of history— as well as a cult of
pastiche, miming, deconstructive montage, grafting, superimposing one text on the other (Szegedy-
Maszák: 41). Nevertheless, irony and playfulness are applied in these revisions, as the status of
tradition and popular culture is equated in value. This is recognized as a feature of postmodern
culture by Frederic Jameson, who describes it in this way:
The effacement […] of some key boundaries or separations, most notably the erosion of
the older distinction between high culture and so-called mass or popular culture. This is
perhaps the most distressing development of all from an academic standpoint which has
traditionally had a vested interest in preserving a state of high or elite culture against the
surrounding  environment  of  philistinism,  of  schlock  and  kitsch,  of  TV  series  and
Readers’ Digest  culture  […].  But  many  of  the  newer  postmodernisms  have  been
fascinated precisely by that whole landscape of advertising and motels, of the Las Vegas
strip, of the late show and Grade B Hollywood film, of so-called paraliterature, with its
airport paperback categories of the gothic and the romance, the popular biography, the
murder mystery and the science fiction or fantasy novel. They no longer ‘quote’ such
texts  […]  they incorporate  them to  the  point  where  the  line  between  high  art  and
commercial forms seems increasingly difficult to draw. (111)
This is what we observe in the novel. The comic effect depends on noting a discrepancy between
the real and its representation and so black humor is present in our novels quite often, although none
of them are strictly speaking comic novels. As an example of this, let us read the following passage
of  London Fields when Keith, seen by the narrator through his own eyes, considers what a good
person he is, and how harmful it is for his reputation to not project the right image, which in his
case, is (hopefully) one of a horrible man in the eyes of the reader; thus the comic effect. Keith, who
is already robbing a bank, regrets not having been more (proudly) harmful:
Although he  liked  nearly everything else  about  himself,  Keith  hated  his  redeeming
features. In his view they constituted his only major shortcoming— his one tragic flaw.
When the moment arrived, [...] his great face crammed into the prickling nylon, and the
proud woman shaking her trembling head at him, and Chick Purchase and Dean Pleat
both screaming Do it. Do it (he still remembered their meshed mouths writhing), Keith
had definitely failed to realize his full potential. He had proved incapable of clubbing
the Asian woman to her knees, and of going on clubbing until the man in the uniform
opened the safe. (4-5)
As we can see, there is a confusion of values here, between what cheats and thieves value and the
readers’ (supposed)  shared  values  (if  in  postmodernity  we  can  contemplate  such  a  thing)  are
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incompatible producing a rather grotesque scene characterized by understatement.
Another preference of postmodernist authors, as Calinescu points out, is that they treat fact
and fiction, reality and myth, truth and lying, original and imitation, and so on, on an equal footing
as a means to  emphasize undecidability (FF:  304).  This tendency provokes the collapse of the
hierarchical  distinction  between  élite  and  popular  culture  and  in  both  novels  we  find  items
representative from both these visages of (C/c)ulture because, for these authors, they are structural
constituents  of  the  postmodern  man's  tale  of  identity.  For  instance,  in  London  Fields,  God  is
introduced as an imaginary character in Nicola's fictitious life (by fictitious we mean the Nicola in
the novel the narrator is writing, not the Nicola living in the same reality as the narrator's, although
this is fictitious for us as well);  in order to court  her,  God embodies true ‘machos’ throughout
history. All of them stand on the same level; God's: “He tempted her with His charisma: he came as
King David, Valentino, Byron, John Dillinger, Genghis Khan, Courbet, Muhammad Ali, Napoleon,
Hemingway, the great Schwarzenegger, Burton Else [a fictitious character for us, a real tabloid star
in Six's England]” (121). An equal mix appears in the Trilogy on Blue's wall, where he symbolically
hangs up some images he identifies with: “Next to that there is a portrait of Walt Whitman. And
finally,  directly to the poet's left,  there is a movie still  of Robert Mitchum from one of the fan
magazines” (186). For writers such as Proust or Joyce, God had been replaced by art, whereas for
Beckett even art had lost its supreme value (Szegedy-Maszák: 45); and this is the outcome of that
attitude. With our authors comes the deletion of the boundary between art and everyday life; for
them, God is no different  nowadays from celebrities and movie actors, and literature can never
surpass the creativity of our everyday life. However, Amis goes beyond this; Samson Young is not
creating fiction, or so he says; he only collects data from reality, to the extent that he attributes
authorship to the actual characters, as we will see in chapter 3: “The girl will die. It's what she
always  wanted.  You  can’t stop  people  once  they  start.  You  can't  stop  people  once  they  start
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creating” (1). Thus, from the very beginning there will be no boundaries between fiction and real
life in LondonFields, a statement that brings trouble regarding the concepts of agency, authorship,
characterization and the nature of the narrator, as we will see in the next section.
Another  related  point  that  goes  hand  in  hand  with  how  identity  is  constructed  (or
deconstructed) in these novels has to do with, as Sarup points out, one metaphor that postmodernists
commonly  use  to  illustrate  their  inclination  to  intertextuality;  that  of  the  ‘palimpsest’.  For
postmodernist critics (inspired by deconstructionism), reading a text “resembles the X-raying of
pictures which discovers, under the epidermis of the last painting, another hidden picture” (50) and
the closer you read, you can only discover that texts only refer to other texts. Like monks that would
rewrite again on older manuscripts, these authors show intertextuality is not only necessary but
unavoidable, because tradition does not need to be incorporated into the new literary production; it
is already there. Auster does not miss the chance of materializing the metaphor: “[Quinn] often
discovered that he had written two or even three lines on top of each other, producing a jumbled,
illegible palimpsest” (NYT: 62). The irony arises, as many critics argue, from more or less random
hybridization,  and  carnivalization  (a  Bakhtin  term);  tradition  and  literature  itself  turn  into  a
performance  (Hassan:  18-21).  Therefore,  literary  tradition  is  present  in  these  novels  through
intertextuality in many ways, and sometimes certainly carnivalized as in the following conversation
when Quinn tries to figure out who Stillman named his alter ego, Henry Dark, after:
‘Oh, do try. Make three guesses. It you don't get it, then I'll tell You.’
Quinn paused for a moment, trying to give it his best effort ‘H.D.’, he said. ‘For Henry
David? As in Henry David Thoreau.’
‘Not even close.’
‘How about H.D. Pure and simple? For the poet Hilda Doolittle.’
‘Worse than the first one.’
‘[...]H for the weeping Philosopher, Heraclitus... and D for the laughing philosopher,
Democritus. Heraclitus and Democritus… the two poles of the dialectic.’
‘[...] The initials of the name Henry Dark refer to Humpty Dumpty.’
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‘Humpty Dumpty.’
‘You know who I mean. The egg.’
‘As in Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall.’
‘Exactly.’ (79-80)
This is a kind of ironic joke although it does reflect how the novel continually alludes to other
sources, be they from high Culture or  nursery rhymes. But, at the same time, this also has to do,
once again,  with the problem of identification,  which is why postmodernist  authors are said to
present,  in  characterization,  “a  fake  flatness,  without  inside/outside  —or  its  opposite,  self-
multiplication,self-reflection”  trying  to  suppress,  disperse,  “and  sometimes  [...]  to  recover  the
romantic  ego” (Hassan:  19).  In  the  constant  need to  refer  to  the  outside  for  identity,  “looking
outward for sustenance” (NYT:  61), Hassan says: “thinking is  displaced into a mode of alterity
where, in the words of Rimbaud ‘j'est un autre’, or where the ‘I’, in lacanian fashion, constantly
disappears  from  itself  and  reappears  in  the  guise  of  alterity”  (180).  As  a  result  of  all  these
considerations, it is clear that Auster and Amis conceive a “multifaceted and disintegrating play of
selves” (Sarup: 53) over one stable self, which directly affects characterization in their novels. 
In the Trilogy, the list of literary references and inspirations that appear directly or indirectly
in the text is baffling: Milton's Paradise Lost as well as The Bible are crucial for the development of
the story of Henry Dark/Stillman Sr.— Columbus, Raleigh, Montaigne, Thomas More, Geronimo
de Mendieta, Rousseau and Locke, among others, are also named in relation to it (41-42). There are
allusions  to  Swift  and  Defoe  (particularly  to  Robinson  Crusoe,  which  Fanshawe  reads  as  a
teenager). Edgar Allan Poe appears as a direct reference many times, also through the name William
Wilson (a pseudonym for Quinn and a short story by Poe). Herman Melville's  Moby Dick  is also
alluded to recurrently, first in a veiled way through a Kodak picture of Nantucket in Central Station
(51), then more directly in Fanshawe's introduction to one of his letters: “Call me Redburn” (267),
Redburn: His First Voyage also being a novel by Mellville. There is even a passage in Paris where
the narrator and protagonist wants to be called Herman Melville the sailor by a prostitute he insists
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on calling  Fayaway23 (288).  Significantly,  Hawthorne  is  present  as  well,  through  his  novel  on
identity crisis,  Fanshawe,  as well as his short story "Wakefield". In fact, the plot of "Wakefield"
itself is introduced into the narrative as a story that Black tells Blue without attributing  any credit to
the author; this is the story of a man who has abandoned his wife and does not return in twenty
years; he even witnesses the impact of his own death on the mind of his widow (172). Clearly, part
of the point of this is to parallel Blue's own story as he has abandoned the future Mrs. Blue to work
on the case. Yet another example of intertextuality appears through the title of his third story, in
which Auster evokes the 1935 The Locked Room Lecture by John Dickson Carr, which is about a
murder in a locked room; it also echoes Poe's  The Murders in the Rue Morgue, where the same
situation occurs— again the parallels with Auster's story are obvious. Also, Auster refers to Walt
Whitman (who used to walk along Orange Street, where Blue works) (135), and to so many more
we do  not  want  to  overwhelm the  reader  with  them.  However,  two  more  references  must  be
highlighted: Thoreau's  Walden, read by both Blue and Black and  El Quixote, a novel Auster (the
character) is studying; both these references will actually be analyzed further in the next section.
The upshot of all this is that the reader is continually being urged to trace the origin or original, not
only of the plot and character, but also as regards authorship, all of which are continually displaced
and deferred.
Similarly,  but  with  less  intensity,  in  London  Fields,  Amis  also  often  refers  to  literary
antecedents and even to contemporary works such as the novel More Die of Heartbreak by Bellow,
which appears more than once as a favourite of the narrator's. Yeats is freely quoted (101); so is El
Quixote (350). He refers to Owen, the war poet (469), and Keats's Lamia24 is the topic of the false
one-to-one literature class in which Nicola pretends to be Keith's teacher on camera. On another
23 Fayaway is the female character of Melville's first novel  Typee: a literary account based on the time spent by the
author with a cannibal tribe in the South Pacific.
24 The  title of chapter 17 is “Cupid's College”, taken from the following line of “Lamia”: “As though in Cupid's
college she had spent /Sweet days a lovely graduate, still unshent/,And kept his rosy terms in idle languishment” (ll.
197-199). Nicola is pretending to be a Virgin for Guy, like the lady in the lines, which we will analyze in chapter 4.
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occasion, Amis compares Keith to Tolstoy (172) and he is repeatedly called Keithcliff, as a modern
brutal Heathcliff from Wuthering Heights (164), because “Keith is modern, modern, modern” (10).
The end of the novel, with little Kim being taken care of by the only good and rich character in the
novel, Guy Clinch, has Dickensian connotations (which often crop up in Amis's novels), of course.
Another example is the term ‘Murderee’, applied to Nicola by herself and by the narrator; this is
borrowed from D.H. Lawrence's Women in Love. However, above all other references, Shakespeare
appears the most, for instance through Nicola, who had been a drama actress, now referred to by the
narrator as Lady Muckbeth (379). There is even a character named Shakespeare (there is also one
named God, the barman, and both of them are rapists as explained in page 168); he is a parody
figure who is “the least prosperous of the Black Cross brothers. The bum's overcoat, the plastic
shoes,  the  never-washed dreadlocks”  (41);  but  Shakespeare  is  for  Amis,  above all,  a  figure  of
authority who carries the weight of History and canonical discipline: “someone watches over us
when we write. Mother. Teacher. Shakespeare. God” (397); therefore he will not take Him seriously.
Like many of his contemporaries, including Auster, Amis is also interested in how tradition
and popular culture leak into everyday life, introducing references to both extensively throughout
the novel: “[Keith] also watched major adaptations of works by Lawrence, Dreiser, Dostoevsky,
Conrad – and anything else that sparked controversy in the pull-out TV section of his tabloid”
(165).The people  on the pages  of  London Fields  are,  nevertheless,  characterized by being less
cultivated (except for Nicola, and the narrator to a lesser extent), than the ones in the Trilogy, where
Fanshawe, the narrator, Quinn, Auster (the character), Black or Stillman Sr., are all writers who
know well their literary heritage. In these novels, as we will see in the next chapter, everybody
becomes  a  writer.  Now,  at  first  sight  it  may not  seem clear  just  how all  this  allusiveness  and
intertextuality relates to our subject. However, characters and their circumstances seem to become
inseparable from these ‘others’ that are continually referred to. These characters' identities, just like
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real people's, cannot be separated from their relationship to others or from their position within the
world. After all, as readers, we cannot help but relate characters, plots and situations to their literary
antecedents (or to other cultural models); this in turn leads us, and even the characters themselves,
to  yet  another  kind  of  recognition  of  otherness.  Our  authors  present  an  identity  that  is  only
achievable in textual terms; language is a spell by which “these ‘fictions’ produce the other and the
‘I’ as entities continually ‘made’ (factum) in their textual practice” (Hormung: 11).
From all of this, it becomes clear reading these novels that these authors have a great deal in
common thematically and also in the way they portray certain ideas. In this paper, we are focusing
on their representation of identity as alterity, but it is difficult to reduce the scope of our research, as
an insurmountable number of topics is being dealt with while, at the same time, the interrelation of
them is so strong it seems identity “flies off in so many little directions at once” (NYT 74), just like
Quinn's name according to Stillman Sr. in  City of Glass. In these novels, the main characters are
desperately seeking for a source of identity and comfort in a context where nothing but alterity is
apprehensible;  consequently,  they  turn  to  some  outside  factors  in  order  to  find  something
recognizable. This ties in with Bhabha's philosophy: “identification is a process of identifying with
and through another object, an object of otherness, at which point the agency of identification is
itself  always  ambivalent,  because  of  the  intervention  of  that  otherness”  (Wurgaft:  80).  In  their
ambivalence, characters project their selves into their writing, as we hinted at the end of the last
paragraph. To this end, and in order not to lose control of their actions, these characters rely on a red
notebook in order to keep track of their selves through the words they write. This way they also
have control over their reality; that is, they are able to intervene in people's lives. Moreover, these
characters are apparently attracted to these notebooks as if chance has been substituted by destiny,
as if driven by an unconscious drive. For example, Quinn writes in a red notebook all the time while
following Stillman and he writes until there is no more space: 
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He felt that a new notebook was in order. It would be helpful to have a separate place to
record his thoughts, his observations, and his questions. In that way, things might not
get out of control. He looked through the pile, trying to decide which one to pick. For
reasons that were never clear to him, he suddenly felt an irresistible urge for a particular
red notebook at the bottom. [...] Almost embarrassed by the intensity of his feelings.
(38-39)
Yet, although there was probably no reason at the beginning, he later realizes that he was meant to
have a notebook the same color as Stillman's: “it pleased him to know that Stillman also had a red
notebook,  as  if  this  formed  a  secret  link  between  them,  Quinn  suspected  that  Stillman´s  red
notebook contained answers to the questions that had been accumulating in his mind” (59). And that
is  also  something that  characters  are  looking for  in  the  notebook:  identification,  truth,  history,
literature, language; words that can satisfy their need for answers. Hence, the notebook is reassuring
for the characters on many occasions when they find nothing to hold on to: “Blue looks around the
room and fixes his attention on various objects, one after the other. He sees the notebook and says to
himself ‘notebook’ ” (Ghosts: 145); this is so even for Quinn who, already at the start of the story,
has managed to have his own identity and past self deleted: “He picked up his pen and wrote his
initials D.Q. (for Daniel Quinn), on the first page. It was the first time in years he has put his own
name in one of his notebooks” (39). 
What appears to be some kind of obsession here has its reasons: everything in the Trilogy
happens through the notebooks: Stillman keeping notes about his promenades, Quinn recording his
every move, Blue recording Black's, Black himself writing reports in one (131), and, of course,
Fanshawe  too,  who  literally  exists  mostly  through  his  writings  only—  his  manuscripts  were
transported in two big suitcases, and “together, they were as heavy as a man” (204). The implication
here, then, is that the man is what is written in the manuscripts. But, in line with the postmodernist
rejection of stability,  which is latent through this  symbol,  the red notebook becomes unreliable
when the moment comes to know any absolute truth: “even the red notebook, which until now has
provided a detailed account of Quinn's  experiences, is  suspect.  We cannot say for certain what
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happened to Quinn during this period, for it is at this point in the story that he began to lose his
grip” (111). These characters' identities blend in with the content of the notebooks, as if they could
only exist through them, and in failing to continue to write their selves, the characters eventually are
lost and virtually disappear. Let us take the example of Quinn at the end of City of Glass and his
paranoia when he realizes that in his exile, the end of the red notebook is the end of his story, of
himself, not only in the future but in the present too; it is the end of his identity: 
He  began  to  weigh  his  words  with  great  care,  struggling  to  express  himself  as
economically and clearly as possible. He regretted having wasted so many pages at the
beginning of  the red  notebook,  and in  fact  felt  sorry that  he had written about  the
Stillman case at all. For the case was far behind him now, and he no longer bothered to
think about it. It had been a bridge to another place in his life, and now that he had
crossed it, its meaning had been lost. Quinn no longer had any interest in himself. He
wrote about the stars, the earth, his hopes for mankind. He felt that his words had been
severed from him, that now they were a part of the world at large, as real and speciﬁc as
a stone, or a lake, or a ﬂower. (128)
In the case of Fanshawe, the red notebook means even more, because the last  notebook
given to the narrator contains Fanshawe's last and best piece of writing, which apparently contains
‘the  everything’,  ‘the  nothing’,  the  very  essence  of  a  new kind  of  literature  according  to  the
narrator, who cannot stand the clarity yet emptiness of his words. From the description of it, as we
never access the primary source, we interpret that Fanshawe's text is a postmodernist novel and that
it is not far from the style of the Trilogy itself:
The words were familiar to me, and yet they seemed to have been put together strangely,
as though their ﬁnal purpose was to cancel each other out. I can think of no other way to
express it. Each sentence erased the sentence before it, each paragraph made the next
paragraph impossible. It is odd, then, that the feeling that survives from this notebook is
one of great lucidity. (307)
Circularity, the opportunity of starting again, is a promise that the book delivers in its spiral shape,
while at the same time the author denies the reader answers and certainties, only clarifying that all
three stories are the same and subtly implying that, in our civilization, every individual's story is
caught  on the  same spiral  where  identity  is  lost  by default,  and that  literature  is  incapable  of
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reproducing or delivering truth in any degree:
The same holds for the two books that come before it, City of Glass and Ghosts. These
three stories are ﬁnally the same story, but each one represents a different stage in my
awareness of what it is about. I don't claim to have solved any problems. I am merely
suggesting that a moment came when it no longer frightened me to look at what had
happened. If words followed, it was only because I had no choice but to accept them, to
take  them  upon  myself  and  go  where  they  wanted  me  to  go.  But  that  does  not
necessarily  make  the  words  important.  I  have  been  struggling  to  say  goodbye  to
something for a long time now, and this struggle is all that really matters. The story is
not in the words; it's in the struggle. (287-288)
The exhaustion of literature is manifest in both novels through the creativity of the intradiegetic
authors/narrators as, inside the books, both the unnamed narrator of the Trilogy and Samson Young
claim that the content of these books is entirely based on the content of someone else's production.
In the Trilogy, it is Quinn's and Fanshawe's while in London Fields, every major character is given
credit for their contribution to the fiction, as the narrator claims he is following real people and
simply  recording  their  moves  in  a  dramatic  story  of  which  Nicola  is  the  driving  force  and
inspiration25.  However,  in all  this  there is  an inherent  paradox.  As we have seen in  the earlier
chapter, Lacan suggests that identity is a linguistic construct,  that the self  is arrived at through
language; however, the separation between language and its referent, the inevitable deferment of
meaning, means that one never arrives at recognition; identity is ultimately inaccessible, and this is
clearly implied by both the Trilogy and London Fields.
In the same way that all in the Trilogy is derivative, coming from a source or sources, in
London Fields its narrator, who recognizes that he is incapable of creating fiction from imagination,
will be inspired by Nicola Six and his friends in the Black Cross, a symbol of London's worst, and
the place where the story is born: “If London's a pub and you want the whole story, then where do
you go? You go to a London pub. And that single instant in the Black Cross set the whole story in
motion” (14). But the token in this case is not going to be exclusively the red notebook, but the
25 We will dig into the questions of agency, polivocity, narratorship and characterization in these novels in chapter 3.
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diary. In the novel, even Keith, who is almost illiterate, keeps a diary himself in his need for self-
representation; and it is a red notebook, of course: “a red pad which had no title apart from Students
Note Book— Ref. 138— Punched for filing and which, perhaps, could be notionally christened A
Darters Diary or, more simply, The Keith Talent Story. Here it was that Keith logged his intimate
thoughts, most, (but not all) of them darts-related” (177). Nevertheless as we can appreciate over
and over in the novel, Keith is not smart enough to inspire the narrator all by himself. Nicola seems
to be the only (female) character in both novels that earns a right to be active, to do things by
herself and to be visible, very visible. She is a character in search of constant attention, especially
from every kind of man, although she remains a mystery until and even beyond the end, but this
makes her introduction all the more mysterious: “Nicola turned, wavered, and steadied herself. She
dropped her burden into the trash and, embracing her shoulders with crossed hands, moved off in a
hurrying walk. For perhaps five minutes of stretched time I waited. Then down I went and picked
up my gift. […] When I looked up I saw half of Nicola Six, thirty feet away, split by a young tree-
trunk,  not  hiding  but  staring”  (26). Nicola  has  intentionally  dropped  her  diary  in  Samson's
(Asprey's) trashcan. The narrator, who encounters wonders in Nicola's diary, automatically decides
to  incorporate  her  as  the  protagonist  of  his  new  fiction.  In  the  following  quote,  the  narrator
expresses his literal desire to be the notebook: “I'm intrigued by what you say about the death of
love. Nicola, let me be your diary” (62). Nevertheless he keeps a diary as well, but it is not external
to the narrative, as Fanshawe's was in Auster; but instead, we have access to it at the end of every
chapter in the form of the asides. This is why we get to know a lot more than the author ever
planned, as we will explain later.
As we have already suggested, from the very beginning, the intention of Nicola is suicidal
but also autobiographical; she wants the story to be about her death, or ‘the death of love’ as she
metaphorically names it, and she wants Samson to record her will. After all, this search for attention
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focuses on drawing attention to her ultimate ‘sacrifice’26. However, before elaborating further on
disappearance, an essential factor to consider is simply where our characters live. After all, most of
them belong to and are identified with and by their surroundings. As we have mentioned before, the
setting  for  their  exodus  is  none other  than  the  city,  more  specifically  New York and London,
respectively, both representative of western civilization and its way of life. It is not a coincidence
that  the  authors  select  these  two  bastions  of  civilization/progress/decadence in  order  to
contextualize the not many possibilities for postmodernist escapism in literature (or in real life). The
city  is  the  result  of  a  long  process  that  has  become  part  of  a  tradition  of  physical  and
discursive/moral construction; this is the rather more profound notion of the city as an entity that
our authors want to imprint on their narratives. Hence, it is necessary to understand the significance
of the city historically and, in order to do so, we are going to use mainly (but not exclusively) two
very different sources: Lewis Mumford's The City in History: Its Origins, Its transformations, and
Its Prospects, published in 1961 and de Certeau et al's The Practice of Everyday Life, first published
in 1980. The first is a reflection on the historical expansion and significance of the city as an entity
of power and identification for its dwellers, under a markedly criticizing, marxist tone, while the
second  is  the  strangest  description of  the  sometimes  unspoken,  sometimes  explicit,  social
conventions and labeling that subjects participate in in order to maintain the city as a sustainable
social structure.
It has already become clear that the cities are utterly important in our novels, to such an
extent that they even find their way into the titles: in the Trilogy, New York as the city of cities has
a preeminent spot; it invites and helps these rootless characters to blend in, to melt in, to vanish. It
makes them feel that it is a good place for being, or to become, lost; in fact, to dissolve: “New York
was an inexhaustible space, a labyrinth of endless steps, and no matter how far he walked, no
matter how well he came to know its neighborhoods and streets, it always left him with the feeling
26 We will talk more about our characters', and particularly Nicola's, wish for dissolution in chapter 3 and 4.
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of being lost. Lost, not only in the city, but within himself as well” (3-4). This is a usual reaction to
a great city, as Mumford notices; the city is often “‘poeticized’ by the subject”, appropriated (13).
However, Little argues on the one hand that, in Auster, New York symbolizes the “disunited state of
modern existence. For him, the contemporary American landscape, epitomized by New York, is a
scene of cultural decay, environmental degradation, personal isolation, and spiritual anomie, the
kind of wasteland that T.S. Eliot, in Gerontion, calls ‘a wilderness of mirrors’ ” (157): it is a city of
glass that gives the subject his or her reflection back; it corroborates his or her position in society;
but it can break down at any second too. Hence, because it is made of thin glass,  Baudrillard argues
that “it takes only a straw to collapse the whole system” ("Symbolic..." : 123). On the other hand, in
London Fields, it has already collapsed and Samson Young has fled New York because: “How's
America? Crazy like an X-ray laser” (78). He flies into London to fulfill his escape from his life,
the weather and his illness, but he achieves none of these. For him, London blossoms as a trash
flower, as that is the way he describes it often during the novel, yet still it is the perfect place for
him to fulfill the culmination of his literary career: 
This is a London theme; the attempt at greenery would itself appear to attract the trash.
The cylinders of wire-netting they put up to protect young trees sufficiently resemble a
container of some kind, so people cram them with beer cans, used tissues, yesterday's
newspapers. In times of mass disorientation and anxiety....But we can get back to that.
On with the story. The girl was there: Nicola, the Murderee. (25)
Hence, we can ask ourselves: why would these characters hide in or escape to a place that is
so hostile to their natures? Even seeing the evidence with his own eyes, Young chooses to look the
other way and focus on the book. This is, according to sociologists and anthropologists, because
there is no other place left to run to: “Those who think there are no alternatives to this urban fate,
and no human way out,  may prove correct  in  their  estimate of probabilities” (Mumford:  554).
Thence the city, a priori not that appealing, must build itself up from images and mirages in order to
make itself appealing. This way, according to Baudrillard, the city is to be considered “trompe-l'oeil
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or the enchanted simulation” ("On Seduction":154); this is an effect intensified through the eyes of
the characters, who romanticize and ‘poeticize’ the city. The city  seems to have existed forever;
however, it is the climax of the development of human civilization and a huge step in our evolution
as a species; there  man creates a colossal web where interaction results in togetherness, or so it
apppears.  It  apparently  offers  the  dweller  everything  he  or  she  might  need,  adapting  to  the
imperatives of the times. It offers individuality: one's home, by definition, “cannot be the place of
others […] Here the visitor is an intruder unless he or her has been explicitly and freely invited to
enter” (de Certeau: 145); but it also offers endless social interaction which is a human need: “orality
is the desire of engaging with the other” (251). Moreover, the city integrates several characteristics
that help the subject feel supported, and it implies a certain sense of belonging to the System. It also
relates to identification based on territory, not only on the group, which has been important for
humans since we were only tribes. Conceptually, this is exactly the ‘trompe-l'oeil’ or ‘seduction’
Baudrillard refers to, clearly influencing postmodernist writers, such as Auster and Amis in their
portrayal of the city as an apparent trap for the subject.
While reading de Certeau's  work, one is reminded of the structure of a dictionary almost;
here are the titles for some of the chapters: ‘The Neighbourhood’, ‘Propriety’, ‘The Street Trade’,
‘Bread and Wine’, ‘The End of the Week’, ‘Shopping’, ‘Ghosts in the City’27, ‘Private Spaces’,
‘Doing-Cooking’, ‘The Nourishing Arts’, ‘Plat du Jour’, ‘Gesture Sequences’, ‘The Rules of Art’ or
‘A Practical  Science  of  the  Singular’,  just  to  name  a  few.  According  to  this  extensive  piece
(consisting of two volumes), every little aspect of human behavior is proven to be tacitly controlled
by more or less strict social rules; therefore nothing we do can ever be spontaneous. He insists: “the
practice of the neighborhood implies adhesion to a system of values and behaviours forcing each
dweller to remain behind a mask playing his or her role […] the body is the primary, fundamental
support for  the social  message proffered” (16). And behind this affirmation is the idea that our
27 This is a remarkable chapter for us in relation to Ghosts, as we will see towards the end of the chapter.
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authors resonate with: identity is a compound of societal elements which results in a variety of
masks more than personalities, which we will further discuss in the next two chapters. De Certeau
has been criticized for his simplification of our roundness into these definitions, for representing a
theater of actions more than a city, reducing everything to the spaces and contexts where an action
takes  place:  “spatial  practices  are  none other  than  repetitive  gestures  aimed at  overcoming the
alienation of all conceptual, abstract space” (Leach: 129); or his work is seen as a dehumanized
documentary about us: “we are the indigenous tribe, we are the ones in question” (Terdiman: 8). But
for us and our focus on how people draw identity from outer elements, it is quite valuable; let us not
forget de Certeau's discourse is doing no more than applying anthropology to us, since it had always
really been “a conversation of ‘us’ with ‘us’ about them” (Huggan: 92). He clarifies that every
civilization, when looked at from the outside, is reducible to patterns, and he undermines the idea of
the city as an unnatural way of life we are simply born into, the same way Mumford does: the city
has been considered a “‘second nature’ to civilized man and is erroneously thought as natural too”
(46).
Nevertheless, critics like Foucault, Debord, Baudrillard or du Gay openly attack the very
foundations of the city as such as well. They argue that “the growth of cities on the detriment of the
country life is a result of the immediate imperatives of mass consumption” (Debord, my translation:
147). Mumford argues that the city was born “away from the central concerns of nutrition and
reproduction:  a  purpose  beyond  mere  survival”;  and  that  cities  spread  over  the  fields  at  an
astonishing speed: 
[G]rain cultivation, the plow, the potter's wheel, the sailboat, the draw loom, copper
metallurgy, abstract mathematics, exact astronomical observation, the calendar, writing
and other modes of intelligible discourse in permanent form all came into existence at
roughly the same time, around 3000 B.C. And in less than seven centuries between the
invention of the clock and the unlocking of atomic power” (33). 
He does  not  think  this  is  positive  or  natural;  instead,  he  enumerates  several  milestones  in  the
Rueda 88/209
Identity as Alterity
historical development of the cities that he considers to also be steps that humanity took in order to
detach itself  from nature: “natural home gods were replaced by those distant in the skies,  sun,
water, distant entities of power” (30). This allowed priesthood to arise as a very important agency
center, fusing secular and sacred powers. For instance, he refers to fortresses or walls— and every
protection  device  that  the  city  offers—  as  being  double-edged,  because  they  also  effectively
succeed in containing the population, which is confined inside like a “permanently captive farm
population” (47). In this light, the city was always a jail that did not feel like a jail, mostly because
of the existence of religion as a soothing but powerful agent. However, since its beginning “law and
order supplemented brute force” (53), an idea clearly influenced by the Foucauldian discourse we
analyzed in chapter 1.
By expanding their frontiers,  almost until  overlapping one another,  the cities necessarily
take over nature: “parts of the earth, the productive agricultural areas tended to be isolated green
islands,  slowly disappearing under a  sea of asphalt  […] either entirely covering up the soil  or
reducing its value for any purpose other than more paving, piping and building; displacing living
forms and enhancing only human desires and needs that could be profitable” (Mumford: 530); this
is a reflection that both authors incorporate into their novels. Looking at the title, Amis's novel
results from a compound of these two contrary realities: London/Fields; and we see a lot of London
but none of the fields. Samson repeatedly reminds himself: “I must go to London Fields, before it's
too late” (323); he means before he dies from his illness or the world ends, both of which are
predicted to happen quite near in time. Other times, he realizes: “But this is London; there are no
fields.  Only  fields  of  operation  and  observation,  only  fields  of  electromagnetic  attraction  and
repulsion, only fields of hatred and coercion” (134). No wonder when he looks up and sees the sun
punishing the earth, and both punishing the people, he can do nothing but blame this same people
for not taking into account the consequences of our communal way of living in relation to the
Rueda 89/209
Identity as Alterity
planet that supports us. We will talk more about the environment in the last section, but let us
anticipate this by sharing this character's vision:
How would you begin? Well, we suspected that sacrifices might have to be made, later,
for all the wonderful times we had with our spray cans and junk-food packaging. We
knew there'd be a price. Admittedly, to you, the destruction of the ozone layer looks a
bit  steep.  But  don't  forget  how  good  it  was  for  us:  our  tangy armpits,  our  piping
hamburgers. Though maybe we could have got by with just roll-ons and Styrofoam.
(156)
The city is, no doubt, a structural, constitutive part of Baudrillard's simulacrum, just as it is a
very important piece in Amis and Auster's fiction. Baudrillard believes that the city does not derive
from nature, but substitutes it: “Simulation is no longer that of territory, a referential being or a
substance. It is generated by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal” (166), which
means that human beings have lost their ability to connect or communicate with anything that can
be considered natural or real whatsoever, because the System has replaced it leaving no margins,
showing no borders.  More real that the real,  this simulation of the city is the only life we are
allowed to live. Almost in the same terms, Debord considers the System is ubiquitous and self-
justified, as we can only access representations (37). Can we infer that we are living a lie, then? Not
necessarily; postmodernist thinkers are open to contradiction and paradoxes in every regard, as we
have argued elsewhere: “reality emerges in the spectacle, and the spectacle is real” (my translation,
my emphasis: 40). According to Debord, the spectacle does not take the subject anywhere but back
to the spectacle, keeping people “isolated and together” in “pseudocollectivity” (my translation:
146). Therefore the city, as a design by the System to contain it, directly affects every level of the
subject's life, intervening in its process of self-identification; this means that, in our novels, the city
will be represented as the perfect place for alterity and alienation.
According to Little, the use of the city as a symbol by literary authors implies a traditional
resonance within artistic representation; again it is metaliterary: witness the phrases ‘the book of the
world’ and ‘the book of nature’, and how, metaphorically, the spheres of reality have always been
Rueda 90/209
Identity as Alterity
considered  a  fiction  written by  either  human  or  divine  entities.  There  is  an  early  association
between manipulating  the  environment  and the  act  of  writing:  “as  early as  Plato,  we ﬁnd the
comparison between the dressing of a field [, plowing,] and writing”. Throughout the early and
middle Christian eras,  significance was something not  to be inscribed onto the earth but to be
discovered in it: Nicholas of Cusa remarks that there had been saints who regarded the world as a
written book  to be read.  However,  soon enough, the manipulation of the surroundings allowed
humans  to  write  ‘reality’ instead  of  just  reading  and  interpreting  it  (Mumford:  140-142).  For
Mumford then, the world turns into the “showing forth of the inner word” (142), a projection of the
human psyche. Hence the recurrent use of synecdoche in our novels; the city, the notebook, and so
on, become just such a manifestation of the inner self: “There was a time when I thought I could
read the streets of London, I thought I could peer into the ramps and passages, into the smoky
dispositions, and make some sense of things. But now I don't think I can. Either I'm losing it, or the
streets  are  getting  harder  to  read.  Or  both”  (367).  The  simulation  constitutes  a  scaled-down
representation of our universal human experience of life and identity: “Always the simulacrum,
never the real thing, that's art” (LF: 131)— always interpretation, never meaning, that's life. 
We do put together ideas of ‘reality’ or ‘self’, but they are not grounded in the real: our inner
life is reflected in or projected on our surroundings; therefore we imprint meaning onto reality and
we infer meaning from nature, as well. These are ultimately the prevailing ideas in our novels, and
everything our characters will ever achieve is a reflection of emptiness, of alterity. On these lines,
Little interprets the references to the elements in the Trilogy, reflecting on the importance of time,
space and nothingness, and how these concepts affect Auster's characters. He argues that in the
book, for the ‘now-here’, there is a ‘no-where’ and characters recognize several times that they do
not  feel  they  are where  they are;  for  example,  Blue  reflects  in  Ghosts: “Writing  is  a  solitary
business. It takes over your life. In some sense, a writer has no life of his own. Even when he's
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there, he's not really there. Another ghost.” (172). Another key concept in relation to the city and
our novels is therefore the presence of ‘ghosts’; in the chapter de Certeau calls ‘Ghosts in the City’
(133-144) (subtitled: ‘An Uncanniness of the “Already There” ’) he reflects on the importance of
“legendary objects” in  the city,  or historical  places and monuments  (135):  “The renovated ‘old
stones’ become places for transit between the ghosts of the past and the imperatives of the present.
They are passageways on the multiple frontiers that separate periods, groups, and practices” (137).
If this is so, then New York represents for Auster the perfect city for intertextuality, full of bridges
that interconnect his fiction to the past through space in several instances, like: “On this same spot,
in the summers of 1843 and 1844, Edgar Allan Poe had spent many hours gazing out at the Hudson”
(82); “Walt Whitman handset the first edition of Leaves of Grass on this street in 1855, and it was
here that Henry Ward Beecher railed against slavery” (135); or “Many great men28 have gone there,
says Black. Abraham Lincoln, Charles Dickens” (my emphasis: 171).
However, as a result of being a ghostly place, the city transforms itself/is transformed  into
“a kind of anti-topos, a place of absence” —although it is a geographical and historical setting,
(Little: 150). That is the extent to which Auster's New York is mutable: 
The world was outside of him, around him, before him, and the speed with which it kept
changing made it impossible for him to dwell on any one thing for very long […] On his
best walks, he was able to feel that he was nowhere. And this was all he ever asked of
things: to be nowhere. New York was the nothing he had built around himself, and he
realized that he had no intention of ever leaving it again. (4)
In this passage, the modern city is presented both as a desirable place (if you are interested in
disappearing) but also as something that we no longer belong to; paradoxically, it is the place they
want to escape from and the place some characters chose to escape to. As we will continue to argue
throughout this paper, the city, as part of the System, is a self-built illusion from which we have
become dissociated; the simulacra that it generates— consumerism, capitalism—, have gone too far
28 We will discuss in chapter 4 about the exclusive male literary heritage that Auster and Amis, among many other 
male writers, constantly refer to.
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and for too long and all too fast, resulting in an overwhelming amount of alienation for the subject:
“Really the thing about life was its incredible rapidity, with people growing up and getting old in
the space of a single week. Like the planet in the twentieth century, with its fantastic coup de vieux”
(LF: 36). 
In both of our novels, the resulting relationship between the subject and its reality is shown
as delusional, but Amis's characters do not find escape by wandering around London's streets; the
weather makes it impossible, yet it is the place of escapism that the American Samson Young, the
narrator, has chosen. Young will never leave London either; he does not know for certain yet, but he
intuits he has come to the city to be terminated: “If London's a spider web, then where do I fit in?
Maybe I'm the fly. I'm the fly” (3). He is in London willingly in order to evade his disease and his
previous life, and ultimately to disappear, and yet he feels like he is trapped in a world he no longer
wants to be in, as we will see in the next chapter. Similarly, every one of the characters in the
Trilogy is trapped inside the System, each of them living a life in which they are deceived, that is
founded on principles that they themselves do not understand. The individual is actually consumed
by what he consumes in such a reality; the commodity, label or whatever symbolic entity ultimately
becomes the individual, the appearance/simulacrum becomes reality and as a consequence we will
see characters that are no more than walking illusions. But this is also the most alienating world, a
world where people, like Keith, worship the image, the fake; and people like Nicola rise to the
superior (in the System) category of the fantasy. However, some of our characters no longer wish to
live in this type of world. For some, disappearance, dissolution or plain death is what they seek to
escape  from this.  After  all,  the  self,  at  least  some notion  of  a  subjective  self,  is  no  longer  a
possibility; as we will see in chapters 3 and 4, the result of this is that identities are slipping away,
overlapping, transforming and disappearing, which directly affects characterization in our novels.
This is the context for Amis's and Auster's deliriums. Both authors can be considered to
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represent  a  branch  of  what  Baudrillard  calls  a  ‘new  humanism’,  one  that  embodies  ‘serial
conditioning’ through the nihilism of consumerism. In his simulacrum, objects are used to allow
fulfillment and liberation; as individuals we are only free to “project one's desires onto produced
goods” ("The System..."12). However, freedom is negative for the control centers of the state, and
therefore it is literally impossible. Consequently, in order to mediate our interpretation of the real, a
new language is created within the System, that of brands (10-15). We do not have a choice but to
take part in the System, yet its experience is not satisfactory, as “boredom and harassment and
depression [have been] brought about by this daily shuttling between dormitory and workplace”
(Mumford: 549). Because of all this, escapism is a craving for postmodern individuals. Our reality
lacks cohesion and therefore the self is bound to “disappear into products which have a greater deal
of coherence” than reality itself, certainly more coherence than any other elements in reality that
used to support self-identification (Mumford: 15). In the city, or the System, we are permanently
exposed  to  innumerable  “ﬂoating  signs”  (Sarup:  167)  and  nothing  is  stable,  which  Mumford
curiously enough interprets in the same way as Stillman Sr.: “Here we have the tower of Babel:
each  item speaks  its  own idiom” (15).  Quinn,  Blue,  Fanshawe,  the  nameless  narrator,  Nicola,
Guy....they all wish to disappear, but not through “the act of buying, [which] is surrounded by the
halo  of  a  ‘motivation’ that,  one might  say,  precedes  it  before  its  completion:  faithfulness”  (de
Certeau: 19), because they have already lost faith: “[Faith], the President's wife was already dead”
(LF: 394). In these novels, once they lose connection with reality, the others, their selves, and the
System, they will  have to  find a new way of  escapism that  is  not  the generally spread act  of
consumerism.  But  is  it  even  possible?  As  we  have  argued  until  now,  it  appears  not;  but  our
characters, in their desperation, will find new ways of opposing the System, of disappearing, and it
turns  out  that  the  only  possible  solution  for  them  will  be  self-destruction  as  a  means  for
empowerment, as we will explain in the next two chapters. However, for now, only one thing is
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certain: one can never go back from the realization that what we called identity has turned out to be
alterity and that this leaves the subject with very limited options for self-realization and a huge
feeling  of  frustration  and  meaninglessness;  this  will  be  the  nature  of  the  epiphany all  of  our
characters will experience at one point, just as Quinn does: “It had been a bridge to another place in
his life, and now that he had crossed it, its meaning had been lost” (NYT: 128). Taking into account
all the information in this chapter, the following one is devoted to characterization, agency and
authorship in The New York Trilogy and London Fields. We will also be focusing on escapism as it
appears  in  these  novels;  for  this  matter,  we  will  refer  to  Walden and  El  Quixote as  literary
antecedents for the ideas portrayed by these authors within their postmodernist reinterpretation.
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3. Postmodern personalities: revisiting Walden and El Quixote
In the previous chapter we inevitably went in circles, not unlike Stillman Sr. and Quinn in
City of Glass, as every major topic we dealt with took us back to alterity as the only fate. The
struggle for self-identification (and its inevitable failure) appears in Auster and Amis as a negative
search that all characters are bound to embark upon, an epic song to disappearance, to an uncertain
end. Having realized the forgery that reality  is, our characters confront a difficult choice; that is,
shall they rebel against the System or rather play by its rules? If the answer is to play, the subject
must leave behind so-called moral limitations; this means that going along with the System has dark
implications: you will most likely end up using or hurting others directly or collaterally (Jelin: 108).
If the answer is not to play, then, as de Certeau notices, in the city, solitude is the only option:
“When the public sphere no longer offers a place for political investment, men turn into “hermits”
in the grotto of their private living space. They hibernate in their abode, seeking to limit themselves
to tiny individual pleasures” (147). Characters like Quinn and Fanshawe, in the Trilogy, or Guy, in
London Fields, will abandon their previous convictions and commodities in order to connect with
others and their selves; they are characterized by their lack of action, an apparent passivity. Other
characters like Nicola (LF) or the nameless narrator of The Locked Room will embrace the System
and actively play by its  rules  in  order  to  gain  power  and  agency.  Both  sets  of  characters  are
categorically against the System, as they can never fit in and urgently desire to rebel against it; they
all search for an escape and they will all suffer the consequences of trying. On one hand, the former
retreat into solitude and isolation, limiting everything physical in favor of a contemplative attitude
that  resembles  the  intentions  of  Thoreau  when  he  left  society  and  wrote  Walden:  “I  hear  an
irresistible voice which invites me away from all that” (Thoreau: 5). Meanwhile, on the other, the
latter play by the concealed rules of the game, like nowadays Quixotes who, after elaborate (and
sordid) adventures of their own creation, realize they were always real people wearing a mask, just
Rueda 96/209
Identity as Alterity
as Cervantes's character does: “Although I have positively been [crazy], I wouldn't like to confirm
that truth in my death. […] I am Don Quixote de la Mancha no more, but Alonso Quijano” (my
translation: 1040). Like Don Quixote, Nicola and the nameless narrator's strategy is to pretend to be
someone else in life, in effect altering their relationship to the others, who they use, but as part of
their desperate search for their own self to emerge. Related to this, in  City of Glass Quinn asks
himself: “He wondered why Don Quixote had not simply wanted to write books like the ones he
loved—  instead of living out their adventures” (98); a question we will try to satisfactorily answer
throughout this, and the next chapter.
In  this  chapter,  we  are  focusing  on  escapism  and  the  way  it  is  reinterpreted  under  a
postmodernist  lens.  In our  novels,  as we have seen,  escapism is  an intrinsic  constituent  of  the
postmodernist discovery of one's true self, or, more accurately, the discovery of the absence of it.
For the reinterpretation (or rewriting) of previously conceived ideas and themes related to escapism
in literature, our authors will specifically revisit two of their literary fathers29, specifically Thoreau
and Cervantes, both of whose works are celebrated pieces of the  international literary canon and
highly representative  of their  respective national literary traditions. Our authors consider, as we
have seen elsewhere,  that there is  no escape from the System, neither  physically nor mentally;
characters are always reinserted in the System, with the certainty that there is no real or stable
identity; therefore these characters become representative of a number of the different issues that
affect postmodern personalities: “No wonder there is quite a generous pinch of schizophrenia in
each  postmodern  personality  [and  there  are]  effects  on  popular  morality  and  politics  in  a
postmodern  context”  (Bauman,  Z:  32).  Auster  and  Amis  therefore  must  reinterpret  previously
existing literary conventions in order to reinvent the novel, and to make both the themes and the
novels more attuned to our times. The authors themselves are also trying to symbolically escape
29 Again gender is marked and emphazised; the issue of exclusively male voices in these novels as well as in literary 
tradition will be dealt with in chapter 4.
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from the constrictions of literary tradition. They focus on creating the thickest of mists around the
figure  of  the  author  and  the  notion  of  agency  in  their  novels  as  well,  thus  highlighting
metanarrativity  and  self-reflectivity  in  order  to  deliberately  complicate  and  problematize  the
reader's understanding,  and to get us lost in in a web of authors and agents in a fiction that is
difficult to disentangle. They also transgress barriers in characterization; by stripping the characters
and narrators of their identity, new and interesting interpretations of previous tropes, archetypes or
types will be possible, as we will see later. According to Stevenson, narrators have had two options
left from the 1920's on, and even more so after WWII; either to reproduce the fragmentary nature of
contemporary experience  or  try  to  escape  from it,  often  ending in  “openness  and uncertainty”
(Stevenson: 152); this is how both our novels end. This is so to such an extent that we believe all
writers/characters in the Trilogy end up losing the urge to describe reality: “I've been at it for more
than a year already, and nothing could be more boring. I'm so bored that sometimes I think I'm
losing my mind” (177). On the other hand, Samson never had any interest in describing reality
anyway; rather, he was always interested in escaping from it: “Sometimes I wonder whether I can
keep the world situation out of the novel: the crisis, now sometimes called the Crisis (they can't be
serious)” (64). Therefore they are trying to escape reality through their writing, drowning in the
notebooks and the city, choosing language over anything else because, as Debord puts it, we can
never grasp both the real and its sign simultaneously (81), and the linguistic sign is less ambiguous
than the real (15). As they have lost a pillar in reality, fearful that they might disappear, we can say
our  characters  follow  an  unconscious  motto:  ‘I  write,  therefore  I  exist’;  hence,  their  identity
originates again in the realm of alterity. But, nevertheless certain images of reality filter through the
words,  contaminating  them  with  ambiguity  and  leaving  us  readers  with  the  difficult  task  of
interpreting and labelling the actors in these novels.
Of course, it was not always like this. As Docherty puts it,  “Once upon a time, there were
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novels with plots, ethnographic settings, and recognizable individuals known as characters” (38); it
was  a  moment  when  identity  was  interesting  in  both  political  and  religious  terms,  which  he
pinpoints in time as the early days of Protestantism and Capitalism. We do not mean identity is not
present in official discourses anymore, but that “Identities are [known to be] constituted within not
outside  representation  […],  they  relate  to  the  invention  of  tradition  [and]  arise  from  the
narrativization of the self, but the necessarily fictional nature of this process in no way undermines
its discursive, material or political effectivity” (Hall "Who needs...?": 4). Identity will most likely
always be necessary for the System and probably, mankind will continue to build and be built out of
discourse. And so identity, built out of discourse, exists as an ontology that is necessary for our
being to have purpose, or as Cohen puts it: “imagination must then make a presentation that allows
for synthesis of the type whereby an Idea of humanity is conserved” (110). At the same time, the
harsh criticism of a subjective notion of identity on the part of postmodernist thinkers paradoxically
frees us from all its flaws and constrictions, as our authors represent a less stable, plural and at the
same time empty type of identity in these novels. As we said earlier, identities produce margins and
outsiders, however, they also produce “subjectivities, which construct us as subject, who can be
‘spoken’ ” (Hall "The Question...": 5-6). This subject has been a constitutive part of the novel from
its origin; therefore our authors must incorporate this quandary into their fictions: to what extent can
the literary subject resist as such if all his traditional characteristics are taken away? In Peacock's
opinion,  it  will  resist  nonetheless  because,  no  matter  how  consciously  rejected,  apparently
individuality and the self emerge against all odds; for him, a character like Fanshawe “serves to
emphasize only that an individual somehow hangs together despite being a mass of irresolvable
contradictions. This is all anyone can know about anyone” (Peacock: 82). This way, even the ‘anti-
characterization’ we will find in these novels produces subjects through what Docherty calls the
“seduction of characterization”, even those characters whose identity is based on total alterity or
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“the ‘economy of identity’ changed for ‘economy of alterity’ ” (40). 
As we have said, the literary subject has been the basis for the novel as a genre, therefore, to
understand how we got here, we should briefly consider its fundamental characteristics by the hand
of critics like Bakhtin, who recollect the historical formation of the subject in the novel and the
‘chronotopes’ or types it has traditionally been related to. To this end he introduces the  archaic
genres and considers their continuing influence on the imagery of literature. There are, for him,
three predecessors of the novel: Greek romance, adventure novel and biography, and each of them
introduces  new parameters  and tropes  that  would be  widely reproduced.  Greek romance is  the
oldest; within the chronotope of the adventure, it represents the quest of a hero, who's on a road
where  representatives  of  all  social  classes  are  bound to coincide  (243-246).  Because it  usually
happens in an indeterminate point in time and space, the resulting world is often an “abstract-alien,
since the world from which the author came and from which he is now watching is nowhere to be
found” (101). Hence, there is no social critique or even relationship between the author's and the
intended readers' society and the one depicted by the romance. Besides, the human connection with
fate is considered external; divine intervention and chance are more active forces than free will.
However,  in  a society that was starting to conceive the universe as geocentric  and man as the
supreme king of creation, this complete determinism and alienation in literature would soon evolve
into new forms, more complete and more realistic, as it were with the corresponding changes with
regard to the nature of identity and the depiction of character. 
To  illustrate  these  developments,  Bakhtin  goes  on  and  points  out  how  later  adventure
narrative would go a step further in several ways:  The Golden Ass, by Apuleius, is taken as an
example of this predecessor of the novel. Although it starts as a false autobiography, Lucius not
only suffers the twists of chance through fictitious metamorphoses, but he is thrown onto the road
and put in the “unprivileged” position (as an ass) of the observer and bearer of every-day life's
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injustice. After this suffering, he is purified and released from the spell; therefore, “ineluctability is
human; it is not mechanical or depersonalized” in this second archaic genre. That is, he maintains
his identity. On top of that, not only social critique upon the author's society is present through
satire but, here, “the temporal sequence is an integrated and irreversible whole” (119), unlike in the
romance, as we previously discussed. The third ancient type of narrative according to Bakhtin is
biography. Biography gives more importance to the chronotope of biographical time and allows
different variants of itself to be born: the hero, as a token representative of mankind, must pass
through the course of a whole life, just as a real man does. The chronotope of “the life course of one
seeking true knowledge” (130) is introduced; thence real biographical time dissolves into the idea of
achieving the epiphany. The recollection of someone's deeds as a lament for his death as a public
discourse is an innovation at this point too. These accounts of real individuals'  interventions in
public life, though not entirely realistic, gave origin to the biographical chronotope (131-135). In all
cases, the notion of identity is stable. Furthermore in relation to the disposition of the events in the
chronological sense and to characterization, he notes there is no requirement for any strict order of
occurrence, because the events will always be arranged in a convenient order, so that one or two
main  events  can  define  the  characters'  attitude  towards  life.  Every step  in  the  development  of
biography progresses  toward the  representation of  the  self  as  a  more  specific  entity,  a  hero or
protagonist portrayed more as an individual than as a type. Later, after the fossilization of these
conventions, satire and self-satire spread strongly, a modality that keeps on developing to our days,
with examples like Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse5; a satirical account of the author's participation in
WWII where he mixes fiction and fact to create a fabulous science-fictional account.
Developing from all this, the individual, round, canonical protagonist would finally appear
in the Middle Ages and would have great impact on the European novel (142-146). From all three,
this biographical subject is the most criticized by postmodernist authors, who will totally undermine
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biography as  such:  we  have  recollections  of  our  protagonists’ deeds  but  they  acquire  no  life-
changing true knowledge, no evolution, no fulfillment of their desires and, although some of our
characters will die, there is no panegyric intention whatsoever. Our authors reject the trend where
“human beings have come to imagine themselves as the subjects of a biography. […]. To make this
intelligible  to  themselves[,  people  use]  rituals  of  storytelling,  supported  by  artifacts  such  as
photographs, etc. ” (Rose: 143). Our authors reflect openly, as we have said elsewhere, on how this
illusion helps the characters carry on in spite of their lack of real motivations. For example, TV,
especially in Amis, shapes people's expectations of life and the core of their identity: “When Nicola
walked down the street, she was lit  by her personal cinematographer, nothing too arty either,  a
single spotlight trained from the Gods” (69). This is also a theatrical figure of speech to refer to the
highest part of theatre and suggests that Nicola is always a performer, always the protagonist. But
this does not automatically create a stable subject; this is only another discourse of identification
based on outer  conventions.  No matter  where our  characters look for  inspiration,  TV, tabloids,
literature, or politics, the world has lost its own biographical right; reality is a simulacrum, past,
present and future can interconnect no more: “the present has torn the fabric of infinite existence; it
ignores history. It comes starting out from now” and therefore causality and realism are lost in real
life, and even more so in art. Hence, the life these characters endure “is an enchantment in relation
to  itself”  (Levinas:  56),  something which  Blue  realizes  in  Ghosts:  “perhaps  a  moment  of  real
contact would break the spell” (143). For characters who are farther from the need of representation
through things, there will be nothing external to reassure them of their identity; note, for example,
what Blue finds in Black's room: “The room is much as he imagined it would be, though perhaps
even more austere. Nothing on the walls, for example, which surprises him a little, since he always
thought there would be a picture or two, an image of some kind just to break monotony, a nature
scene perhaps, or else a portrait of someone Black might once have loved” (181). As we see, there
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is nothing that allows Blue to get to know just who this other is; nothing to identify him or to
identify him with.
Rather than being identifiable this way, our characters are more influenced by the previous
romance and adventure chronotopes, albeit with a postmodernist twist, while the one related to the
stable  concept  of  autobiography (the  one  that  extensively  influences  Realism)  is  rejected.  For
example, Guy Clinch is described as a modern version of a knight:
GUY CLINCH WAS a good guy— or a nice one, anyway. He wanted for nothing and
lacked  everything.  He  had  a  tremendous  amount  of  money,  excellent  health,
handsomeness, height, capriciously original mind; and he was lifeless. He was wide
open. Guy possessed, in Hope Clinch, a wife who was intelligent, efficient (the house
was a masterpiece), brightly American (and rich); and then there was the indubitable
vigour of the child... But when he woke up in the morning there was— there was no
life. There was only lifelessness. (27)
As we can gather from this description, which is the beginning of chapter 3, "The Foil", Guy seems
to  be  perfect  for  society's  standards;  according to  business  guru  Tom  Peters:  “contemporary
organizational reform accords ontological priority to a particular category of person – the ‘business
person’ or ‘entrepreneur’ ”; therefore, logically, a white male is more likely to become successful
or, as Weber also calls it, he is by definition “the dominant type” (Dugay: 152). Nevertheless our
modern knight is also obsolete and he is bound to be torn apart by virtually everybody he interacts
with in  London Fields. Like Cervantes, Amis believes the “chivalry” code is no longer a viable
option in society as it is; therefore he will ridicule Guy Clinch as the ‘ass’ in this story30. Moreover,
the strangeness of the world depicted is  also in a way romance-inspired; because what we are
experiencing are but simulacra, the world is literally “nowhere to be seen”, which is paradoxical
again because the settings are modern New York and London: in “the tradition of Joyce and the
modernist artificers, we find the date, so that the work, with all its indeterminate self-reflection, all
its postmodern ‘floating signifiers’ is positioned at a concrete point of time, place, and authorship,
30 In chapter 4, there is a quote by Amis where he expresses his thoughts on this kind of masculinity (159).
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signed, as it were, and affirmed as a crafted artefact” (Lavender: 230). In other words, by insisting
on their existence in real life, the effect the authors create is the exact opposite, one of artificiality. 
As we have been arguing throughout this paper, our authors imply social critique as well as
humor by distorting reality so much; at this point, both chronotopes, romance and adventure, are
mixed to bring this about: in his mind, Guy Clinch is a knight searching for his one true love but in
real life, Nicola is no Dulcinea and Guy is being put in the position of the ass: he is a real Quixote.
Not only are all social classes bound to be found on the journey, but also our characters will lose
any position of privilege they ever had in society: a character like Guy Clinch will spend his time
more and more with the Black Cross gang, degrading himself to a Sancho Panza position in relation
to Keith; or a quite successful writer such as Quinn will change into a homeless man in a matter of
days with neither regrets nor hesitation. If they ever had any social status, these characters are going
to lose it in order to embark on this journey: Quinn, Blue, Fanshawe, the nameless narrator, Young,
Keith or Guy, they all fall in these novels. In fact, Nicola is a quixotic character herself, as we will
see, but she does not fall in the same way; although she does die, that is exactly her purpose from
the very beginning, so we must assume that she is in control of her destiny (in chapter 4, we will
discuss whether Nicola can be considered to exercise real agency throughout the novel).
From the adventure chronotope, both authors take the perspective of the quest in search of
true knowledge, but our protagonists will not be rewarded with an epiphany, nor will they be able to
break ‘free from the spell’ as Apuleius did. On their quests, both in the Trilogy and London Fields,
we have a series of protagonists who turn into detectives in search of true information, in order to
solve a mystery that will be deceiving. However, critics such as Dennis Porter or Stefano Tani,
believe that these are the characteristics of a ‘genre’ considered “antidetective”, “metaphysical” or
“postmodern” detective fiction (O'Gorman 44); this  type of narrative usually is more about the
“process of reading” than about the actual research of the PI.  Hence, these stories have multiple
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interpretations, they refuse to restore order, and reject the monopoly of the truth by undermining
any source of authority, including the reader (Peacock: 44-45); as Szegedy-Maszák points out, this
is “the false teleology of ironic works, and the reader's desire will not be satisfied” (55). Similarly,
O'Gorman also notes that the authors use this device in order to compare detective fiction with
historical  writing;  they  both  require  coherence,  congruence  and  verisimilitude,  retracing  and
ultimately recovering  the  past  (44-45):  “This  [traditional]  model  of  detective  fiction as  history
presupposes the existence of one prior, correct version of the past, at which it is possible to arrive
by a careful process of recovery,  and to which it  is imperative to owe allegiance” (20). In our
novels, our detective characters do recognize this logical similitude, as they appreciate how similar
what they are doing is to paleontology: for example, in City of Glass, Stillman “made Quinn think
of an archaeologist inspecting a shard at some prehistoric ruin” (59); and, in  London Fields, the
narrator directly relates it to the process of reading; he imagines how the readers of the future, the
ones  remaining  after  the  cataclysm,  will  uncover  the  past,  the  fossils  being  the  characters
themselves: “dinosaurs would we be exhumed (the cheat, the foil,  the murderee),  would we be
reconstructed and remembered by the rat,  the roach, the triumphal virus?” (204). However,  our
detectives are unable to gain access to the past first hand; by definition, there will always be the
intervention of an ‘author’ to some extent as historian, which Little believes postmodernist writers
use “in order to draw attention to the blindness that always accompanies the insight of a private
eye/I” (138).
Accordingly, all open cases are misleading in our novels; we can only speculate but can
never assume our interpretations are complete or true; nevertheless, we do have clues that we can
put  together  in  order  to  give  coherence  to  the  apparent  mess  of  voices,  points  of  view  and
nothingness in these novels. During this chapter and the next, we will collect some hints that (we
like to think) have been left for us in the novels to try and solve these cases as detectives ourselves;
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but these are our only certainties: Quinn never solves the Stillman case, neither does Blue, nor does
the narrator get real satisfaction from finding Fanshawe, or what's left of him. For Young the case is
similar; he will realize that, during his whole time in England, neither the book nor his life have
been under his control at all (as it had first appeared to be), and he will be forced to write (and
perform) an unexpected final scene. Our characters, in their reports, usually feel their own words
escape from the paper; as they strive towards a realistic account they do not quite capture anything
at all: “It is as though his words, instead of drawing out the facts and making them sit palpably in
the world, have induced them to disappear. This has never happened to Blue before” (NYT: 145).
For Samson Young, following the characters is a “mission” (452), but London is a trap and he will
not fulfill his prospects as he wanted; the plot does not quite go the way he planned it: “I couldn't
stop them, I don't think, even if I wanted to” (1).
Because  of  all  this,  epiphanies,  as  in  revelations  of  the  truth,  in  our  novels  are  either
nonexistent or take the characters to a dead-end street31, which brings us to the last characteristic
Bakhtin considers, that is, the question of fate: ineluctability is presented as probably a mixture of
mechanical  destiny,  chance,  and human intervention in  our  novels;  but  it  is  never  to  be under
control, just as with identity. According to Peacock, in  Auster's universe “life's only certainty is
chance” (11), but we believe that chance is the starter of the action only superficially; in the Trilogy,
the setting is realistic, but it is a fact that the events that happen are too strange to happen only by
chance; it is on the reader's part to find some clues that there is an apparent greater scheme that the
characters are drawn into and within which they play their part. For example, Quinn's implication in
the Stillman case is apparently fortuitous:
It was a wrong number that started it, the telephone ringing three times in the dead of
night, and the voice on the other end asking for someone he was not. Much later, when
he was able think about the things that happened to him, he would conclude that nothing
31 "Dead-End Street" is the name of chapter 4 in LF, and it is mostly about Keith and his first encounter with Nicola at 
her house. 
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was real except chance. But that was much later. In the beginning, there was simply the
event and its consequences. Whether it might have turned out differently, or it was all
predetermined  with  the  first  word  that  came  from the  stranger's  mouth,  is  not  the
question. (1)
However,  although it  never  occurs  to Quinn that  he must  have been set  up (because all  those
mishaps do seem arbitrary and unconnected to him), and although he sometimes even turns to the
concept of  ‘fate’ to justify his position (108), just like Blue (183), that is only possible until he
learns, like Young in London Fields, that he is being somehow framed into this kind of life.
In spite of all this, for now, we will assume that apparently chance and coincidence trigger
the plot at all times, although we will see later in the chapter that Auster leaves other interpretations
open —even for Quinn's situation, the most bizarre and seemingly purposeless of all of the plots.
Moving on to Amis in this regard, the setting is ‘futuristic’ and apocalyptic, though, more in tune
with science fiction, and there is nothing left to chance; everything is causal and the present state of
affairs is a consequence of human behavior. Even the dropping of Nicola's diary was absolutely
intentional and so will be the concatenation of events it will start. So, can Nicola predict the future?:
“She always knew what was going to happen next (not all the time, the gift was not obsessively
consulted), and not every little detail; but she always knew what was going to happen next” (15-
16)32. Nevertheless, in our opinion, Nicola is not a psychic at all; as we will see in chapter 4, she
can only predict her own behavior and people's reactions throughout the novel because she is the
most manipulative of women, and knows a lot, among other things, about psychology (particularly
male). By the end of the chapter we will argue that there seems to be a greater plan also in London
Fields; there is a larger design over Auster's absolute chance and Amis's total determinism, a hidden
32 There are many instances in the novel that make us think that Nicola's ‘gift’ represents nothing but her expectations
and plans; for instance: “Nicola was an only child and knew she always would be” (16); she knows so because she
plans to be a very complicated child. In the following passages, Nicola plans how she wants her day to be; more
than being able to tell the future, she is able to manipulate the outcome of every situation on demand: 
Nicola stands on the crest of a slope with her new friend, pretty Dominique. And of course Nicola
knows what is going to happen next: the girl will hesitate or stumble: reaching out to steady her,
Nicola will accidentally propel her playmate downwards, down into the rocks and the briars. She
will then have to run and shout, and drive in silence somewhere, and sit on the hospital bench
swinging her feet and listlessly asking for ice-cream. And so it proves. (16)
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force that pushes the plots to their extreme.
Let  us return to  the notion of  the subject  in  the novel,  which,  as  we have pointed out,
developed over time to detach itself from being based solely on stereotypes. The novel has acquired
strength  as  a  very  popular  genre,  always  reinventing  itself,  reflecting  the  constant  interest  of
novelists to incorporate new trends from every discipline to better capture the complexity of the
experience  of  life,  as  Bakhtin  and  Docherty have  noted.  But  Docherty,  who focuses  more  on
modernist  writers,  goes  further  by  stating  that  the  overwhelming  impact  of  psychology  as  a
discipline on the novel has had characters coming back to their archetypal nature (38). As Rose
argues: “The psy disciplines, partly as a consequence of their heterogeneity and lack of a single
paradigm, have acquired a peculiar penetrative capacity in relation to practices for the conduct of
conduct. They have been able to supply a whole variety of models of selfhood and recipes for
action in relation to the government of persons” (139). Thence, although the basis for psychology is
hardly  universal,  it  has  managed  to  successfully  position  itself  as  the  main  agent  in  the
categorization of different kinds of people, reducing us humans, and not only characters, to types;
this  is  done by using labels that evidently come from without:  “We find ourselves bound to a
seemingly obsessional iteration of a slim repertoire of othering tropes” (Terdiman: 9). In Amis's
novel the labeling of these types is not subtle; the narrator very early enumerates the stereotypes he
is going to use in his book, only because, in his opinion, he just found them acting their roles in real
life. The narrator is also able to classify the genre of the story that is about to happen because he
happily  sees  himself  able  to  confirm  beforehand  that  the  story  will  have  all  the  necessary
ingredients: “This is the story of a murder. It hasn't happened yet. But it will. (It had better). I know
the murderer, I know the murderee. I know the means. I know who will be the foil, the fool, the
poor  foal  also  utterly  destroyed.  [...]A really  snappy  thriller.  Original,  too,  in  its  way.  Not  a
whodunit. More a whydoit” (1-3). Fortunately for us and unfortunately for him, neither the story
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nor the characters will satisfy Samson's first categorization, mostly because of the intervention of
Nicola as an actress incarnating a whole variety of types, as we will analyze deeper in chapter 4. As
we have seen, postmodernist narrative, in sum, only shows more transparently the same problems
dealing with identity that it always had, but calling into question previous intents of representing
the whole of reality or identity (Docherty: 38-39). These authors are able to take these archetypes as
their literary inheritance and transform them into the empty postmodern types we will next see; they
are ready to destroy the presumptions that the self is a stable concept in order to balance with the
actual instability of the referent: “Where the real world turns into mere images, those mere images
turn into real beings and effective motivations for a hypnotic behavior” (Debord, my translation:
43).
As it has already been suggested, and according to many critics, the interpretative techniques
of modern psychology have made it successfully into the novel. In her article about the constitution
of identity after the 70's, Wheeler states that the subject in fiction is “part a result of the influence of
psychological writing” (15), as psychology from its birth presents a new source for different and yet
real  experiences  of  life  in  subsequent,  sometimes  unconnected,  layers  of  thought;  therefore  it
challenges  literature  and  art  in  general  to  “turn  inward  and  probe  to  the  lower  levels  of
consciousness  for  its  material”  (Mendilow:  38),  and  this  is  very constructive  at  the  beginning
because it enriches the modernist novel “through stream of consciousness, recovered memory and
loops in  time” (Stevenson:  152).  Wheeler  also points to some very influential  works that have
experimented with the discoveries of psychology in order to present a new point of view in the
novel, for example,  Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hide, which brought to the page a character with a double
personality as a result of a psychiatric condition. Writers such as Stein, Joyce, Barnes or Woolf
deeply experimented with psychological perceptions in their  fictions,  a modernist  tendency that
continued to develop with Roth, Nabokov, Heller, Marguerite Young, Ann Quin or Susan Sontag,
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who present the self as a “network of values, attitudes or acts— with no substance (or soul) behind
it, no essence underneath the surface” (Wheeler: 15). As we have said before, Amis and Auster, as
their direct successors, emulate modernist fragmentation on all the levels of narrative, but they are
fully aware that, by incorporating the discourse of psychology the unconscious presents itself as the
deepest and the highest part of agency in the subject through “the complex operations by which we
internalize the  imperatives  and the rules  which  come from agencies  of  society”  (Ricoeur  "The
Question...":  238);  and  that,  together  with  the  mechanical  explanation  of  every  detail  of  our
everyday life, as presented in de Certeau's  The Practice..., leaves little room for free will in their
literary universes.
Psychology,  if  anything,  proves  “consciousness  is  cut  off  from  its  own  sense  by  an
impediment  it  can  neither  direct  nor  know  [...]:  the  dynamism  of  repression,  in  placing  the
unconscious beyond our reach, requires an interpretive technique adapted to the distortions and
displacements which are better illustrated by dream work and the work of neurosis” (Ricoeur: 238).
Therefore  it  not  only seems that  the  unconscious  governs  the  subject's  free  will  but  it  is  also
unreachable except through a discourse that is in accord with its obscurity; the analyst is always re-
interpreting the psyche, imposing order against the anarchy of thought, while identity is made to
appear too stable and conflict-free to correspond to the “uncertainty, fluidity, and discontinuity” of
adulthood (Wurgaft: 74). Considering all this, identity must be like a text, and “the meaning or
signification of the text is not necessarily enunciated by the text itself; one is forced to recognize
that its thematization can only be produced by the reader” (Haidu: 674). This metaphorical reader is
the analyst, who can only interpret the subject's psyche in his or her own subjectivity. Moreover, as
we have commented before, modern psychologists as influential as Lacan will insist on the notion
that a “stable ego is illusory”, as it is, in its totality, built on the image that others in general have of
us, particularly the image that we  think they have of us (Sarup 12-13). Hence, even psychology
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pushes identity out of the realm of the conceivable, positing alterity as the agency center of human
brains. Hence, for Wurgaft it “lives at the center of the individual, whom he governs in its own way,
even if it has dethroned the ego” (135); and for Baudrillard, psychoanalysis “applies the principle of
reality to the unconscious, thus transforming it into another simulacrum model” (122).
Undoubtedly conscious of all this, Auster and Amis are builders of new types of characters,
ones that capture the spirit of our times in postmodernist literature, and they confront a difficult
matter because it is known what type of categorization the psy disciplines have implanted and that
has  become well  rooted  in  society;  that  of  metal  illnesses.  Accordingly,  Auster  and Amis  will
capture a society that is mentally ill; as we saw in chapter 1, they believe even countries as well as
people go insane just in the same way: “Some had been insane all their lives, and some had gone
insane and then gotten better again and then gone insane again” (LF: 367). Something like this is
brought about by what individuals and societies have come to believe in (or are made to believe in
by  the  media),  or  have  ceased  to  believe  in.  Gabel,  for  example,  establishes  a  very  strong
parallelism between ideology and schizophrenia (Debord 173), and so we will find characters, such
as Stillman Sr. who want to reinstall sense in the System, which he calls the world: “[...] The Tower
of Babel stands as the last image before the true beginning of the world” (NYT: 43), although we
must remember that the man is insane, and so is every character with an ideology in these novels. In
the same way,  Debord talks about  the disassociation and catatonia that  conducts the subject to
‘spectacular  autism’;  with no real  interlocutors  outside,  our  characters  turn within in  search  of
safety and belonging: “This is a deception. We exist for ourselves, perhaps, and at times we even
have a glimmer of who we are, but in the end we can never be sure, and as our lives go on, we
become more and more opaque to ourselves, more and more aware of our own incoherence. No one
can cross the boundary into another—for the simple reason that no one can gain access to himself”
(NYT: 243). About Amis, critics say he displays a “hallucinogenic atmosphere” (Peacock: 61), while
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he  himself  has  to  say  this  about  his  protagonist  in  a  later  novel,  Money:  “[Self]  embodies
confidence, which is at last in my novels identified as a psychopathic state” (Tredell: 62). Therefore,
although direct criticism on psychology as such is not apparent in our novels, Amis does mock the
modern obsession for psychology as a means of escapism, as a savior;  he does so particularly
through the Clinch family. Apart from several therapists and counsellors to save their marriage, they
inundate  their  home  with  specialists  on  children's  behavior  for  their  son  Marmaduke,  who  is
portrayed as a child devil who abuses his father: “During these struggles, Marmaduke's lifelong
enthusiasm for hurting his father —and, within that, his specialization in hurting his father's genitals
— was given play only twice. A flying headbutt to the testicles, and an unrestrained blow with a
blunt instrument (a toy grenade-launcher) to the sensitive tip” (363). When the psychologists are
unable to catalog or control the child's behavior, Guy confronts what might be a hard truth: “But I
prefer Freud. I'd rather Marmaduke didn't like me for Freudian reasons. I don't like him just not
liking me because he doesn't like me” (155); this proves how people find comfort in the labels of
psychology more than in its ability to solve their problems.
In order to innovate in characterization, our authors are involved in a dialogue with tradition
throughout both novels by incorporating the  ‘ghosts’ of previous trends in the form of traditional
archetypes that are reinterpreted. One model that we have considered basic (embodied by masculine
characters only) is ‘the pilgrim’, an archaic protagonist in fiction that our authors will deconstruct in
their  novels because “living one's  life as a pilgrimage is  no longer  the kind of ethical  wisdom
revealed to, or initiated by, the chosen and the righteous” (Bauman Z: 21). This means that we can
take the religious character of actual pilgrims out of the equation in order to represent a quest that is
more personal, towards one's own identity and individuality. In his article "From Pilgrim to Tourist
…",  Bauman  chooses  the  pilgrim  as  a  referent  and  symbol  for  the  historical  development  of
identity;  he believes that although impelled by religion in the first place, pilgrims had a special
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capacity no one else in the System had: they would leave all the commodities of life in society
behind in order to commence a journey of self-recognition, far from all the city's  ‘distractions’ or
‘seductions’ that Baudrillard, Debord or Mumford talk about. In their self-inflicted odyssey, always
on the move, pilgrims will not have a dwelling place and they can settle for very little in this, and
every other regard. Bauman says the perfect place for pilgrims is the desert, as it was for Christian
hermits,  “a  land not  yet  sliced into places and for  that  reason [...]  the place for self-creation”.
(Auster)ity is the key for the pilgrim's successful escape from the constraints of the world, but to an
extent that the System does not like and does not allow anymore, so much so that Bauman argues
that their tendency to austerity constitutes the main reason why the church resented early hermits
and eventually channeled them into monastic life, characterized by rules and supervision. This is so
because as pilgrims freed themselves from material things they were in fact free (Bauman Z: 20-
21). In the same way, Protestants were less inclined to the material and they were rejected by other
Christians in Europe because, like Stillman Sr., they wanted to metaphorically bring “the desert to
the world” in the form of austerity (Bauman Z: 21). But Stillman is not the focus of our attention as
he is not a real pilgrim; his mission goes beyond himself alone: he wants to change language and
therefore society to make it heaven on earth, to bring back the Tower of Babel. Like Bauman's
pilgrims,  our  pilgrim-like  characters  pursue  an  isolated,  one-person  pilgrimage  with  no  solid
purpose but disappearance from the world: “To be inside that music, to be drawn into the circle of
its repetitions: perhaps that is a place where one could finally disappear” (NYT: 107).
As it is well-known, the US arose from pilgrimage more than any other modern society; the
rejected Puritans found a new kind of desert in the wilderness of America, a new kind of adventure
for which they are called Pioneers. For the characters in the Trilogy, pure American as they are,
there  is  a  sentimental  resonance  to  the  concept,  a  possibility of  freedom.  They can  track their
national roots as far as conquistadors, and they find themselves inclined to romanticize these types
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of historical personalities: “Fanshawe got his apartment in Columbus street,  he found the name
appealing”  (304);  or  the  fact  that  he  enjoys  so  much Raleigh's  History  of  the  World and  The
Journeys of Cabeza de Vaca, because what he wanted to do in literature and life was to “to haunt the
edges of things” (210). A Pilgrimage is for them the only beginning of history and probably the only
solution, or end, to it; but notice how they see no real possibility of really quitting society:
What if he just simply left? What if he stood up and went to the door, and walked away
from the whole business? He ponders this thought for a while, testing it out in his mind,
and little by little he begins to tremble, overcome by terror and happiness, like a slave
stumbling onto a vision of his own freedom. He imagines himself somewhere else, far
away from here, walking through the woods and swinging an ax over his shoulder.
Alone and free, his own man at last. He would build his life from the bottom up, an
exile, a pioneer, a pilgrim in the new world, but that's as far as he gets. (183)
Blue is inspired by the Founding Fathers and imagines he can break free from the case, the city and
society altogether, which inevitably links with Walden as well, as we will soon develop. This is a
hope that is recurrent throughout the Trilogy; (auster)ity and asceticism are praised and practiced by
all three (four?)33 main characters, who force themselves to live on only what they genuinely need:
For example, in the case of Quinn, “It turned out not to be much— and as it happened, less and less
as time went on” (112). 
These characters look for disconnection, for purity, for a spiritual experience of reality, but
as  there  is  no  more  uncharted  land  on  the  planet  to  be  explored/conquered  anymore,  there  is
nowhere physical to go; moreover identity is not a  ‘place to go’ either, as all the characters will
eventually learn; this is the origin of Blue's fears and anxieties regarding the possibility of leaving,
although he will later progressively retreat from society as a way of escapism. Quinn, on the other
hand, is the one character that is further from his identity from the beginning, due to the loss of his
wife and child, who previously anchored him on earth (in society). He refuses to use his own name
anymore and he has absolutely no social life  —“he had managed to outlive himself” (5); Quinn's
33 There are three main characters as there are three stories: Quinn and Blue are the clear protagonists of the first two 
stories, but in the third story both the narrator and Fanshawe can be considered the protagonist, as we will see later 
in the chapter when we focus on the narrators.
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transformation through pilgrimage will therefore be even more extreme, as we will see later. There
is also a character in London Fields that longs to leave his historical wealth and his physical reality
behind to be a pilgrim in search for love, for real life; that is Guy Clinch, a man secretly fascinated
by love and life: “He thought of his thoughts as explorers, in virgin territory” (216); and also by
poverty and austerity, for taking you closer to love and life: “And this is why Guy honoured [Keith]
and pitied him and admired him and envied him (and, he sometimes thought, even vaguely fancied
him):  because  he  was  poor”  (91).  Like  the  Trilogy's  characters,  Guy  neglects  his  physical
appearance and care while other characters insist on his evident deterioration: “You look like death”
(212);  to that,  he repeatedly asserts  “he never  felt  more alive” (142) and that  is  why his wife
correctly concludes: “You know what you look like? A hermit” (214).
According to Bauman, pilgrims, although detached from their material possessions and their
geographical and family roots, are still able to maintain their own version of a stable identity clear
because the path taken is their constant; like Parmenides, they focus on the riverbed and not the
water: “one can look back at the footprints left in the sand and see them as a road”, as a past leading
to a future, “a  progress towards” or “coming  closer to” that gives continuity and purpose; it is
teleological.  The  world  for  the  pilgrim and  his subjectivity  evolve  together  and on the  move;
“meaning and identity can only exist  as  projects” (21-22);  therefore his  happiness  rests  on the
search, not actual achievement. Auster's and Amis's pilgrims walk with a purpose only when acting
as  detectives;  they pursue  their  counterparts  obsessively,  recording their  every move:  Quinn is
Stillman's shadow, Blue follows Black, the narrator stalks Fanshawe, and Young intrudes into every
sphere of Nicola's, Keith's and Guy's lives in order to record the events in reality, that is the only
trace they will be able to look back to: “I write these words to keep my hand steady. And because
nothing means anything unless I write it down. There's some kind of absolute obligation here” (LF:
436). When following Stillman, Quinn eventually gets tired of following the man without figuring a
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purpose to his apparent lack of direction, up until he connects the dots in the map and realizes “How
much better it was to believe that all his steps were actually to some purpose” (61); but this is a
postmodernist  kind  of  pilgrimage,  so it  is  also open to  reconsideration:  “He had to  admit  that
nothing was sure: it  could well  have been meaningless” (69).  In fact,  even actual steps on the
ground are misleading because in the Trilogy, all the threads left to be followed are usually there in
order to confuse both characters and readers: “lt is a windless morning, so still that he can hear the
snow falling on the branches of the trees. No one else is about, and Black's shoes have made a
perfect set of tracks on the white pavement. Blue follows the tracks around the corner and then sees
Black ambling down the next street, as if enjoying the weather” (138). This is a false trace, like the
one Nicola left when throwing her diary away; Black wants Blue to follow him, to write about him,
so he is being tricked into following somebody that wants to be followed. This takes us back to
Derrida's idea of différance, when he recognizes that although there is a “trace” left from the other,
the other itself will never be present (Hägglund: 43); the other must come as the “no longer” or “not
yet” creating “spectrality, ghosts” (Hägglund: 47). This also relates to Lacan's reflection as to how
important is the view of others for the self to actually exist, which Blue finally proves right: “He
needs my eyes looking at him. He needs me to prove he's alive” (178); or as the narrator says about
the relationship of Keith with Nicola: “he wanted her for her belief in him, because she was the
other world, and if she said that Keith was real then the other world will say it too” (446). In spite of
the steps from others on the ground, the trace of their presence might always be misleading, as:
“how can identity be grounded without presence?” (Hägglund: 43).
“For the pilgrim, only streets make sense, not the houses— houses tempt one to rest and
relax, to forget about the destination” (Bauman, Z: 20); just as Debord, Baudrillard, Mumford, and
other authors say, pilgrims want to escape from this seduction of human shelter. Moreover, in the
Trilogy  and  London  Fields  the  pilgrimage  happens  in  the  streets  as  well.  In  an  existential
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pilgrimage,  our  pilgrims  intend to  leave  behind their  attachment  to  their  previous  identities  by
melting in with the city. Because real life is simulation, the city has no limits, as Guy realizes in
London Fields, “there was no edge. Only life, more life” (454). Therefore, in the city it is easy for
our characters to wander without a destination, which is a way of exercising their freedom in an
over-organized society: “More than anything else, however, what he liked to do is walk. Nearly
every day, rain or shine, hot or cold, he would leave his apartment to walk through the city— never
really going anywhere, but simply going wherever his legs happened to take him” (3). We know the
streets of Amis's London are a far more dangerous place to be, not only because of the harmful
climatic conditions, but because the Black Cross and its surroundings are full of dangerous people
too. In fact, Guy Clinch's pilgrimage is comparable to Dante's descent to hell, because it comes with
the fear of leaving the most comfortable social position. In his search for liberation, identification
and real love, Guy wants to reconnoiter the life that the lower classes live, which seems for him
closer to reality than his own:
Increasingly, Guy stopped going in [to work] and just walked the streets instead. Fear
was his guide. Like all the others on the crescent Guy's house stood aloof from the road,
which was all very well, which was all very fine and large; but fear had him go where
the shops and flats jostled fascinatedly over the street like a crowd round a bearpit, with
slotgame parlours, disastrous beaneries, soup queues, army hostels, with life set out on
barrows, on pingpong tables, on decapitated Portakabins— the voodoo and the hunger,
the  dreadlocks  and  dreadnoughts,  the  Keiths  and  Kaths  of  the  Portobello  Road.
Naturally  Guy  had  been  here  before,  in  search  of  a  corn-fed  chicken  or  bag  of
Nicaraguan coffee. But now he was looking for the thing itself. (35)
In this  description,  furthermore,  we can see him as a symbol of white supremacy and also the
phenomenon of gentrification of lower class neighborhoods by the elite, as Guy had in fact only
been here before for the intercultural commercial advantages represented by the chicken and the
coffee (another reference to post-imperialism and cultural  appropriation). However, Guy is now
here for the people, for the Other; he wants to experience the life of racial minorities and low class
people in London to give his own life a meaning.
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From all this, it should be clear that the basic characteristic of the pilgrimage, which is the
attainment of a better  understanding of oneself  and others by abandoning all earthly  bonds and
having the opportunity of coming back to civilization afterwards is not a realistic mission in the
current  System,  and  Bauman  acknowledges  this  in  his  article  by  presenting  the  three  natural
evolutions  of  the  pilgrim  in  postmodernity.  The  available  possibilities  for  those  who  want  to
emulate the original liberating purpose of a pilgrimage are  ‘the vagabond’,  ‘the tourist’ and  ‘the
player’ (28-32). Nevertheless, “They all favour and promote a distance between the individual and
the Other and cast the Other primarily as the object of aesthetic, not moral, evaluation; as a matter
of taste, not responsibility” (33). However, in our authors' universes, the Tourist has little future
because tourists never fully undergo the process of leaving their stable home behind; they plan their
movements  and keep  it  a  safe  adventure:  “the  strange  is  tame,  and no longer  frightens”  (29);
therefore they visit but the surface (the advertised part of their destination) before they are back in
the safety of identity and self-recognition, which is even reinvigorated by the contemplation of the
other (29-30). However, in our novels, no one is able to transgress the limits of propriety and then
be able to go back to sanity or life as they used to know it, although we will deal with the vagabond
and the player only when we can see them clearly in our characters. For example, we can recall the
moment in  London Fields when Guy first  ‘intrudes’ in the Black Cross, where he is practically
instantly harassed by Keith: “he had to step forward to deal with the royal tourist” (24); if he were a
tourist, Guy would not have been able to come back to the Black Cross after this first contact, but
he is on a larger mission, as we have said. 
It is not only in  London Fields that we can see someone like Guy captivated by, amongst
other things lacking in his life, the conditions of poverty; he also shares this fascination with the
characters in the Trilogy. The first time Quinn writes about something that is not the case he is
working  on,  when  he  is  starting  to  totally  disconnect  from reality,  he  gives  in  to  a  romantic
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description of the poor,  as if he has seen them on the street for the first time: “Today, as never
before: the tramps, the down-and-outs, the shopping-bag ladies, the drifters and drunks. They range
from  merely  destitute  to  the  wretchedly  broken.  Wherever  you  turn,  they  are  there,  in  good
neighbourhoods  and  bad”  (106).  For  Quinn,  as  for  Guy,  there  is  an  intrinsic  feeling  of  self-
identification with the homeless: “for every soul lost in this particular hell, there are several others
locked inside madness— unable to exit to the world that stands at the threshold of their bodies.
Even though they seem to be there, they cannot be counted as present” (107). Here, and as we have
read elsewhere,  invisibility appears as a desirable quality for our characters,  as an empowering
strategy against the machinery of society. What these characters aspire for is the actual freedom and
anonymity they see in the homeless, as we will continue to explain.
According to Zygmunt Bauman the System has been fighting against this attractive (to our
characters) condition of masterlessness that characterizes vagabonds. Society wants no outcasts, no
individuals out of control, yet the vagabonds' movements are unpredictable, errant; they move bit
by bit and with no apparent logic or destination. They are always a stranger in the place they are at
and they have no roots (29), something that Quinn unconsciously brings up by quoting Baudelaire
at the end of his digression on homelessness (and we say unconsciously because he still does not
know at this point that he will be one of the vagabonds soon): “It seems to me that I will always be
happy in the place where I am not34. Or, more bluntly: wherever I am not is the place where I am
myself. Or else, taking the bull by the horns: Anywhere out of the world” (108). Quinn had an
identity crisis before, but he is gradually reaching Bauman's conclusion; maybe the most powerful
move to make is to become homeless; therefore, with the excuse of the case, he installs himself in
an alley across the street from Stillman Jr.'s apartment for months. But the Stillmans will not show
up,  which  triggers  his  disconnection  from the  case  and  from the  world.  He  engages  then  in
seemingly  the  most  peaceful  and  happy  passages  of  the  whole  Trilogy,  which  are  Quinn's
34 Line 5 from Baudelaire's "Anywhere out of This World", included in the collection of poems Paris Spleen.
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descriptions of the weather; when he is utterly isolated with nothing but his thoughts, Quinn for the
first time immerses himself in what seems for him real life indeed: 
He spent many hours looking up at the sky. From his position at the back of the alley,
wedged in between the bin and the wall, there were few other things to see, and as the
days passed he began to take pleasure in the world overhead. He saw that, above all, the
sky was never still. […] Clouds, too, introduced the matter of color, and there was a
wide range to contend with, spanning from black to white, with an inanity of grays
between. These all had to be investigated, measured, and deciphered. On top of this.
there were the pastels that formed whenever the sun and the clouds interacted at certain
times of day.  The spectrum of  variables was immense,  the result  depending on the
temperatures of the different atmosphere levels, the types of clouds present in the sky,
and where the sun happened to be at that particular moment. From all this came the reds
and  pinks  that  Quinn  liked  so  much,  the  purples  and  vermilion,  the  oranges  and
lavenders,  the  golds  and feathery persimmons.  Nothing  lasted  for  long.  The  colors
would  soon  disperse,  merging  with  others  and  moving  on  or  fading  as  the  night
appeared. (114-115)
The beauty of these passages is revolting; he describes the scene just like impressionist paintings,
but it  is nevertheless grotesque,  particularly because we know this description is  being literally
made  from  a  dumpster,  where  Quinn  is  now  installed.  The  concept  of  the  grotesque  gets
reinterpreted  here,  this  is  due  to  a  certain  incongruity  between  the  decadence  of  his  physical
situation,  the pointlessness or absurdity of  his  vigilance and the hyperbolic  romanticism of the
descriptions of what he observes. He convinces himself this is the closest to an epiphany whose
origin  is  nature  (without  nature). Of  course,  the  most  preeminent  literary  referent  for  such  a
contemplation of nature, a connection that will grow more and more apparent during the novel, is
Thoreau's  Walden.  Henry David  Thoreau,  a  Concord  MA essayist,  believed  our  existence  was
mediated  too much by human constructs and advocated for a life of freedom (non-servitude) and
wildness (as early as the 1850's!). For that purpose, he moved into the woods and built himself a
shelter by Walden Pond, today a state reservation where Thoreau's Walden Bed & Breakfast and
Thoreau Cabin Site stand for all tourists to enjoy35.
While still untouched by men, Walden Pond and the life in it could bring the author to the
35 Information gathered from Google Maps.
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deepest  thoughts  upon what  our  nature  might  really be.  He once  and again  argues  about  how
humans  should  be  in  connection  with  the  earth  in  order  to  live  the  life  they are  supposed to
(biologically and spiritually):
The indescribable innocence and beneficence of Nature— of sun and wind and rain, of
summer and winter— such health, such cheer, they afford forever! and such sympathy
have they ever with our race, that all Nature would be affected, and the sun's brightness
fade, and the winds would sigh humanely, and the clouds rain tears, and the woods shed
their leaves and put on mourning in midsummer, if any man should ever for a just cause
grieve. Shall l not have intelligence with the earth? Am I not partly leaves and vegetable
mould myself? (67)
Thoreau  is  so  immersed  in  nature  that he  can  communicate  with,  or  at  least  understand,  the
language of the wind and the rain. However, Quinn is not that lucky; he is unable to leave the city
because there is nowhere to go. But nevertheless, even from a position where he cannot directly
experience nature, the sky, as a constant reminder of it, is enough for him to become aware, as
Thoreau did, that we are insignificant in a whole natural universe we are ignoring:
Almost always there was a wind to hasten these events. From where he sat in the alley,
Quinn could rarely feel it, but by watching its effect on the clouds, he could gauge its
intensity and the nature of the air it carried. One by one, all weathers passed over his
head, from sunshine to storms, from gloom to radiance. There were the dawns and dusks
to  observe,  the  midday transformations,  the  early  evenings,  the  nights.  Even  in  its
blackness, the sky did not rest. Clouds drifted through the dark, the moon was forever in
a different form, the wind continued to blow. Sometimes a star even settled into Quinn's
patch of sky and as he looked up he would wonder if it was still there, or if it had not
burned out long ago. (114-115)
Clearly, there are huge differences between the world of Thoreau and the world of Thoreau's Bed &
Breakfast, though. Quinn is captive in the city; he is not really free from the System because there is
no nature  to  turn to.  In  connection with  this,  here we must  see  the clear  contrast  with  Amis's
descriptions of the London sky; on the verge of collapse, the sky shows there is no comfort to be
sought  outside  of  the  System  anymore;  therefore  Amis's  characters  experience  an  even  more
extreme situation than Auster's:
The sky also was empty, blown clean, an unblinking Africa of blue. Down on the beach
the wind went for his calves like an industrial cleanser; Guy gained the hardened rump
of damp sand and contemplated the wrinkly sea. It opened inhospitably to him. Feeling
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neither vigour nor its opposite, feeling no closer to life than to death, feeling thirty-five,
Guy pressed on, hardly blinking as he crossed the scrotum barrier; and it was the water
that seemed to cringe and start back, repelled by this human touch, as he barged his way
down the incline, breathed deep, and pitched himself forward in the swimmer's embrace
of  the  sea...  Twenty minutes  later,  as  he  strode  back up the  beach,  the  wind threw
everything it had at him, and with fierce joy the sand sought his eyes and teeth, the
hairless tray of his chest. (33)
Here, there is no possible connection of man with nature,  because nature has turned hostile.  If
Thoreau found identity in the sky, our characters find alterity; these three very different descriptions
of the sky represent an evolution from a time when the experience of nature was remotely possible
to a time when natural elements are so exhausted by mankind that they seem to repel its  very
presence, to attack it, having turned into harmful agents. As we said in the introduction to this paper,
the sky is a reminder  of the state of human nature or simply the state of nature, a reality long
forgotten about or a reality long ignored by those who now engage in its contemplation:“Clinch had
looked up. Now he looked down. To him, clouds had always been the summary of everything that
could reasonably be hoped for from the planet; they moved him more than paintings, more than
exciting seas” (80); for Guy, losing (H/h)ope (remember that this is also the name of his wife) will
lead him straight into Nicola's trap: “Dead clouds made love hard. They made you want and need it,
though: love” (242). 
Although Thoreau is writing from the ‘oldest’ part of the States, industrialization has not yet
totally engaged the whole continent in his era, and he is not forced to be either a vagabond or a
tourist, he is able to chose to disconnect from the frenzies of society for more than two years and
still  return  as  a  sane  man,  a  pilgrim that  has  connected  with  his  roots  and  has  gathered  new
perspectives. So, Thoreau presents himself not as a pilgrim in nature anymore, but a pilgrim from
nature, now on holidays in society: “When I wrote the following pages, or rather the bulk of them, I
lived alone, a mile from any neighbor, in a house which I had built myself [...] I lived there two
years and two months. At present I am a sojourner in civilized life again” (1). On the other hand,
Quinn deteriorates immensely in just a few months time on the streets and becomes an  alien to
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himself: “Now, as he looked at himself in the mirror, he was neither shocked nor disappointed. He
had no feeling about it at all, for the fact was that he did not recognize the person he saw there as
himself” (117). He cannot go back home either, as someone else lives there now: “ ‘I've had some
difficulties lately,’ muttered Quinn by way of explanation ‘But it's only temporary.’ […] /  ‘This is
my apartment and I want you out. If you don't leave, I'm going to call the police and have you
arrested’ ” (123). As we can see, it is not a round trip for Quinn; in the real world, he does not exist
anymore: “It was gone, he was gone, everything was gone” (123). Bauman ironically recognizes
that “The world is catching up with the vagabond, and catching up fast. The world is re-tailoring
itself to the measure of the vagabond” (29); however our authors show the world keeps re-tailoring
itself so that not even vagabonds are allowed to exist parallel to the System; the consequence of
their transgression will be disappearance; they will metaphorically die and turn into invisible ghosts
—“We're the dead” (NYT:  261)—, unable to come back to the world of the living, which Amis
ironically shows through Guy:  “He looked round in fear  with the ghost's  eyes  of the deceiver.
Always this problem of reentry” (my emphasis: 291).
Another variant of the vagabond is Blue, and so is the nameless narrator, who makes himself
more apparent in the third story; like Quinn, they represent the search for their selves through their
projection on the other, namely Black and Fanshawe. In our opinion, they take a step further in the
same story because, unlike Quinn, they succeed in finding the “purpose” of their cases: Black and
Fanshawe both wanted to be followed from the beginning. When they realize this fatal truth, they
both  acquire  a  manuscript  they believe  is  going to  clarify things,  and they can  make  contact;
however, we can appreciate their failure because contact only brings violence and frustration, not
clarification. For Blue, all this contemplation that the case has implied takes him to a new sphere
where he identifies with Black as the same person; that is how he gets to his copy of Walden: “The
only way for Blue to have a sense of what is happening is to be inside Black's mind, to see what he
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is thinking, and that of course is impossible” (137). He feels the only way he can actually gain
access to the man's mind is by reading the same book (a book that we can suppose Black wanted
him to read) although at the beginning, as we have said, he is shocked by this non-fiction full of
nothingness: “What's all this about planting beans and not drinking coffee or eating meat? Why all
these innumerable descriptions of birds?” (160). 
However, it takes only months of Blue being alone and disconnected from everything else
for him to change his attitude and switch his  interest  from the case to  the same nature Quinn
observed, which he can now see from the window in Brooklyn that connects him to the outside:
Life has slowed down so drastically for him that Blue is now able to see things that have
previously escaped his attention. The trajectory of the light that passes through the room
each day, for example, and the way the sun at certain hours will reﬂect the snow on the
far corner of the ceiling in his room. The beating of his heart, the sound of his breath,
the blinking of his eyes—Blue is now aware of these tiny events, and try as he might to
ignore them, they persist in his mind like a nonsensical phrase repeated over and over
again. He knows it cannot be true, and yet little by little the phrase seems to be taking
on a meaning. (142)
It is then when he begins to feel like he has a purpose in life again, as he is making himself
believe  he  is  connecting  with  nature  and  the  other,  the  only  hope  we  have  of  grasping  self-
identification:  “There  are  moments  when  he  feels  so  completely  in  harmony  with  Black,  so
naturally at one with the other man, that to anticipate what Black is going to do, to know when he
will stay in his room and when he will go out, he need merely look into himself” (152). The need of
figuring  the  other out  as  a  self-justification  is  a  kick-start  for  the  narrator's  quest  too;  he  is
determined to find Fanshawe even when he  knows Fanshawe has  disappeared  willingly.  He is
practically living the other man's life and feels the same connection to him that Blue discovered
with Black; but he has done so since they were children, which feels like a quantum entanglement
or what Levinas calls ‘participation’: “One had the impression that through participation the subject
not only sees the other, but is the other” (Levinas: 43). For all these characters, desire for true
connection and understanding will stay unfulfilled and they will go through a great deal of violence
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and despair for trying to achieve it: Blue beats Black probably to death, both ending up all  black
and blue, while the narrator is about to shoot Fanshawe at the end, finally leaving him behind—
never to look for him again.  Both these characters have been framed into their pilgrimage, by the
very man whose tracks they are following and their own end is uncertain. Quinn's story, on the other
hand, also remains unfinished and unresolved. In sum, our pilgrim characters can never go back to
their former ‘identity’, and, as readers, we will never know what happened to them after the stories
are over, which is itself a postmodernist device writers often use in different forms: “circularity,
negative  teleology,  open  endings  or  multiplicity  of  endings  and  the  discontinuity  of  narrative
structures” (Sarup: 56). They have retaken modernist efforts to represent the apparent uncertainty of
the referent (Calinescu  FF: 303), which is evident for our authors, who allow alterity to filter to
every layer of the fiction, letting this différance remain even beyond the end.
As well as the consequences we have already mentioned, along with homelessness come
three basic  problems that Quinn enumerates: food, sleep and shelter (112-113). On the one hand,
Thoreau was able to build himself a respectable shelter in nature “for a lifetime at an expense not
greater than the rent which he now pays annually” (23), and relies on the soil for sustenance, for
example through his bean plantation: “they attached me to the earth, and so I got strength like
Antaeus” (75). Quinn, on the other hand, cannot access any natural source of food and finds no
shelter in the city and, as a consequence, he will embrace extreme starvation as he aspires towards
total detachment from the material. Quinn (and the rest of the pilgrim characters, to some extent)
wants to minimize his levels of consumption in order to be able to stay in his alley almost all day
and for longer; this way he will focus on the case only. But this hectic choice goes beyond a mere
logistical decision and is related to a more spiritual goal; he somehow wishes he could abandon his
bodily needs: “He kept total fast in his mind as an ideal, a state of perfection he could aspire to but
never achieve” (113); just like Thoreau in ‘Economy’, our characters become obsessed with keeping
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alive with as little as they need. This is precisely the point where the postmodern pilgrim meets the
postmodern ascetic: “He did not want to starve himself to death [...] — he simply wanted to leave
himself  free  to  think  of  the  things  that  truly  concerned  him”  (113);  therefore,  what  Quinn  is
searching for is more time and concentration to simply be.
Homelessness and starvation are recurrent throughout the Trilogy, and although Quinn is the
one who takes the vagabond to the extreme, homelessness is referred to in all the stories: Stillman
Sr. on the streets or Blue “in the garb of tramphood” (168) as Jimmy Rose are just a couple of
examples. Also the unnamed narrator remembers how Fanshawe had “persuaded [him] to spend the
weekend with him in New York— roaming the streets, sleeping on a bench in the old Penn Station,
talking to bums, seeing how long we could last without eating” (211), a custom that Fanshawe
continued to pull off throughout his life: “I watched you and Sophie and the baby36. There was even
a time when I camped outside your apartment building. For two or three weeks, maybe a month. I
followed you everywhere you went. Once or twice, I even bumped into you on the street, looked
you straight in the eye. But you never noticed. It was fantastic the way you didn't see me” (303).
This is what Fanshawe says to the narrator, again reflecting on the invisibility of vagabonds in
society. The topic is so interesting to Auster that it appears recurrently in his work; for instance in
Moon Palace the protagonist  almost starves to death, and takes refugee at Central  Park; this is
because, as Peacock argues, Auster himself had experienced being on the edge of poverty while in
France, where he spent some of his formative years (1). Nonetheless, characters like Fanshawe or
Quinn, are not the only ones who find inspiration and peace in the abstinence from food; in London
Fields  we have  Hope  Clinch  referring  to  her  husband  as “the  famished  mute”  (212)  or  “the
anorexic” (229); they all follow a call that has been heard by many before;  they are what Maud
Ellmann (inspired by the short story by Kafka) calls ‘the hunger artists’.
36 Sophie and the baby were the former family of Fanshawe, now living with the narrator.
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In her book, Ellmann reflects on “The ascetic forms of self-starvation, which extend from the
medieval  saints  to modern slimmers” (7);  although cautiously,  she recognizes that self-inflicted
hunger has been historically used for anti-systemic protest but that it easily turns into a problem
when high numbers of people end up becoming anorexic as a consequence: “fasting as a protest
differs so profoundly from fasting as a personal pathology that it  seems almost perverse to link
these  two  strange  disciplines  at  all”;  however,  some  people  react  as  if  the  experience  really
captivated them as an ideal personal state (as it happens with our characters) and people “become
addicted to the nothingness that [they] had learned to substitute for food, clinging to it even at the
cost of life” (1). As we have seen in Bauman, characters become vagabonds in what they believe is
an empowering move towards their freedom from the System; in addition to this, according to some
critics like Little, Anderson or Ellmann, anorexia provides a symbolic counter-myth to the story of
Creation: it is a subversive private and individual strategy of rebellion against the impositions of
consumerism. Although it can be seen as a particular form of narcissism and masochism, strategies
of  self-denial  and  self-negation  like  these  seek  for  a  restitution  of  identity,  as  a  primal  unity
uncontaminated by the “ﬁlth” of the ‘other’ (the other being sexual differentiation, social hierarchy
and power relations, temporality or “history”) (Anderson in Little: 145). The desire for food is on
the one hand seen as indicative of the self's effort to secure the boundaries of his or her stable,
independent identity by assimilating or devouring the world around it (by ingesting the external
world,  the  subject  establishes  his  body as  his  own,  distinguishing  its  inside  from its  outside);
however, it is also indicative of the self's forever expropriated, unwholesome state; it symbolizes the
inevitable dependence upon, and penetration by, others. This need to incorporate the outside world
exposes the subject's fundamental incompleteness: the catch is that the very need to eat reveals the
“nothing” at the core of subjectivity. This also means that identity is constantly in jeopardy, as we
have said elsewhere, as it is placed outside of the body and depends on the ghost of the other. In
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relation to this, feminist critics like Kristeva believe self-starvation in the form of anorexia has
conquered our times precisely because it allows fulfillment by not allowing anything in, which is
why she believes transcendence and diet  are heavily interrelated from the twentieth century on
(Little 142-143). In sum, the nothingness that our characters have found as a substitute for food is
their own thoughts, the opportunity to give in to them; therefore fasting is definitely related to the
process of self-identification for the anorexic characters in our books.
Furthermore, these critics explain the relationship between hunger and art itself,  as these
characters line up with the perception of hunger as a creative impulse, as a state for inspiration;
Ellmann talks about Rimbaud, among many others: 
To write, for Rimbaud, is to hunger, and it is only through a diet of stone-crop that the
poet can accede to the inhuman solitude of art. This visionary hunger also resembles the
miraculous abstinence of the medieval saints, for whom to fast was not to overcome the
flesh so much, but to explore the limits of corporeality, where humanity surrenders to a
bodiliness so extreme that it coalesces with the bestial or divine. (13)
According to Little, Auster clearly follows this trend and shows how hunger relates to art in The
Trilogy; the implication is then that Auster is creating “anorexic” texts (144): by eliminating all the
pre-conceived limitations of the novel and by stripping his characters and narrators of  identity he
expresses “the desire to purge difference from the text and from the self” (135). While minimalist
abstraction seeks to  produce an autonomous text  cleansed of the impurities inherent  in  acts  of
representation, the individual who practices self-starvation (as well as the author) seeks to produce
an autonomous identity cleansed of impurities inherent in the act of consumption: “The auster(e)
detective  writer  and the  auster(e)  detective  who write  are  puritanical  Operatives  undertaking a
religiously inflicted quest to uncover transcendent truth by eliminating waste from the body of the
text and from the text of the body” (Little: 135). Therefore, Auster actually uses these characters in
order to capture a literary motivation, the intention of creating a new novel that relies  as little as
possible on the foundations of the traditional novel.
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Before we change the focus from vagabonds to players, we must talk briefly about two of
the other problems that arise from the vagabond's choice: sleep and shelter. The vagabond, as we
have previously said, is in search of an illusion of moral epiphanies in order to bring himself closer
to the philosopher than a regular, normal, participant in the System, in this way reinterpreting the
intrinsic goal of the traditional pilgrimage. According to Thoreau, “The philosopher is in advance of
his age even in the outward form of his life. He is not fed, sheltered, clothed, warmed like his
contemporaries. How can a man be a philosopher and not maintain his vital heat by better methods
than other men?” (7). This is, for Quinn, one of the easiest issues to solve, as he finds perfect shelter
for private moments and to protect himself from the rain in a dumpster: “on his knees on top of the
garbage and leaning his body against one wall  of the bin,  he found that he was not altogether
uncomfortable”  (114);  anyway,  he  still  “never  stopped  giving  thanks  for  his  luck”  (113).  For
Auster's  characters,  being  dependent  on  eating,  sleeping  and  shelter  is  misinterpreted  as
representative  of  their  inability  to  escape  from the  System:  as  Mumford  suggests  “we  are  so
detached that we are incapable of interpreting organic processes or furthering the development of
human life” (554). For Thoreau, the fact that we are born into a society that does not challenge our
natural thirst for survival is comfortable yet enslaving: “I see young men, my townsmen, whose
misfortune it is to have inherited farms, houses, barns, cattle, and farming tools; for these are more
easily acquired than got rid of. Better if they had been born to the open pasture and suckled by a
wolf, that they might have seen with clearer eyes what field they were called to labor in” (2). This
same idea of impasse is manifested in Amis through the character of Guy Clinch, who recognizes he
must leave the commodities and comforts of his privilege and inherited position to get in touch with
a more real experience of life: “How will I ever know anything in the mistake of all this warmth and
space, all this supershelter? I want to feel like the trampolinist when he falls back to earth and to
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gravity. To touch the earth with heaviness— just to touch it. God expose us, take away our padding
and our room” (my emphasis: 38).
As Bauman notes, a pilgrimage-like life is in fact rooted in the delay of satisfaction and
completion;  inconclusiveness is  necessary because,  for the pilgrim,  it  is  the actual  journey that
makes sense while, within the System, the demand for pleasure is immediate. For the characters
who play the game of the System, as a consequence, the journey is irrelevant and must be as short
as possible; the player must seek pleasure after pleasure only, therefore not really ever enjoying
having achieved the goal (Bauman, Z: 22-23). Thus, pleasure is a key part of any choice humans
take and “the difference in amount between the pleasure of satisfaction that is demanded and that
which is actually  achieved” (22) will differ  from vagabonds to players obviously. Characters like
Quinn, Blue or Fanshawe demand no satisfaction from society any more, turning only to themselves
in search of their true self. For example, this is when Blue makes this discovery: 
He has never given much thought to the world inside him, and though he always knew it
was there, it has remained an unknown quantity, unexplored and therefore dark, even to
himself.  He  has  moved  rapidly  along  the  surface  of  things  for  as  long  as  he  can
remember, ﬁxing attention on these surfaces only in order to perceive them, sizing up
one and then passing on to the next. (141)
These ordinary people turn into vagabonds when they realize they have been experiencing only the
surface of things; that is, a game, as Baudrillard and Debord posited, where “baits feel like desires,
pressures like intentions, seduction like decision-making” (Baudrillard "The System...": 27). When
these characters go deeper into their isolation, to confront an identity they presupposed was there,
they are forced to find themselves feeling “something of a loss” (NYT: 141). In their search for a
pure self, vagabonds react to otherness by rejecting it altogether, and they do so through solitude:
“Fanshawe was alone the whole time, barely seeing anyone, barely opening his mouth [...]. Solitude
became a passage into the self, an element of discovery” (272). As we can see, interaction with the
other  is  perceived  as  very  problematic  by  pilgrims  and  all  kinds  of  ascetics  and  vagabonds,
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something that  Thoreau praises,  for example,  in the following segment from the chapter called
‘Solitude’: “I find it wholesome to be alone the greater part of the time. To be in company, even
with the best, is soon wearisome and dissipating. I love to be alone. I never found the companion
that was so companionable as solitude” (64). However, Thoreau recognizes that “solitude is not
measured by the miles of space that intervene between a man and his fellows” (66), which is why
Quinn is capable of nearly the same realization while in the streets: “Quinn had always thought of
himself as a man who liked to be alone. For the past five years, in fact, he had actively sought it.
But it was only now, as his life continued in the alley, that he began to understand the true nature of
solitude. He had nothing to fall back on anymore but himself” (115). Players, on the contrary, will
rely on otherness and will need social interaction in order to configure their self out of total alterity,
as we will soon see.
For  Bauman,  clearly influenced by the spectacle/simulacrum theories,  our world is  “not
hospitable for pilgrims any more” (23), because no epiphanies can give the individual control of
anything in the real world; and that is an empty space for the vagabond, —the empty space where
Quinn or Fanshawe will remain hidden— , a locked room. All those who decide to quit the game
may do so, but the game does not end (31). What Bauman presents is more of a big arbitrary game
whose rules “keep changing in the course of playing”; it is a “sequence of present moments; a
continuous  present”  (23),  where  any  illusion  of  totality  and  connection  with  the  past  is  lost.
Therefore players must exist in society; they are people who go by the rules of the moment and
participate in the simulacrum. In this passage from Ghosts, the narrator realizes that he aspires to
something impossible; he longs for the life of a vagabond (Fanshawe) but he is a player, a captive of
the images of desire and the impositions and rewards of society:
I would admire [Fanshawe] so intensely, would want desperately to measure up to him
—and then, suddenly, a moment would come when I realized that he was alien to me,
that the way he lived inside himself could never correspond to the way I needed to live.
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I wanted too much of things, I had too many desires, I lived too fully in the grip of the
immediate  ever  to  attain such indifference.  It  mattered  to  me that  I  do well,  that  I
impress  people  with  the  empty  signs  of  my  ambition:  good  grades,  varsity  letters,
awards for whatever they were judging us on that week. (208)
This  initial  imbalance  will  turn  into  the  game of  his  life;  he  consciously decides  to  cover  for
Fanshawe, who is missing, in all the areas of his life: he will marry his former wife, raise his child
and,  most  importantly,  he will  usurp his  literary career  by attributing to  himself  the  fame and
fortune of Fanshawe's work. This player goes from designated literary executor to author: “I was
the mad scientist who had invented the hocus pocus machine, and the more smoke that poured from
it, the more noise it produced, the happier I was. Fanshawe's success was my success” (227). For
the narrator, the big move in the game is to become Fanshawe (that is probably why we never get to
know his name), to highlight that his identity is based solely on alterity.
We will not usually deal with powerful characters in our novels, but we see some of them
who do demand agency and power. Just as vagabonds wanted to free themselves from the system,
players want to be free within the System because, in a consumerist society, subjects are subaltern
to  capital  and  objects:  “dependence  dissolves  in  freedom,  and  freedom  seeks  dependence”
(Baudrillard "The System...": 27); this has players trying to empower themselves by being drawn
into the jaws of the System, which at the same time cancels any possibility of freedom. Baudrillard
puts it as if we were “facing a massive ‘devolution’ or ‘de-volition’ ”, “a massive desisting from
will, but not though alienation or voluntary servitude (whose mystery, which is the modern enigma
of politics, is unchanged since La Boétie) because the problem is put in terms of the consent of the
subject to his own slavery, which fact no philosophy will ever be able to explain” ("The Masses...":
215). This paradoxical enslavement is also described by Thoreau, a confusion between freedom and
passivity he does not accept: “worst of all when you are the slave-driver of yourself” (3). As a
consequence of this common tendency, even our own characters can find no justification for their
own behavior, except the feeling that this is what they are supposed to do, the feeling that there is
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no other  choice:  “The mark  of  postmodern  adulthood is  the  willingness  to  embrace  the  game
wholeheartedly, as children do” (Bauman, Z: 32). Therefore, one of the most important reasons why
players embrace the game is basically that they must fit in, quite like in high-school, and not be
treated differently, as the narrator finally acknowledges in Ghosts: “It was stupid. I didn't have any
chance. It was either that [continue to publish Fanshawe's under his own name] or get hauled back
— which would have meant being treated like a crazy man” (301).
For us,  in the novels,  players are more inspired by Don Quixote than by Walden, although
this  dichotomy  is  not  mutually  exclusive;  by  that,  we  mean  that  characters  can  act  both  as
vagabonds and players (take Quinn, Fanshawe or Young). Players give in to the instability of the
world by behaving as unstable individuals, paradoxically in and out of control because  “in play,
there is  neither  inevitability nor accident  [...];  nothing is  fully predictable  and controllable,  but
nothing is totally immutable and irrevocable either. [...] The world itself is a player” (Bauman: 31).
In other words, life is a succession of games and each has its internal coherence and rules; hence
conventions may change from one to the other, but games may change altogether at any time as
well.  Thence,  mutability  and extremism make the  best  players;  for  this,  we see  Nicola  as  the
greatest player there is in London Fields. Nicola knows the game and she knows what she needs: “‘I
do need real life. It's true. For instance, I need the class system. I need nuclear weapons. I need the
eclipse.’ ‘You need the Crisis’ ” (259). Nicola is an actress in life— “she had gone quite far with
that. [...] Acting was therapeutic, though dramatic roles confused her further. She was happier with
comedy, farce, custard-pie” (190)—, and she is also a “puppetmaster” (259), representing a whole
range of characters that vary depending on the man she is fooling, because we can officially say
Nicola is a con-artist who cheats men by default, so much so we never get to see any trace of her
true self (she seems to have no motivation for showing it or figuring it out herself). In fact,  Nicola
acts twenty-four hours a day: “if you're the dramatic type, anyway, then don't go to Drama School”
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(191). Therefore she likes extreme behavior and changes characters easily, which makes it difficult
to label her; here follows a passage where the narrator himself expresses to her how difficult it is for
him to categorize her as (only) a character type for the book: 
You're hard to categorize, even in the male fantasy area. Maybe you're a mixture of
genres. A mutant. You're not a Sexpot. Not dizzy enough, You're not a Hot Lay either,
not quite. Too calculating. You're definitely something of a Sack Artist. And a Mata Hari
too. And a Vamp. And a Ballbreaker. In the end, though, I'm fingering you for a Femme
Fatale. (260) 
In this passage, and throughout the novel, we see Nicola knows all these ‘categories of woman’ in
advance and she lives up to their characteristics for her own purposes; but we will dedicate chapter
4 exclusively to figure out how female characters are represented in these novels, thence going back
to Nicola and a longer list of types she incarnates. She knows what to do because she is a total
player; therefore she is remorseless, as the goal in the game is always to win, and so it allows “no
room for pity, compassion, commiseration or cooperation” (Bauman, Z: 32). 
Some other characters play too, although not with quite the mastery that Nicola has acquired
since her early years.  For example, we have seen how Samson Young readily gives in to Nicola’s
game in order to successfully obtain a story for his book: “What a gift. This page is briefly stained
with my tears of gratitude. Novelists don't usually have it so good, do they, when something real
happens  (something  unified,  dramatic  and  pretty  saleable),  and  they  just  write  it  down?”  (1);
therefore he sees himself as a player too, although he is going to lose in the game. In fact, Keith,
Guy and Samson, all see themselves as players (and potential winners) at some point, a common
expectation among players which Nicola catalogues as ‘Hitlerian Hubris’, just like a “loan company
[which] was ready, was eager, to underwrite a millennium” (395).  In the case of  the Trilogy, the
player who most sees himself as a potential winner is the narrator: he aspires for fame and money as
a writer and for a new identity for himself, but at the same time wants to acquire these with the least
effort possible, as it is common in the game. The narrator builds an identity for himself out of the
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alterity that Fanshawe represents to him: first he takes credit for all of Fanshawe's work and then he
fantasizes with being able to keep on reproducing his style, with absolutely no moral restraints:
I  realized that  once all  of Fanshawe's  manuscripts  had been published,  it  would be
perfectly possible for me to write another book or two under his name— to do the work
myself and yet pass it off as his. I was not planning to do this, of course, but the mere
thought of it opened up a certain bizarre and intriguing notion to me: what it means
when a writer puts his name on a book, why some writers choose to hide behind a
pseudonym, whether or not a writer has a real life anyway. It struck me that writing
under another name might be something I would enjoy—to invent a secret identity for
myself—and I wondered why I found this idea so attractive. One thought kept leading
me to  another,  and by the  time the  subject  was exhausted,  I  discovered  that  I  had
squandered most of the morning. (232)
Quite like Young in London Fields, the narrator will eventually realize he is not in control of his
own moves, of his own game; he will lose track of reality and lose everything he had or aspired
towards, which is a red flag for other driving forces that are not apparent to him but are influencing
his  life  and decisions;  but  luckily for  players,  for  everybody in  the  System,  we  are  all  to  be
considered “foreigners  to  our own acts” (Laplanche:  124),  therefore not  responsible  (not  really
guilty) of anything.
With all this  is mind, to what extent are these books to be considered as being  by their
narrators or even by their authors, then? If they both reproduced their stories from real facts and
other texts, that means identity and agency are both in question in our novels, and that influences
characterization as much as the construction of the narrators.  Our narrators are  supposed to  be
capturing events from real life, with a heavy reliance on other texts (by other people), and so they
present themselves as passive recorders. For example, in the Trilogy, the narrator states: “Since this
story is  based entirely on  facts,  the  author  feels  it  his  duty not  to  overstep  the  bounds  of  the
verifiable, to resist at all costs the perils of invention” (NYT: 111); nevertheless the same narrator
later recognizes he might be altering the events in real life by his attempt:  “I was offering my
creation directly to the real world, and therefore it seems possible to me that they could affect this
real world in a real way, that they could eventually become a part of the real itself” (245). The same
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paradox  appears  in  London  Fields,  where  Young  recognizes  that  he  is  not  only  following  his
characters in real life, but that he relies on texts written by each of them: “Now here's a pleasing
symmetry. All three characters have given me something they've written. Keith's brochure, Nicola's
diaries, Guy's fiction. Things written for different reasons: self-aggrandizement, sell-communion,
self-expression. One offered freely,  one abandoned to chance,  one coaxingly procured” (42-43).
This  takes  us  to  Tredell's  interpretation  of  the  situation  in  London  Fields,  which  is  perfectly
applicable to the Trilogy too; a narrator who not only is intervening in the events of real life, but
who is incorporating other texts in order to shape and impose an interpretation on those events: “As
the interventions by the narrator in the events that he is narrating grow in importance, instances
proliferate in the narrative of the dependence of narrative, not on life, but on other narrative” (106). 
Displaying a similar use of intertextuality (which is actually intratextuality, as the originals
exist within the fiction only), the narrator in the Trilogy is allegedly using a red notebook by Quinn,
Blue's  notes and Fanshawe's  texts,  although we never  have direct  access  to  them as  readers,  a
characteristic O'Gorman believes Auster shares with detective fiction, where the first story (or the
crime) is always absent (20), a characteristic we have found before in historical writing and other
types  of  fiction.  Therefore,  the  reflection our  authors  present  is  that  literature  (history  or  any
discourse) is never “the recovered past, but the narratives of attempted recovery, and the validation
or discrediting of those narratives by the structures of power which constitute the law of the social
order” (O'Gorman: 23). Hence, we must take into account not only that our authors do not present a
recoverable  end,  but  also  that,  by  trusting  so  heavily  in  inter  and  intratextuality,  they  are
undermining their own presence in the process of writing. Rimmon-Kenan, in her book Narrative
Fiction: Contemporary Poetics¸ sums up the two types of narration that interact in the different
dimensions that literature imply: “the factual one, by the author; and its fictional counterpart, the
one which takes over; the narrator's” (4). Story, for her, is subsequent to a larger construct, the axis
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of  temporal  organization,  and  it  is  not  directly  available  to  the  reader  (5-8).  Generally,  in
postmodernist novels, characters in the texts do not only interact with each other but also with the
author and reader (Hormung: 18), and this is how agency is distorted in our novels. Postmodern
texts are said to lack “identifiable authority” and the intention of our authors is to displace the
relation between texts,  writers  and readers  (91-93).  For example, in  London Fields, Samson is
actually delusional when he states: “Boy, am I a reliable narrator” (162).
But it is not only the narrator we cannot hold on to; we also cannot totally assume characters
are going to be proper round individuals: “In most fiction, proper names […] promise coherence
and identity” (52), says Peacock, but nevertheless, in Auster's novels, he appreciates characters “are
always differing, not only from other characters, but from their putative ‘selves’. [They] always
dramatize their own ‘absence’ from themselves” (60) and they prefer engagement with otherness
(63).  This  is  why  the  characters  in  the  Trilogy  will  present  themselves  as  a  multiplicity  of
characters, reinforcing the postmodernist idea that “our sense of a single selfhood [is] complexly
refracted through the existence of various, duplicitously conflicting, voices” (Todd: 136). Critics
agree names are never randomly assigned in Auster's work, and that they carry great significance
(Peacock: 50); however, they do not promise to deliver an individual round stable subject. Amis
also names his characters in a very witty way, so that irony arises instantly: “Keith Talent. He just
didn't have...he just didn't have the talent” (5). In sum, although our characters have a proper name,
it  doesn't  really  imply  this  name reflects  a  proper  identity;  for  example,  Daniel  Quinn—  “He
wandered why he had the same initials as Don Quixote” (126)—, a writer who consciously breaks
down  his  personality  into  fragments:  He  is  the  detective  fiction  novelist William  Wilson,  a
pseudonym, who “led an independent life” (5), as “Quinn was no longer the part of him that wrote
books” (4). But it does not end there: “in the triad of selves that Quinn had become, Wilson served
as a kind of ventriloquist, Quinn himself was the dummy, and Work was the animated voice that
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gave purpose to the enterprise”. Therefore it is Max Work who is “his interior brother, his comrade
in solitude” (6) and the fictional protagonist of all of Wilson's stories. His inclination towards this
character  is  probably why he accepts  the role  of  (detective)  Paul  Auster  in  the  first  place,  the
pseudonym by which he will start on the Stillman case. We know he gives in to this rosary of selves
in order to find comfort beyond his empty subjectivity, as a way of escapism: “By a simple trick of
the intelligence, a deft little twist of naming, he felt incomparably freer and lighter. At the same
time, he knew it was an illusion. But there was a certain comfort in that” (50). 
Doubling and doppelgangers are commonplace in the Trilogy, mostly because our characters
impersonate detectives and sometimes must disguise and change names in order to interact with the
people they need to get information from. We will have them turn into “a life insurance salesman
from Kenosha, Wisconsin” (176) or “The Fuller brush man” (180), while in London Fields we have
Nicola, who is never only one kind of woman, and Keith, who will also need other names and
personalities in order to  cheat— for example Lady Barnaby thinks Harry is his name (53). Both
authors  also  introduce  doubles  for  their  characters,  usually  a  successful  ‘mitosis’ of  them;  for
example there is another Keith, a friend of Keith's whose name is Keith Double (8); this character
works in advertising, a TV-related position, something our Keith could only dream about. Doubling
even happens to Stillman in the Trilogy before Quinn's very eyes when, at  the station,  another
Stillman appears right behind the original: 
Directly  behind  Stillman,  heaving  into  view  just  inches  behind  his  right  shoulder,
another man stopped, took a lighter out of his pocket, and lit a cigarette. His face was
the exact twin of Stillman's. For a second he thought it was an illusion, a kind of aura
thrown off by the electromagnetic currents in Stillman's body. But no, this other Stillman
moved, breathed, blinked his eyes. (55)
Also, for the nameless narrator, this projection is produced by Fanshawe, and for Samson Young
this anti-self is Mark Asprey, a multiple award-winning novelist whose apartment he is using in
London:  “Actually the whole  damn place is  a  trophy room” (25).  However,  doubles  are  not  a
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postmodernist innovation, as they had been a “favourite device of Romanticism and even Jacobean
drama” and already present in Greek comedy (Szegedy-Maszák: 55); but still they are very common
in postmodern texts; for example, most of Beckett's works “present some form of a decentered or
deconstructed subjectivity; His experimentation with several versions of one self and the reduction
for the self to one or several voices” (Hormung: 184). 
Moving beyond this, both our authors display an extensive usage of literary doubling that
they apply not only on characters but they also go even further; to illustrate this, we should talk now
about one of the most intriguing characters in the Trilogy, and that is Paul Auster. Both the real
Auster and Amis like to introduce themselves in their novels as characters, intruders in their own
fictions. For example, in the much commented last chapter of Money, Amis and his main character
Self play a game of chess where Amis ‘zungzwangs’ Self, as he is the real manufacturer of his
story: “Martin talked on, shadowy, flicker-faced. I don't know if this strange new voice of mine
carried anywhere when I said: ‘I'm the joke. I'm it. It was you. It was you’ (379) . This is what Todd
calls  an “intrusive author”  (123),  which is  a  device that  usually goes  together  with the  use of
doubles “in a tradition whose roots can be traced at least as far as a Gothic text such as James
Hogg's  ‘Confessions’ ”  (136).  It  also  appears  in  postmodernist  novels  such  as  The  French
Lieutenant's  Woman,  by  John  Fowles,  which  shows  what  Todd  calls  a  “canonical  use  of  the
intrusive author” (123). So before we talk about Auster the character,  and see if  Amis is being
intrusive or not in  London Fields, we must talk about how authorial presence has evolved in the
novel and see what tendency our novelists follow. According to Hormung, in the pre-modern novel
we find the “author's practice of addressing the reader in prefaces and inter-chapters in order to
authenticate the story”, which our narrators do, but not the real Auster or Amis. Later, modernists
started inscribing some aspects of the author into the text, like a “self-consciousness to be emulated
by  the  reader”,  which  we  do  not  see,  at  least  directly,  in  the  novels.  Finally,  he  lists  some
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postmodernist  authors  whose  authorial  self  appears  as  “the reader  of  his  own fiction”  such as
Fowles, Gray, Beckett, Barth, Federman or Sudernick, and Amis himself is also on that list (175).
He also refers to Borges's short stories "The Library of Babel" and "Pierre Menard, Author of the
Quixote", which we also consider must have certainly influenced both our authors for their theme,
especially the second one, "Pierre Menard...",   as the actual authorship of  El Quixote is openly
being discussed,  just  as  in  the  Trilogy:  “Borges's  story of  this  second Quijote  —an imaginary
Quijote— is a teasing, kind of therapeutic thought-experiment that invites us to contemplate the
way meaning is the product of diachronically given rules for the genesis of meaning” (Thiher: 160).
Having considered all this, then, do Amis and Auster present themselves as readers of their
own  fiction?  We  believe  that  in  the  case  of  The  New  York  Trilogy and  London  Fields that
assumption  would  be  inaccurate  or  only partial,  as  they actually  filter  their  authorial  presence
through the existence of certain characters: in the case of Auster it is very easy to know his double
in the fiction is Auster (although the real Auster detaches himself as author of the Trilogy through
the nameless narrator). There is a writer named Auster in  City of Glass, who Quinn finds in the
phone book while he is impersonating a detective also called Auster. This Paul Auster, a writer quite
similar to the real Auster, is precisely working on an article on El Quixote and its authorship, as in
Borges's  “Pierre  Menard...”. His  dissertation  is  captivating  and  occupies  a  preeminent  central
position  in  the  novel, which  is  probably not  an  arbitrary  choice.  When  Auster  introduces  this
discussion  about  El Quixote,  we can  tell  he is  making an attack  on literary criticism itself:  “I
suppose you can call it speculative, since I'm not out to prove anything. In fact, it's all done tongue-
in-cheek.  An  imaginative  reading,  I  guess  you  could  say”,  because  his  dissertation  is  not  on
Cervantes, but on the authorship of “the book inside the book, the one he imagined he was writing”
(98). In  El Quixote, Cervantes insists, like Auster and Amis, he is not the author but merely the
editor of real material that he had found written in Arabic by Cid Hamete Benengeli: “he makes a
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great point of insisting that everything in the book really happened in the world [...]. Because the
book is an attack on the dangers of the make-believe. He couldn't very well offer a work of the
imagination to do that, could he?” (NYT: 97). But, actually, Auster helps us realize what the rules of
the (literary) game are in the Trilogy by establishing this parallelism; to determine who the actual
author really is, he relates how authority actually comes from a combination of four people: Sancho
Panza is an illiterate witness who dictates stories to the priest or the barber, who eventually give
them to a Samson Carrasco, who translates it into Arabic; but Benengeli turns out to be invented by
Cervantes, who is, for Auster, the mere translator and editor of a real-life story. He argues the real
origin of it all was always Don Quixote himself; he believes: “It was Don Quixote who engineered
the Benengeli quartet” (98).
In the Trilogy, this quartet is represented by four actors: Quinn, Blue, the narrator —who
presents himself as the author—, and Fanshawe, the one who manipulates the narrator into first
living his life and then losing it to obsessively look for him; in fact, there is a moment when the
narrator  recognizes  himself  as  a  Sancho  for  Fanshawe:  “I  continued  to  go  along  with  him,  a
befuddled witness, sharing in the quest but not quite part of it, an adolescent Sancho astride my
donkey,  watching my friend do battle  with himself”  (211).  In the temporal  arrangement  of the
Trilogy, Fanshawe and the narrator are real and are constituents of a more or less clarified plot
where the narrator finds his counterpart; it is the other two stories that are difficult to frame and
interrelate.  Blue's and Quinn's stories are parallel in their thematic content but not on the level of
reality; they never happen in the same dimension. Their authorship is never totally clear (on the
level of fiction, of course), but a story like Ghosts, dated more than thirty years before The Locked
Room, could perfectly be by the narrator or even Fanshawe, as the narrator has constant access to
his work, and we know of his intentions of taking credit for it. Then we have City of Glass, which is
really more complex and contributes to create a mystery around the actual interconnection of the
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whole Trilogy, as it is dated only three years earlier and keeps a connection with the level of reality.
Quinn's story comes from a diary that was given to the narrator but many questions are left open:
why is Quinn contacted for the Stillman case in the first place and who is the invisible hand who
feeds him at the empty apartment by the end of the story? Auster tries to mislead us as there is a
second character named Quinn that is real in The Locked Room, a detective looking for Fanshawe
who “worked doggedly on the case for five or six weeks, but in the end he begged off, not wanting
to take any more of their money” (198). What this Quinn didn't know was that Fanshawe was aware
of this and “I was watching him the whole time, and when the moment came, I set him up, and he
walked straight into my trap” (301). However we must not confuse Quinn the character and Quinn
the PI unless this chase happened in that span of three years in between stories and we assume
Quinn would have taken on the profession of detective after he left the Stillman's apartment and the
notebook behind, something we will never know: “As for Quinn, it is impossible for me to say
where he is now” (130). But there is a more ‘realistic’ possibility if we consider that the Trilogy is
written  by  a  collective;  there  must  be  a  missing  element  besides  Quinn,  Blue  and  the
narrator/Fanshawe in order to close the circle.
For Peacock, the Trilogy “is a collective work authored by Auster, Poe, Cervantes, Carroll,
and any number of other antecedents”, and he poses the next question: “Who actually narrates it? Is
he or she a real villain setting traps for readers and characters alike?” (60). We do not know about
evil, but this could actually be part of an orchestration by Auster (the character), as it is  he who
leads the narrator into the Stillmans' apartment and cedes the red notebook to him: “Auster picked it
up, looked through it briefly, and said that it was Quinn's. Then he handed it to me and said that I
should keep it” (130). In this gesture, Auster might not be innocent and, just as Nicola does  in
London Fields, he is setting the narrator up so that it is another person who publishes the text, as
Fanshawe did too. Maybe Auster and Fanshawe work together to seduce the narrator into publishing
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their story, making use of his own ego and airs: “Why would I go to the trouble of creating an entire
body of work and then not want to take credit for it? And yet—did people really think I was capable
of writing a book as good as  Neverland?” (232). So, there might be two Quixotes in the Trilogy,
Fanshawe and Auster, and they behave as players probably for the same reason that Don Quixote
tricked everybody into writing his biography, in which, according to Auster:
Don Quixote was conducting an experiment. He wanted to test  the gullibility of his
fellow men. Would it be possible, he wondered, to stand up before the world and with
the utmost conviction spew out lies and nonsense? To say that windmills were knights,
that a barber's basin was a helmet, that puppets were real people? Would it be possible
to persuade others to agree with what he said, even though they did not believe him? In
other  words,  to  what  extent  would  people  tolerate  blasphemies  if  they  give  them
amusement? The answer is obvious, isn't it? To any extent. (98-99)
Hence, the possibility is open that Auster (the writer in the fiction) is the real instigator, as he is
currently working on this topic and experimenting with it; after all,  Auster is his name, and he
stands  for  the  displacement  and  deferral  of  authorship, for  the  real  Paul  Auster  has  set  these
characters up for real, by writing a novel where their desires and needs would never be satisfied.
This is a possibility that is considered by, for example, Diedrick:
In a move intended to recall Don Quixote, we discover that the narrator is a friend of
Paul Auster's ( at least, the fictional character) who was actually away in Africa when
most of the action took place. […] The two men have since fallen out, the narrator
blaming Auster for Quinn's decline. This sudden revelation casts doubt on everything
that has gone before. (62)
Again  we notice  the emphasis  on the process  of  creating  and understanding literature  we find
highlighted elsewhere in Auster's work: “Despite their both being solitary acts in the physical sense,
Auster stresses that ethically and psychologically,  reading and writing are collective endeavors”
(Peacock: 6), which is why he not only relies on inter and intratextuality or ‘mutant’ characters but
he also plays with the certainty of the author, presenting literature disconnected from all previous
stable conventions; in the absence of any indisputable, uncontaminated evidence,  it  all  depends
upon our own position(s) as readers and participants in this process too.
Rueda 143/209
Identity as Alterity
In London Fields, the exact same pattern can be observed; Amis relies on another ‘Benengeli
quartet’ to take on the responsibility for the horrible deeds in this novel who are, namely, Keith,
Guy, Nicola and Samson; and the Quixote is not Samson, he is merely the “translator” (notice he
keeps Cervantes's character's name, as he might be considered simply the transcriber of Nicola's
adventures in real life). Although he conceived himself as an observer and a player— a player
outside of his fiction—, he finally realizes: “I should have understood that a cross has four points.
Not three” (466); and that is when he realizes that he is not in control; Nicola is, and he is the actual
murderer in an end to his book that is the most unexpected for him: “Nicola destroyed my book”
(466). They all succumb to the experiment of Nicola, who practices lying as an art just to feel the
power from abusing others (men). Related to this, we find that Lavender argues that the characters
in  London  Fields sense  they  are  part  of  a  fiction  and  they  express  the  sensation  of  being
“semantically  overcoded”  (234):  for  example,  this  is  the  case  of  Young, “I  feel  seamless  and
insubstantial, like a creation. As if someone made me up, for money. And I don't care” (470). They
feel  permanently observed;  even  Keith  has  the  idea  somehow Nicola  is  “watching  him”  (44);
therefore, as in the Trilogy, there is a greater plan, another invisible quixotic character that must
have played or manipulated all these characters into performing this fiction for him.
This quixotic theory is possible because Amis himself manifests an interest in the piece in
his collection of essays on literary criticism War against Cliché: 
While clearly an impregnable masterpiece, Don Quixote suffers from one fairly serious
flaw - that of outright unreadability. [...] Reading Don Quixote can be compared to an
indefinite visit  from your most impossible  senior  relative,  with all  his  pranks,  dirty
habits, unstoppable reminiscences, and terrible cronies. When the experience is over,
and the old boy checks out at last (on page 846 - the prose wedged tight, with no breaks
for dialogue), you will shed tears all right: not tears of relief or regret but tears of pride.
You made it, despite all that Don Quixote could do. (427)
But over the dullness and the anachronistic nature of the piece, Amis, who is interested in agency
and polivocity, says himself, nevertheless, that the most appealing thing about El Quixote for him is
how special part two is:
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Since the technique of  El Quixote is  that  of periphrasis,  of  lapidary duplication,  of
saying  everything  (at  least)  twice  [which  reminds  us  of  the  structure  of  LF],  it  is
appropriate  that  the  second  half  should  be  a  mirror  image  of  the  first,  with  one
important reversal. Both in the actual world of Cervantes and in the fictional world of
the novel, Volume I has been published, to vast international acclaim. […] The Don is
now as famous as he could ever have wished, if for all the wrong reasons. (430-431)
It is delightful for Amis, as a modern reader, that Don Quixote is self-conscious about his existence
as a literary character and wants to start another set of adventures so that his and Sancho's fame and
reputation is  restored: “‘people have you for such a crazy man,  and myself  for no less a  fool.
Knights say that, unable to content under chivalry's limits, you have called yourself a  don.’ […]
‘That’— said Don Quixote— ‘has absolutely nothing to do with me’ ” (Cervantes, my translation:
559). This influential detail is exactly the one Lavender pinpointed: the narrator will have the final
realization that he is part of a fiction himself, which leads him to believe Nicola is working with
someone else; this virtually invisible character is Mark Asprey, a writer who is everything Samson is
not: imaginative and successful.  To support this idea, note that  it  is suggested that actually it is
Asprey who prepares the situation for Samson to be hypnotized by Nicola; they were former lovers
and he knew about her plan, which Samson discovers through the various stories in her diary about
her and a man by the initials ‘MA’: “Nicola and MA? Nicola and Mark Asprey? I have to know”
(205); and in his final suicide note/letter to Asprey, he asks: “PPS You didn't set me up. Did you?”
(468). 
There are some hints throughout the novel that this might be the case, that Samson has been
framed; for example when he went to Heathrow and Asprey knew, as if he had an informant besides
Incarnacion, his housekeeper,  who seems in many instances to be sending him information but
never  knew about  the  trip  (304).  Also,  Samson eventually learns  that  Nicola  destroyed one of
Asprey's novels (which was about her) and it seems that the original deal is to get a new novel co-
authored by Asprey and Nicola herself, as she wants to be in control of her image in it (Tredell:
123). Moreover, it is very possible Asprey is getting copies of the manuscript while overseas as
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Samson writes: “Incarnacion was in the studio. She seemed to be looking at my notebook. Another
thing. The toaster-like photocopier— I thought it didn't work, but there it was with the light on. It
hummed warmly...I sometimes (I don't know) I take a knight's jump out of my head and I think I'm
in a book written by somebody else” (409). It is again not a coincidence his initials are MA; like
Auster, Martin Amis has introduced a character that represents him and who might be the only one
winning the game, although he always seems a secondary character. However, Young's last wish is:
“Be my literary executor: throw everything out” (468); again this doppleganger of the author or the
author himself, as it happens in the Trilogy, is the one who is responsible for the text finding its way
into circulation, into print; Asprey is a man of many literary pseudonyms— we know he is also
Marius Appleby (433)— so why not believe he is Martin Amis? Amis's novel thus plays with the
notion of text-theft in such a way as to suggest that “disconnecting a text from its author is the best
way to keep it moving, to get it read. Indeed, those disconnections take place at several levels in the
novel” (Tredell:  120).  This way Amis,  like Auster,  metaphorically shares the authorship of this
novel with his characters and narrator, although still keeping some authority for himself, while at
the same time he demands from the reader constant attention and implication. 
In these novels, one can never take any identifiable element of the novel for granted, be it
character, narrator, plot or author because, as we have been arguing throughout this paper, they have
been all taken over by alterity. When it seems that we can identify any of these, they slip out of, not
only our, but even their own grasp; identity is always displaced,  différance is total; we can never
quite arrive at some final point and know who they are. Vagabonds and players in our novels, as we
have described them, have become like this because they have confronted the total alterity that their
reality is,  which is  why they turn to escapism, mostly through writing.  As the narrator  of The
Locked  Room states:  “writing  about  it  is  the  only  chance  I  have  to  escape”  (NYT:  231).  For
vagabonds like Quinn or Fanshawe, though, the System makes no sense and, therefore, they want to
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disappear from all possible social spheres in order to be closer to their true inner self, which they
will, however, never be able to access, unlike Thoreau in Walden: “By the time he was thirteen or
fourteen, Fanshawe became a kind of internal exile, going through the motions of dutiful behavior,
but cut off from his surroundings, contemptuous of the life he was forced to live. He did not make
himself outwardly rebellious. He simply withdrew” (212). On the other hand, other characters will
embrace the alterity represented by the game of the System,  giving in (all in) to it, in order to
acquire status and, above all, real agency; however, this goal will escape them, as nobody is able to
actually win in a game that is, in our novels and in real life, part of a greater design impossible for
us to figure. Nevertheless, there is one player in London Fields who succeeds in taking control over
the people who surround her and also to fulfill her plans for escapism, and that is Nicola Six, to
whom we dedicate the next chapter.
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4. Woman as the darkest Other
We have seen throughout this study how the very concept of identity is  questionable in
postmodernism as  well  as  the  multiplicity  of  issues  it  raises  as  regards  its representation.  The
process of self-identification is deeply problematic, let alone the recognition of and connection with
the other. As we have argued, theories as influential as Lacan's, Derrida's or Levinas's place the
ultimate bridge for the subject's self-recognition in the relationship with the other, who gives sense
to the entity that the subject projects and stands for. Nevertheless, as we discovered in chapter 1,
there is an insurmountable obstacle that impedes our apprehension of that ‘Other’ in their theories;
subjects are left facing alterity not only in their understanding of the other but consequently in the
grasping of their own self, which is revealed as alter, an entity no longer stable but constituted of
fragments or images, projections that most of the times are not natural but learned and performed.
Furthermore, society and the current urban lifestyle worsen this situation for the lost and confused
postmodernist  self;  as  we have  seen,  the  nature  of  reality  itself  is  questioned by thinkers  like
Baudrillard and Debord, who place the origin of the System outside of the real. This construct that
has substituted nature and every trace of reality is now the only possible place to live in, and this
has dislocated people's desires and aims in favor of consumerism and capitalism. Moreover, this is a
global process and, therefore, there is no way out, no possible connection to the roots of humanity,
to nature. Sociologists like de Certeau describe most accurately any kind of social interaction as a
human construction,  utterly detached from the natural processes and inscribed into our lives by
mechanical  learning,  which  almost  erases  any  hint  of  spontaneity  and  authenticity  concerning
human  relationships.  Mumford  or  Foucault  are  critical  of  these  impositions  and  call  for  an
awakening, the first one encouraging the preservation of the natural resources of the earth and the
pursuit of a way of life that is more connected to the natural cycles, away from the city, although he
recognizes it is impossible to escape from the current System. All this overwhelming alterity sets
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the tone for our novels and Auster and Amis, in order to capture the spirit of the postmodernist man,
create characters that consciously or unconsciously feel this fragmentation, this surrealism, this total
alterity, and want to escape from it at all costs.
We have seen that Auster and Amis share stylistic intentions and that they have both been
interested in the representation of identity as alterity throughout their careers. They both display a
series of dysfunctional characters that take fragmentation to the extreme, and we can see them
double,  disguise  themselves,  and  even  disintegrate.  They  also  share  a  taste  for  black  humor,
undermining everyday conventions and preconceptions through the smartest use of language. They
reinterpret literary and psychological archetypes and stereotypes in order to create the narrators and
the characters that better suit our times, questioning authority and agency at all times and confusing
the readers, who are avid for answers about the causality and coherence that, of course, they will not
find in The Trilogy or London Fields. Moreover, we can also say that Amis's novel is more extreme
in its portrayal of radically stereotyped characters, implying a much more direct and sarcastic social
critique than Auster, so that the reader is disgusted by, amused by, but unable to identify with any of
them. We must notice, though, that up until now we have been mostly concerned with male types,
as the main characters in our novels are all white, male, and around their thirties. Up until now, they
have been the vagabonds and players in search of an escape from a society that alienates them, and
also from the cage they have built for themselves. However, in this chapter we want to talk about
specific feminine types, too, and see if the principle that identity equals alterity that we have been
observing throughout the novels applies for female types too. This is not an easy task in general,
because women's presence in canonical literature both as protagonists and as writers traditionally is
limited. 
In  Auster,  on  the  one  hand,  women  are  almost  invisible,  with  the  exception  of  certain
secondary  characters  that  never  act  by  themselves,  but  only  briefly  interact  with  the  male
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protagonists, as we will see. In Amis, generally, it is the same, with a few exceptions where female
protagonists are introduced in his attempt at writing from the point of view of others and represent
alterity. Hence there is, for example, Mary Lamb in  Other People  (1981), the novel he published
prior to London Fields: “In Other People, Amis uses Mary/Amy to explore varieties of ‘otherness’,
[which]  also  allows  Amis  to  explore  gender  more  fully.  At  first,  of  course,  the  male/female
dichotomy is  a  distinction  without  a  difference,  since  Mary/  Amy has  forgotten  her  gendered
identity along with everything else”, but it does not take long for her to notice that the violence
practiced by men on women is the norm in society (Diedrick: 66-67). This violence is denounced
not only in Other People but in most of his following works, London Fields included, where Keith
Talent stands for the representative of the worst kind of masculinity, the one directly related to
violence: “Keith's rapes were to be viewed distinctly from those numerous occasions, in his youth,
he  had  been  obliged  to  slap  into  line  various  cockteasers  and  icebergs  (and  lesbians  and
godbotherers)” (168). As we see, Amis shows the sordid in relation to femininity, usually through
the behavior of men; therefore it should not be surprising that porn is a recurrent theme in his novels
too, always interrelated with the image that men have of women as currency, and to money itself as
the most dangerous item in current times: “Pause, SloMo. Picture Search. What [Keith] was after
were the images of sex, violence, and sometimes money” (165). Keith Talent, who embodies this
corrupted masculinity, portrayed through the eyes of Young, even reflects on violence matter-of-
factly, always concluding violence is the only possible relationship there is with women: 
It came to him as a flash of inspiration. The black guys beat up the black girls who went
out with white guys! Of course. So much simpler. He pondered the wisdom of this and
drew a lesson from it, a lesson which, in his heart, he had long understood. If you're
going to be violent, stick to women. Stick to the weak. (5)
But there is something we must bear in mind always to understand the point of this chapter;
Martin Amis writes satire, and femininity is represented in extreme terms, along with everything
else, and sometimes with the deliberate intention of being politically incorrect, as we will argue. He
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tends to refer to controversial topics, but the feminine in his work has almost never gone unnoticed
by critics;  for  example,  the  women characters  in  Success have  been called  “a  little  more  than
caricatures” (Tredell: 56). However, against these attacks, other critics defend Amis: “Such women
are types, the subjects of fictional narratives, genre-specific […] ballbreakers and golddiggers are
the sort of women who belong in comedy” (Tredell: 108). Not surprisingly though, Amis's portrayal
of the feminine through Nicola Six continues by far to be the most controversial point of his career,
as he has been harshly attacked by feminist critics for his prototypical femme fatale. Unlike Mary,
Nicola is not the protagonist in Amis's  London Fields;  she is the main character in the  London
Fields Samson Young is writing; therefore she only exists in the fiction. We do not have direct
access  to  her  self  as  she  always  appears  through  the  voice  of  the  narrator,  who  is  the  actual
protagonist. But although we do not hear her own voice, she is far from invisible; she emerges as
the most professional player we can see in the novel, unabashedly playing the puppeteer for the
action to continue. Nevertheless, like the rest of the characters, she also wants to escape from this
world; she wants to die. However, in order to get her way, Nicola will destroy several lives, as she
gets (more than) three men involved in her games. All of her moves have been despicable from an
early age and she shows no signs of empathy: 
Years ago, when she studied the Method, her instructor told her that sadness— misery,
tragedy— wasn't always the way. You had to think about the things that made you cry in
real  life.  Whereas  her  classmates  all  got  by with  images  of  lost  puppies,  vanished
fathers, Romeo and Juliet, starving Namibians, and so on, Nicola found that her one sure
path to tears lay through memories of irritation and above all boredom. (125)
We could also continue to do as Samson Young does; he tries desperately to look the other
way while he writes his fiction– “I am trying to ignore the world situation. I am hoping it will go
away. Not the world. The situation. I want time to get on with this little piece of harmless escapism”
(64). We could continue with this study without acknowledging the fact that the feminine is an issue
not only in this novel, but in relation to the whole discussion about identity and self-definition we
have engaged with throughout.  But we will  not.  We must assume that,  if  the subject builds its
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identity from without, having to socially perform coherently as he or she is expected, man and
woman are clearly different constructions and thence they must perform differently: “each society
sets limits to the life strategies than can be imagined, and certainly to those that can be practised”
(Bauman,  Z:  35);  and we will  see  that  what  the  System delimits  as  ‘woman’ and its possible
representations, are very different from the representations of ‘man’. As it will become clear in this
chapter, this is a fact pointed out by all the thinkers we have been referring to such as Levinas,
Derrida,  Lacan,  Baudrillard  or  Debord.  For  example,  de  Certeau  talks  about  “The  sexualized
organization of public space: all these social manifestations respond to a gendered organization of
society, each partner playing the role presented by his or her sexual definition within the limits
imposed by propriety” (23). Therefore we will need to consider the different categorizations or roles
that woman can perform in our society. 
In regard to this, we must remark on a fact that makes it  difficult  for women to accept
female characters as realistic in the novels we are dealing with: Auster and Amis are men within a
male literary tradition, as we have seen in chapter 3 (and 4), and therefore they can never actually
reproduce the voice of a woman, just as they could never really capture the mind of an actual dog in
Timbuktu or God's Dice, respectively. They can never experience femininity first hand and therefore
they cannot reproduce it faithfully, although we do not think they are trying to, anyway. As we
always said, realism is not an aim for these authors. Amis, for example, according to Diedrick, is
particularly focused on a large variety of male precursors in search of substitute literary “fathers”;
as it is said, Amis's relationship with his father, also a writer, is very complicated (a fact that we are
not going to consider any further in this study37): 
Beyond their intrinsic merit, the essays Martin Amis has written on such writers as J. G.
Ballard, Saul Bellow, Norman Mailer, Vladimir Nabokov, V. S. Pritchett, Philip Roth,
John Updike, and Angus Wilson reveal a writer obsessed with (male) precursors. With a
few exceptions  like  Jane  Austen  or  Iris  Murdoch,  [his]  literary essays  and reviews
concern male writers. (13)
37 For more information on this topic, please check bibliography for Galvin Keulks's Father and Son: Kingsley Amis...
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Moreover, he is not the only male writer who looks back at his predecessors as figurative fathers. In
this regard, the theorist Harold Bloom talks about “anxiety of influence”, an 
Oedipal  struggle  between  literary  ‘fathers’ and  ‘sons’ at  the  symbolic  center  of  all
relations between writers, texts, and their predecessors. In Bloom's [(unrepentantly and
reductively phallocentric) view,] a writer unconsciously perceives his most significant
precursors as potentially castrating father figures, and thus employs strategies intended
to  disarm them.  These  typically  involve  taking the  literary forms  of  the  precursors,
revising, recasting, and displacing them. (Diedrick: 12)
This is something we referred to when we talked about intertextuality; it reinforces “the novel's
central concern with self-consciousness, mediation, and inauthenticity” (21) but, when revisiting
canonical literature, it is a given that they will find a majority of male writers who are concerned
with male topics: women have been historically excluded from Culture, which has left their voices
in the background of a predominantly male History of Culture. 
For feminist readers, eager to find more female actors in fiction, Nicola is an invitation for
uneasiness, as most of the time she behaves as a despicable, evil person, and she uses  sex as a
means for getting everything she wants from men. We agree with whoever considers that reading
Nicola  sometimes  implies  a  nasty,  disgusting  experience.  Nicola  is  the  main  representative  for
women in the novel and she behaves so poorly there is evidently no justification for her extreme
actions against masculinity and what she calls love, the type of desperate love  Sartre explores in
Being and Nothingness:  that is,  when we love someone we want to possess the other's alterity,
objectivizing love this way, we use the other person only for self-recognition (Sarup: 13-18). Nicola
clearly takes advantage of this as she becomes, for each of the men, whatever they want her to be,
the fulfillment of their fantasies, only to bring them crashing to the ground and with them the notion
of their own identity; definitely, this is the kind of love Nicola is trying to kill along with herself.
So, Nicola does not want to be possessed and in this way she avoids not only the identification of
the  other,  but  that  we  can  discover  her identity:  “Nicola  had  lived  deliciously;  but  she  was
promiscuous on principle, as a sign of emancipation, of spiritual freedom, freedom from men” (68).
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We will not try to redeem Amis himself from the feminist criticism; we can never know whether he
really despises women based on his representation of them. Nevertheless we will try to redeem
Nicola, the character, by trying to describe and analyze her within the context of the novel. For us,
Nicola represents “Amis's anatomy of male misogyny, not in his own sustained attack on women”;
and we agree with Tredell that the author must not be confused with his characters and that “in his
narratives, Amis will take additional interest to discourage such confusion” (Tredell: 108). Because
we believe this is so, we will search for such clues in London Fields, looking for clarification in the
text, not outside of it.  Redemption is a key word at this point, as it is redemption that Nicola is
looking for  since  she has  planned her  own death,  but  not  as  a  solitary or  meaningless  suicide
attempt,  but  by  involving  certain  characters  in  her  murder.  She  will  die,  and  it  will  not  be
meaningless, as we will argue throughout this chapter. 
Within this context we cannot really contrast Auster's and Amis's novels due to the lack of
powerful female characters in the Trilogy. Therefore Auster will be relegated to the background
while we try to unravel the mystery of Nicola Six. Even so, it should be mentioned that there are
some female characters who all shine in their invisibility, namely, for example, the future Mrs. Blue,
whose real name we never get to know, as she is just a reminder of Blue's past life he has left behind
in his contemplation and later loss of control; or Sophie, Fanshawe's and the narrator's wife, who is
no more than another of the complements of Fanshawe's life that the narrator takes for himself. This
scandalous lack of importance of women is recurrent throughout the three stories, even within the
short stories Auster introduces in the narrative, like Wakefield by Hawthorne, which we mentioned
in chapter 2 when dealing with intertextuality. In this short story Black tells Blue, a man abandons
his life (and his wife) for more than twenty years, witnessing his own funeral and the suffering of
his wife. One day, this man just decides to come back home and Hawthorne chooses the moment his
wife opens the door for an ending, to which Blue instantly responds: “And we never know what he
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says to his wife? No, that's the end” (173). There is even a woman whose face we never get to see,
although she could be relevant in the Black case: “meeting with a woman with no face, a smoke
screen, or contingent fact?” (151), a possibility he chooses to discard just two pages later: “The
woman never meant anything. She was just a diversion” (153). The most extreme case of violence
and invisibility is Ms. Stillman, about whom it is implied that her husband killed her, being able to
cover for his crime by means of silence: 
Then Peter's  mother  died.  Stillman claimed that  she  had died  in  her  sleep,  but  the
evidence seemed to point to suicide. Something to do with an overdose of pills, but of
course nothing could be proved. There was even some talk he had killed her. But those
were just rumors, and nothing ever came out of it. The whole affair was kept very quiet.
(26)
With nothingness, we have seen, Auster usually means  something; therefore, although there is no
clear denouncing of male behavior towards women, it is made evident that male characters tend to
leave their female counterparts out of their adventures, that they inflict violence on women for no
reason, and that this is left for the reader to ponder on, like every other topic in the novel. 
The only more or less strong female character we see in The Trilogy is Virginia Stillman as
“the femme fatale in his noir detective fantasy”, straight from a classic detective novel (Peacock:
51). Virginia, who recalls virginity through her name, is a woman similar to Nicola, mysterious and
sexy: “The woman was thirty, perhaps thirty-five; average height at best; hips a touch wide, or else
voluptuous, depending on your point of view; dark eyes, and a look in those eyes that was at once
self-contained and vaguely seductive. She wore a black dress and very red lipstick” (13). She kisses
Quinn once, which is enough to have him on the hook of the case: “Much later, long after it was too
late, he realized that deep inside he had been nurturing the chivalric hope of solving the case so
brilliantly and irrevocably, that he would win Mrs. Stillman's desire” (63). It becomes clear that the
kiss was part of a scheme when “his employer had rapidly retreated behind the mask of business
and not once had referred to that isolated moment of passion” (63). Therefore, just as we will see in
Amis, Auster uses this stereotype to reflect on male subjectivity and the real motivations men have
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when it comes to women, while at the same time we can suppose Virginia Stillman is nothing but a
piece in a bigger scheme, and she has been used by ‘other people’ to scam him. 
Masculinity is not a preeminent topic in the Trilogy either, although as Little points out, it is
a constitutive part of the identity that an Auster character is always forced to leave behind: “Having
abandoned the traditional trappings of male power and prestige, having wasted himself, he emerges
as a figure with no profession, no office, no home” (160). Characters are eventually deprived of
every trace of their identity, including every label that made them ‘men’ in society: “Quinn was
nowhere now. He had nothing, he knew nothing, he knew that he knew nothing” (102). Moreover,
masculinity is  not  a  natural  given in  Auster;  “he isn't  made of  stone, he  says  to  himself”  (my
emphasis),  but  the social  notion of it  helps  the characters  reinforce themselves  in their  player-
pilgrim moves, like when they are unfaithful:  “His guilt  towards the future Mrs. Blue is scant,
however, for he justifies these sessions with Violet by comparing himself to a soldier at war in
another  country.  Every  man  needs  a  little  comfort,  especially  when  his  number  could  be  up
tomorrow” (157). This is only a sneak peak of what we can also witness in London Fields, although
it reminds us of the self-justification Keith found for his interracial affairs in the passage we quoted
in chapter 1, where he saw himself as an imperialist force. We will bring up some other examples
from the Trilogy relevant to the ideas presented in this chapter, but from this point on, we will
mostly refer to Amis.
The Times published: “After [Salman Rushdie's] The Satanic Verses (1989), the book most
argued over in Britain continues to be  London Fields”38,  later  adding “[c]ritics of the book are
accused of having mistaken satirical realism for moral turpitude, of confusing the story with its
narrator and of being blinded to its merits by feminist or otherwise ‘extra-literary’ concerns” (in
Tredell: 98). The catalyst for this controversy started up when Amis was left out of the Booker Prize
38 Rushdie included sections from the unofficial life of Mohammed in his novel, which deeply offended large sections
of the Muslim community. For more on the controversy in relation to The Satanic Verses check Said : 370-371. 
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list of the year, something that Young himself predicts in the book: “let me soberly tell you that I
don't think my book is prizewinning material. Though the panel might feel differently about it if
they knew it  was true. Christ,  it's  only just occurred to me: people are going to imagine that I
actually sat down and made all this stuff up” (302). “His exclusion for the shortlist, it is rumoured,
was insisted on by the two women judges on the panel, Maggie Gee and Helen McNeil” (Jane
Ellison in Tredell: 97). This is a rumor one of the judges denies, or at least clarifies stating she likes
Amis in general as a comic author, but she says “there is a strong formal, purely ‘literary’ case
against  London Fields,  [that he] ‘has tried for effects that aren't quite worked out. […] There's
confusion in the book about the function of the narrator’ ”; adding that some male critics “have
disliked the book for similar reasons”. She nevertheless refers to the confusing, for her, relationship
the narrator  has  with two particular  female characters:  his  blessing of  the little  girl  at  the end
combined with the brutal murder of Nicola “just two pages earlier” (Maggie Gee in Tredell: 98). Yet
more feminist authors are vocal about the issue of gender in Amis: “Perhaps the trouble is that
Amis… writes about sex. Quite a lot about sex, as it happens” (Jane Ellison in Tredell: 97; and
perhaps that is the trouble; there is quite a lot of sex in the novel and how it is described might be
disturbing for certain audiences, but we must not forget that sex is Nicola's power in the book too.
Amis locates her power over men in the fact that she physically matches the erotic ideal (by men,
for men) and in this way all kinds of men will succumb to her automatically, although she always
transforms their infatuation with her into pain. This mission of hers in London Fields is a long-term
ongoing strategy and she is using the impact she creates on men in her favor; this is how Young
describes it:
But let us be clear about this: she had great powers– great powers. All women whose
faces and bodies more or less neatly ﬁll the contemporary mould have some notion of
these  privileges  and  magics.  During  their  pomp  and  optimum,  however  brief  and
relative, they occupy the erotic centre. Some feel lost, some surrounded or crowded, but
there they are, in a China-sized woodland of teak-hard worship. And with Nicola Six the
gender yearning was translated, was fantastically heightened: it came at her in the form
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of human love. She had the power of inspiring love, almost anywhere. Forget about
making strong men weep. Seven stone pacifists shouldered their way through street riots
to be home in case she called. Family men abandoned sick children to wait in the rain
outside  her  flat.  Semi-literate  builders  and  bankers  sent  her  sonnet  sequences.  She
pauperized gigolos, she spayed studs, she hospitalized heartbreakers. They were never
the same again, they lost their heads. And the thing with her (what was it with her?), the
thing with her was that she had to receive this love and send it back in opposite form,
not just canceled but murdered. Character is destiny; and Nicola knew where her destiny
lay. (20-21)
Nicola is, although impossible to classify, an extreme version of a  femme fatale, and she
does  not  constitute  a  benevolent  representation  of  womanhood,  particularly  among  so  much
invisibility  of  other  types  of  woman;  we  agree  with  the  feminist  side  on  that.  We  argue,
nevertheless, that this is not an invention or an innovation by Amis at all and so we must figure out
the possible reasons for his use of Nicola in the novel. We will not be as naive as some critics who,
probably enchanted by Amis's very enjoyable virtuosity, try to literally defend him by softening
down  the  impression  that  Nicola  creates.  For  example,  Penny  Smith  states:  “Amis's  apparent
intention is for his female character to be read as a symbol of her age rather than a sign of her
gender” (in Tredell: 101). We believe Nicola is a representation of her gender, in fact, she embodies
all male fantasies concerning her gender and therefore she never stands for a real woman, but for a
seductive simulacrum, to use Baudrillard's  terminology.  Amis's characters are representations of
extreme,  unlikable  characters;  hence  Keith,  Young,  Guy,  Asprey  and  each  of  the  other  male
characters in the novel must also be considered a symbol of their time  and of masculinity  too:
“Keith  acted  in  the  name  of  masculinity”  (23);  and  so  every  character  in  the  novel  must  be
perceived as what might be called a negative extreme. Well-behaved characters, from our point of
view, male or female, are all losers in Amis's game, as goodness in his novels almost always equates
with “a gullibility bordering on imbecility” (Pesetsky in Tredell: 114). For example, he criticizes the
‘new type of masculinity’ in an essay about  Iron John: A New Vision of Masculinity.  There, he
sarcastically critiques a masculinity that may consider women not as equal, but as superior: 
The masculine cultivation of his feminine ‘side’ can be seen as a kind of homage to a
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better  and gentler  principle.  Well,  the  New Man is  becoming  an  old  man,  perhaps
prematurely, what with all the washing-up he's done; there he stands in the kitchen, a
nappy in one hand, a pack of tarot cards in the other, with his sympathetic pregnancies,
his  hot  flushes  and contact  pre-menstrual  tensions,  and with  a  duped frown on his
ageing face. (4) 
This is something that is present in London Fields through the character of Guy Clinch; see how he
sarcastically describes Guy at home very similarly: “He had cooked the dinner himself, as usual,
expressionlessly busying himself with meat-pounder, pasta-shredder, vegetable-slicer. [...] Really,
Guy  could  have  made  the  grade  as  a  proletarian  female.  He  was  obedient,  industrious  and
uncomplaining. He had what it took” (211). Therefore, moving on from this, the task we must take
on is to find possible antecedents for the feminine that Nicola represents both in high and popular
culture, which is what we have already done when we dealt with male types. Of course, this will
mean a shift towards other sources that will help us better contextualize this specific topic, although
always returning to the novel.
Until now, we have done something that most of the critics we have consulted or cited also
do, and that is to look the other way when talking about theories of otherness and alterity and the
topic  of  the  feminine  comes  up  (for  certain,  it  is uncomfortable).  Moreover,  we  have
decontextualized  the words  of  authors  or  at  least  used them partially in  order  to  reinforce  our
arguments and to be able to describe the theories of alterity in our times and their relationship with
our novels coherently; but it must be well noted and highlighted that Derrida, Lacan or Levinas all
present  the  feminine  as  an  opposite  other  to  the  masculine.  Therefore,  this  implies  that  any
understanding between the sexes must be ultimately impossible, at least according to what we have
argued throughout this study. Is this then detrimental towards the feminine? Apparently it depends
on the interpretation of the text, and, of course, language can be deceiving; therefore it is necessary
to offer our own interpretation regarding this othering process that woman has undergone in silence,
then also share some celebrated feminists' opinions in order to answer the question in a manner that
takes  us  beyond a purely personal  view, even though their  theories  are  already under scrutiny,
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notwithstanding those who choose to ignore this issue. 
Lacan is, for example, a very controversial figure in contemporary psychology for his view
of ‘woman’ as a complete alien, and a mere projection of the (masculine) self; but curiously enough,
“many feminists use his work to challenge phallocentric knowledges” such as Juliet Mitchell, Ellie
Ragland-Sullivan, Julia Kristeva, Monique Plaza and Catherine Clement on the grounds that “his
problematizations of the idea of sexuality have helped to free feminist theory of the constraints of
humanism”  (Sarup:  27)— for  example, Nicole  Brossard  explores  the  possibility  for  “an  other
woman” and in her work there are many instances of a mirror that reflects more than one image (in
Derrida: 16-17). This helps her explore, as our authors do, superimpositions of self and other and
doubling. On the other hand, other feminist critics and writers “are extremely hostile to it, seeing it
as elitist, male-dominated and itself as phallocentric”, such as Germaine Greer, Dale Spender and
others. However, some, such as Jane Gallop, Jacqueline Rose, Sara Kofmanor or Luce Irigay, who
we will later refer to in order to support our own ideas, make use of his theories to create their own,
but critique the insurmountable distance that his ideas have created between the sexes (Sarup: 27),
as we will soon see. 
Moving on from here, we will now take Levinas's Time and the Other (1987) as a concrete
example in order to analyze his attitude towards the philosophical subject and its relationship with
femininity.  Levinas  is  insatiably  quoted  by  all  sectors  of  postmodernist  criticism interested  in
finding  a  voice  for  the  minorities;  therefore  Said  or  Bhabha,  for  example,  acknowledge  his
importance, as well as Lacan's and Derrida's, for the beginning of a process of visualization of the
other in western intellectual spheres, while at  the same time influencing them. But male critics
usually  do  not  refer  to  the  issue  that  arises  from Levinas's  text  concerning  women  and  their
presence and participation within the philosophical experience, what Levinas calls the “light” (74).
In a manner similar to Lacan, Levinas cannot but give in to his position in the world as a man and
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progressively starts  showing the negativity that  womanhood implies  in  his  theory.  However,  to
digress  just  briefly,  some  critics  like  Paul-Laurent  mention  that  there  could be  a  wrong
interpretation of these authors; “that the ethical subject is placed on the side of the masculine! [It] is
an idea to correct immediately by saying that ethics is distinguished, as we have seen, from the
metamorphosis of the virile ‘ego’ in an experience of a radical  passivity” (96). Also, in a similar
vein, the editor of our edition clarifies in a footnote: “The issue is important but not as simple as de
Beauvoir, in this instance, makes it out to be, because for Levinas the other has a priority over the
subject” and he recommends some more “sympathetic treatment of Levinas's thought on this issue”
(85).  We do not  agree  with these critics  in  their  toning down of  Levinas's  conclusions  simply
because he clarifies that as the other is impossible to connect with, it  (she) is impossible to be
owned either: “Possessing, knowing, and grasping are synonyms of power” (Levinas: 90). Although
some critics see in this ‘gesture’ or concession towards the other a type of freedom, in that it (she) is
not under the power of the subject, what de Beauvoir, the well known feminist thinker, reacted
against was Levinas's astonishing revelation in his digression on otherness and complete alterity. In
fact, he is able to pin it down to one type of other specifically; let us read the conclusive paragraph
where he makes clear the nature of the dead-end street he has entered and presents:
What is the alterity that does not purely and simply enter into the opposition of two
species  of  the  same  genus?  I  think  the  absolutely  contrary  contrary [le  contraire
absolutement contraire], whose contrariety is in no way affected by the relationship that
can be established between it and its correlative, the contrariety that permits its terms to
remain absolutely other, is the feminine. (85)
Therefore if  femininity  is  total  alterity  to  the  subject,  the  problem  appears  that  it  cannot  be
attributed to the philosophical subject at all. Male characters in our novels progressively learn that
the identity they relied on was actually based on alterity, but under this light, or this darkness, for
females, alterity is always a given. Women are other by default and are left with absolutely no way
of self-recognition that is not based on male perceptions.
Also on the same line as de Beauvoir, Irigay finds it insulting that the other is located “but
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without any recognition of the other's own existence” (78). She starts her article "What Other are
We Talking About?" by stating: “It is through misunderstanding or misjudgment that some people
consider me a disciple or inheritor of Levinas's work” (67), and in order to clarify her position, she
proceeds  to  take  down  the  wall  Levinas  has  built  around  his  theory  by  correcting,  not
complementing, him: “If the feminine is other for the masculine subject, the masculine is, or should
be,  also an  other  for  the  feminine subject”  (71).  She criticizes  Levinas's  “virile  universe”  (68)
because,  surprisingly  enough  for  a  contemporary  reader  (and  philosopher),  he  gives  much
importance to virility, a word that appears on every page of the essay as a desirable characteristic of
the subject; that is, the end of the subject's control over life is called “the end of virility” (75). He
talks about a femininity that is not only unrecognizable because it is other to his subject, but also
because it is characterized by the inherent need for remaining silent and hidden, away from the
philosophical experience he calls ‘the light’: “What matters to me in this notion of the feminine is
not merely the unknowable, but a mode of being that consists in slipping away from the light. The
feminine in existence is an event different [from] that of spatial transcendence or of expression that
go toward light. It is a flight before light, hiding is the way of existing of the feminine” (87). For
Irigay,  here lies  a  huge problematic  for  women's  self-definition  and also their  visibility in  any
context; so she continues by responding to Levinas's definition of femininity as alterity: “It is not in
itself that the other remains invisible. It is invisible for me insofar as I cannot perceive the world in
which it stands” (73). 
According  to  Irigay,  the  historical  invisibility  of  women  is  a  result  of  the  historical
monopoly of the representation of women  by men, who are unable to experience and, therefore,
represent womanhood fairly. Irigay argues that the feminine of the philosophers is an attempt at
keeping women out of the cultural space (Sarup: 121). Consider the following quote: 
If the light evoked by Levinas corresponds to the so-called natural light of Western
reason, how could the feminine not stand back from it, since we know that it is founded
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through the exclusion of the feminine from its logic– be it as nature, as her or Her. It
suffices to reread the philosophers, in particular the pre-Socratics, to be convinced of
this and to follow the evolution of such a process. (Irigay: 75)
Więckowska agrees with Irigay that “A woman is or has always been represented as an artwork, as
a text written by a masculine self  who attempts to top her eternal retreat” (185). Thence many
female writers fight for the deconstruction of the tradition of the levinasian feminine. For example,
Cixous or Kristeva have worked on men writers who tried to speak for women like Mallarmé,
Lautreamont or Joyce.  However, Irigay considers,  on the other hand, that these writers tried to
speak  like  a  woman,  because  speaking  as  a  woman  would  imply  “not  simply  psychological
positioning, but also social positioning” (Sarup: 121). She is also interested in how philosophers
like Nietzsche, Hegel or Derrida relate identity and femininity: 
According to the above scenario we are left in a rather odd position; men, writers and
philosophers who want to write like women, are better at being women than women are!
But  as  Irigay  points  out  one  should  not  confuse  identification  with  identity,  and
therefore women should never accept the imposition of meaning over them by men;
they should find “a language of their own” (Sarup: 121). 
With all this in mind, let us now return to the novel and see how this discussion helps us clarify a
little bit more about Nicola as a character and as a woman in London Fields.
Nicola is  a very complicated character because she does not speak as or like a woman;
furthermore, she  wants to have her story written down by a man. In this sense, Nicola is not a
woman, she is a literary construction by Martin Amis, a man. Furthermore, in the book we can
never quote Nicola directly, not in the first nor in the second level of the fiction; everything about
her passes through the filter of Samson Young. In fact, she uses both Asprey and Young to write and
publish her biography as a female fantasy; and in order to be this fantasy she always resorts to male-
invented arts, for example by wearing the scandalous dress she wears towards the conclusion, she
makes a statement: “The dress was man-made, drulon, trexcett, man-made in every sense, made by
men with men in mind” (456-457). Nicola does not exist in real life, that is a fact, but the ideas she
incarnates  most  definitely exist  in  cultural  (not  only male)  imagery:  “The feminine within this
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economy is thought on the basis of the needs or desires of the masculine subject and not on its own
basis” (Irigay: 75). Under this perspective, Nicola embodies an entity to be attacked or looked down
upon, even by feminists, and Amis is clearly presenting her for that reason: she is a stereotype as
full of flaws as the male stereotypes in the novel, all of whom are Amis's satirical creations.
From  what  has  been  said,  Nicola  fits  into  the  levinasian  description  of  the  feminine
perfectly, because darkness is her territory. We never get a very detailed description of her nor her
background, first because she avoids giving up information and second because the narrator focuses
only on certain facts and features: she is an eastern European woman in her early thirties, beautiful
and voluptuous and with dark hair and skin. This physical darkness deviates from simple skin tone
to a halo of total darkness: “her darkness” (61), “the dark of her waist” (74); a black hole (76); this
denotes a way of being that escapes permanently from the light and apprehension by the male
subject. Fot example, black is the color she is wearing the first time she goes into the Black Cross to
drink black coffee and smoke black tobacco (22); even a blackbird flies the first time she ever
speaks39 (21). So, if whiteness in the  Trilogy was related to the Stillmans, a symbol of western
patriarchal tradition– “Everything about Peter Stillman was white” (15)–, certainly blackness in
London Fields stands for the total alterity of the woman who opposes this tradition. De Certeau says
propriety is diurnal and transgression is not tolerated in the daylight while the night is obscure, “an
irrepressible interrogative buzz: who is doing what?” (18-19); this is why the mysterious Nicola, in
the darkness, closely related to the nocturnal, maintains the constant attention of Samson Young and
Guy, who take the image that they want to have of her as an excuse for the escapism they crave;
they pursue the achievement of a fantasy, which is why Nicola will perform differently for each of
them. Nicola knows in her fictional bones the theory we have been discussing here; she knows
“how  deeply  enmeshed  we  are  in  the  network  of  hidden  factors  that  constitute  our  cultural
39  Note that the raven, in particular, is a bird of ill omen and announcing, usually, death. With Nicola, Amis is always
dealing in literary commonplaces and types.
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identities”; she is aware “that our actions are determined by an almost infinite number of forces
beyond the range of our consciousness” (Wurgaft: 68), and therefore she will use this against the
other characters, swindling them into progressively abandoning their previous lives and getting lost
in her lies. 
Moreover, Nicola's mission –a very quixotic one, according to the last chapter– seems to
involve proving that individuals are less important than the “symbolic significance of role-filling”
(Pristed: 29), and so she will satisfy the type she has to play for any of her particular goals, lying to
inexplicable extremes and making all of them believe. Hence, there must be no doubt that what
Amis is putting on paper is the male fantasy and not the representative for females or femininity,
something that becomes obvious when she herself clarifies to the narrator, “I  am a male fantasy
figure. I've been one for fifteen years. It really takes it out of a girl”. In this affirmation, she clarifies
that reality or the girl she might have been once has been substituted by the fantasy she has become,
but  she also lets  the readers  know what  it  is  that  she really stands  for.  This  statement  is  then
followed by the enumeration of some names men have applied to her type: “Sexpot, Hot Lay, Sack
Artist, Mata Hari... Femme Fatale”, then concluding with Nicola's definition which is, simply: “I'm
a Muderee” (260). From this, we appreciate that she is a fantasy, one that has been configured by
men throughout history, but in this case she is also designed to disappear; she must be killed by the
those who invented her: she must be murdered by men. Therefore although she might be considered
too extreme to be put into words, the same society that disgusts Nicola co-exists with the images of
‘woman’ she represents, as they come at us from everywhere in the System. She impersonates what
Baudrillard calls a simulation, embodying the confusing moves of what he describes as ‘seduction’;
she constitutes an entity that has no referent in the real but only within the System, and therefore
exists and is real within the only realm possible. 
In order to develop something that was touched on earlier, it should be noted that, originally,
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‘seduction’ did not refer directly or exclusively to sex; seduction is contrary to production, deviating
the value of things into the domain of appearances: “its symbolic interchange does not only affect
the interchange between sexes” (Baudrillard C, my translation: 29). But it is a fact that all fields of
human experience have been absorbed and reinterpreted by the System, which has transformed
every aspect of our lives into the kind of script de Certeau describes, including the notions of sexual
gender and sexual relationships. As Grossberg argues, preconceived personal practices place people
within  the  ‘regimes  of  the  person’:  “character,  personality,  identity,  reputation,  honour,  citizen,
individual, normal, lunatic, patient, client, husband, mother, daughter....” (131). Therefore, as we
have been arguing all along, identities feed from these unnatural sources in order to hold on to a
category of being. A woman who looks for traces of a possible self in the existing conventions
involving gender and female sexuality is ultimately going to find total alterity, nothing more than
images created to seduce (women and men at the same time). Given this state of affairs, a woman
will  never  be  able  to  define  herself  other  than  by  alterity,  which  some  reject:  “From  a
psychoanalytic perspective it is therefore vital that alterity remain abstract and nonspecific, that it
not be reduced to the social differentials of gender, race, class, sexuality, ethnicity” (Dean: 919).
However, for rebellious reasons, Nicola will find a way to bring this fantasy, this alterity, to life,
suppressing any original features she might have had from birth, as her whole life seems to be
manufactured from the orphanage to the trips around the world, always resembling fictions or a
film.
We can never see any shade of reality behind the images that Nicola projects as she will
always wear a pre-calculated outfit, a mask –a concept that Latin captured with the word persona.
Related to this, Amis makes use of again “The metaphor of masquerade (the dislocation between
subjectivity and role) [which] has been used primarily in recent years to theorize the experience of
being a woman in a man's town” (Dugay: 185). Nicola can play very extreme and very different
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roles and effectively be several different people in order to empower herself over men. Therefore
we also see Nicola being different people just as we saw multiplicity in Quinn or Fanshawe from
the Trilogy. All of her masks are in one way or another related to sex. Consider for example that,
only within the category of kisses, she uses a variety of types depending on the reaction she is
searching for in her ‘victim’, and the narrator offers a catalogue of them (although we do not know
if Young names the types or if Nicola did it herself): 
Many  subheads  and  subsections,  many  genres  and  phyla-chapter  and  verse,  cross-
references, multiple citations. [...]The Rosebud, the Dry Application, Anybody's, Clash
of the Incisors, Repulsion, the Turning Diesel, Mouthwash, the Tonsillectomy,  Lady
Macbeth, the Readied Pussy, Youth, the Needer, the Gobbler, the Deliquescent Virgin
[and] the Jewish Princess. (186-187)
Nevertheless, we must clarify that moments of actual sex are not that numerous in London Fields in
spite of how it must seem from all the criticism. Nicola eventually has sex with Samson, but as
readers, we never get to know much about these encounters because for him, Nicola behaves as if
she were not playing any role at all: “What was she wearing? I can't remember. No outﬁt or disguise
of depravity. Just clothes. And she wasn't made-up either; she wasn't drunk, and she wasn't mad.
Very much herself, was, herself, fraying but shiny like worn velvet, extreme, aromatic, nervous,
subtle” (391). This way he feels comfortable outside of the action of his book although, in fact, she
is doing to him the same as she does to every man she takes control over through sex; that is, the
kind of sex any man likes and wants: “She really did a number on him. What was the number? It
was Six. Six. Six” (96). 
Even so, and in spite of the foregoing, the most vivid sexual images in the book come along
with the sex that  does not  happen;  hence we must  go back to Ellison,  the feminist  critic  who
denounced that London Fields was about sex. She continues as follows: “[London Fields] is awash
with sex, sleazy, nasty sex, involving lots of black stockings, panties and things too dreadful to
mention  here”  (in  Tredell:  97).  However,  here,  we  believe  that  Ellison  must  be  referring  to
pornography in the book, not  to  sex:  of  course,  the pornographic passages  where Nicola films
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herself  on  video  do  involve  a  lot  of  clothes  and  classic  stereotypes from  many  genres  of
pornography: “Nicola disliked pornography, but it was easy to do. It stank of money” (191). For
Keith, she knows porn is what will work because Keith is so absorbed by the TV screen that real
sex for him has been substituted by porn: “In the days after their first meeting, the image of Nicola
Six  began  to  work  on  Keith's  mind.  It  worked  like  television”  (55).  This  is  where  the  much
criticized stockings come into play. The problem with Nicola's transgression is that these images do
not correspond to propriety whatsoever and are not supposed to be exposed in the open. Although
sex is the natural way by which we reproduce, and although there is a possibility for connection
between the sexes as opposite others, all of which is a constitutive part of humans' societal behavior,
there are some contradictions in “[t]he Status of the discourse on sexuality, [dominated by] double
meaning  and  other  figures.  The  sexual  life  of  the  neighborhood  (the  language  as  well  as  the
practices) is not locatable in a systematic place that would reveal full social transparency to us. On
the contrary, it only manifests itself there in brief sparks, in a twisted way, obliquely, as if through
the looking glass” (de Certeau: 26). De Certeau talks about an early sexualization of human beings,
while they still do not have the code necessary to understand, because of the exposure to images of
highly  sexualized  content:  “the  adult  world  is  entirely  infiltrated  with  unconscious  and sexual
significations to which adults themselves do not have the code” (126-127). In Amis, the looking
glass is the camera and the actions of Nicola belong to that code invented by the System for the
regulation of sexual relationships that is not based on natural sex, as no simulation is: “This wasn't
the real  thing.  Just  a  mannequin,  on the  remote”  (LF:  269).  The “events  themselves  disappear
behind the television screen” and it is no mirror anymore, it is simply a mode of escapism and
disappearance  for  the  masses  (Baudrillard  "The Masses...": 213).  Therefore  pornography is  yet
another way of escapism, another consumer product that the System offers to men disenchanted by
the emptiness of available relationships: “We do in fact live among pure forms, in radical obscenity,
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which is to say visible and undifferentiated, among figures that were previously secret and distinct
(…), the social [is] obscene and empty” (Baudrillard  "On Seduction":  162). Therefore porn is a
commodity “more real than the real”; it is one of the top enchanting simulations, “more false than
the false, and the secret of appearances” (154).
Baudrillard denounces how in our society the sexual act is shown openly and directly to the
sight for its consumption (through pornography), to be ‘devoured’: “There the game does not exist,
nor the dialectic nor the distance, but a total termination of the elements” (my translation, C: 36).
Hence the world we live in and the one Amis tries to capture in his novel are too obscene, which is
why Nicola uses the System's Achilles's heel for seducing men on her behalf, this way empowering
herself  by playing  by the  forbidden  rules  of  the  sexual  games.  Amis,  through  the  narrator,  is
conscious that Nicola is heavily politically incorrect: “But Nicola is heavy stuff. Nicola is heavy. I
guess I could tone it down, if there's time. But tone it down to what?” (78). That is a problem, but
not only for the narrator, because in the real world porn does exist, taking more and more power
over the internet, where filters are basically impossible to impose on the content: “Nowadays the
main  issue  in  criticism  on  the  media  revolves  around  tolerance  limits”  (Baudrillard  C,  my
translation: 37-38). But even so, if the issue is porn in literature written by men, there are also many
other  examples  of  people who have used explicit  sex in  contemporary novels  such as Jeanette
Winterson, W. H. Smith, Julie Burchil, Sally Bauman, Shirley Conran or Judith Krantz: “What do
all these fat volumes have in common? Yes, lots of passages of pornographic sex. And they're all
written by women. [...] Women cannot complain about their treatment in male fiction when it is
women  themselves  who  write  those  trashy,  livid  blockbusters  just  to  earn  themselves  a  vast
publisher's  advance”  (Jane  Ellison  in  Tredell:  99).  Therefore  there  are  some  women  taking
advantage of the preconceptions on femininity and sex, just as Nicola does in the novel. Ellison says
sex represents one paragraph to every five pages, although it might be less, but we agree with her
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that it is not written purely to keep the reader “salivating (it is far too nasty for that)” (99). The main
problem we find is that pornography in this novel is outwith propriety; Amis knows that and partly
denounces that the representation of sex has been reduced to pornography and made invisible, while
at the same time it has become very visible, but only outside of propriety: “Everybody masturbated
all their lives. On the whole, literature declined the responsibility of this. So pornography had to
cope with it. Not elegantly or reassuringly. As best it could” (67). 
Anyway it is not just hardcore porn that Nicola successfully performs; for Guy, she dresses
as a puritan to fake virginity and purity; “Again the word pornography came to mind: to Guy's
mind, where there wasn't any— where there wasn't any pornography” (215). He remains unable to
satisfy his sexual arousal with her no matter what, but it is this (fake, impossible) purity Clinch
dreams about in his philanthropic existence, although he feels guilty for being unfaithful to his wife:
“What kind of man was this? How unusual? Guy gave money to charity. For every other man in his
circle, charity began at home. And ended there too. Or not quite: charity continued for a mile or so,
into the next postal district, and arrived at a small flat with a woman in it” (87). But thanks to his
good intentions, he will be easy to con by Nicola and her faithful helper, Samson: “the second
definition of  infatuation is ‘inspired with extravagant passion’;  but the first  definition is ‘made
foolish’. Guy asked my advice about Nicola. I gave my advice (it was bad advice), and with any
luck he'll take it” (101). And he did, forcing himself into a very dramatic romance where sex will
conveniently be the biggest taboo, in order to respect the moral code of this very modest woman. In
order to highlight his infatuation (he is the fool, the foal, the fall guy after all), we also get long and
very detailed passages in the novel of this painful affair: “Keith said,  ‘What do you do with Guy
then?’ ‘What  do  you  think  I  do?’ said  Nicola.  ‘I  tease  his  fucking  cock  off’ ”  (330).  When
embodying this virginal character, Nicola hides from the light towards what the male subject sees as
a good woman: “this fact of hiding is precisely modesty” (Levinas: 87); so modesty is just another
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commodity  for  men  that  Nicola  knows how to  impersonate.  She  pretends  she  does  not  know
anything about sex so she can be guided by Guy, a knight in a shinning armor that really sparkles
with  the  super  sun  as  something  obsolete:  “You  could  imagine  Nicola,  someone  like  Nicola,
someone in her position, someone so placed, so cloistered, at the end of the nineteenth century or at
the end of the eighteenth century or any other century that had a number. But not the twentieth
century, which must leave its mark on everyone. Not the twentieth century. Not looking like she
looked” (330). This way, she tricks Guy into following her every step, believing every lie, looking
for imaginary friends internationally on her behalf, leaving his wife and son, and, most of all, she
tempts this chivalric side of men we have seen all over both the Trilogy and London Fields, which
must certainly be outdated because it always implies confusion and deviation from a better path.
Apart from this, however, there is yet another mask Nicola wears, a layer under the puritan
or the porn star ones, and that is the femme fatale mask she wears in every situation of her life. As a
woman interested in luxury and fashion Nicola is, at all times, what she wears, thence clothes and
make up are very important for her success. Nicola has her value system very clear, and it places the
emphasis on perfection in clothing at all times:
Nicola was consternated by how few women really understood about underwear. It was
a scandal. If the effortless enslavement of men was the idea, or one of the ideas (and
who had a better idea?) […] They wanted the female form shaped and framed, packaged
and gift-wrapped, stylized,  cartoonified,  and looking, for a moment at  least,  illusory
pure. They wanted the white lie of virginity. Men were so simple. But what did that do
to the thoughts of women, to the thoughts of women like Nicola Six? Never, in her life,
not ever, had Nicola decisively discarded any item of clothing. The flat's large second
bedroom had become a supercloset– it was like a boutique in there, the suits, the party
dresses, the theatrical costumes and disguises, the belts, the scarves, the hats. (71) 
Moreover,  Nicola undergoes  this  everyday transformation because she  wants  to  forever  send a
message of power, and power for a woman in the System goes with her physical appearance. Guy
Clinch reflects on how different in fact it is for him to get dressed in the mornings: “His closet was
a City of business suits– but on most days his clothes no longer needed to say anything. The outer
man was losing his lineaments. Soon there would just be an inner one, palely smiling” (86); and he
Rueda 171/209
Identity as Alterity
compares this to women's clothing: “The vaults and galleries of female clothing, their catholicity of
cut and colour, surprised and impressed him. Compared to this, men went around in uniform. But
then... but then, just now (and in a sense it had been this way for half a century): we are all in
uniform” (419). The underlying truth is that women feel a stronger urge in the System to perform a
variety of different roles that, although sometimes contradictory, must remain in harmony with the
picture she wants to project above all, which is certainly not an easy task; it takes a lot of effort but
Nicola knows she must be “Actress like. Real pro: knows what she's doing. The others: amateurs”
(289). Even de Certeau, when speaking about propriety and the meaning imposed on darkness and
night  cannot  but  refer  to  women's  clothing  and their  meaning as  an  example  for  clothes  as  a
fundamental  support  for  the  social  message  proffered:  “i.e.  The  clothing  of  a  woman  who  is
‘dressed to go out’ ” (16). And this is a very concrete example that does not need to be explained,
because we all know what a woman dressed to go out can mean in cultural imagery and Nicola
consciously chooses what to wear for ‘horrornight’; she is dressed for rape and she is dressed for
death: “‘Do You think this dress is sufficiently disgusting?’ she called out. […] ‘Let's stop it. Let's
abort...Oh, wear a coat Nicola’ ” (455); although, ironically, Keith “has never seen her looking quite
so beautiful” (458).
Nicola assumes her role as a fictitious character beyond the fiction although the narrator
reminds her several times that she is a real person: “‘But you're not in a story. This isn't some hired
video, Nicola.’ She shrugged. ‘It always felt like a story’ ” (118). The real Nicola would not like all
this paraphernalia if she could come out somehow: “the mirror hours, the looking glass. Nobody
could seriously stand there and expect anybody to be forever having to do with all this shit” (195).
She knows she is a slave to this code and as she is growing older, she knows it carries an evanescent
power: 
Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Which is fun for the beholder; but what about the
owner, the tenant? Nicola wondered whether she'd ever had a minute's pleasure from it.
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Even at sixteen, when you're excitedly realizing what you've got (and imagining it will
last for ever), you're still noticing what you haven't got, and will never get. Beauty's
hand is ever at its lips, bidding adieu. Yes, but bidding adieu in the mirror. (127)
Nicola, the illusion, wants to be eliminated but this way the real Nicola also will be able to escape
from the constraints  of this  distorted femininity.  The lacanian and levinasian figurative mirrors
reinforce the fear that the actual mirror symbolizes for Nicola, beyond the decay of beauty. She will
not get older anymore. This frustration caused by the System that she feels as a female leads her to
kill herself in order to be able to kill the impersonal image that resembles her.  Więckowska so
accurately and sadly describes this levinasian frustration:
Her face, distorted, presents her inability to signify: even in touching her, one does not
reach her, but searches for something which is beyond her, not yet existing […]. In her
passivity,  or  because  of  the  passivity  ascribed  to  her,  the  woman is  immersed in  a
present  that  can  take  on  nothing  and  thus,  like  an  object  of  art,  she  becomes  an
impersonal and anonymous instant.  She retreats  into shyness,  eludes herself  and the
lover who touches her; therefore, she is not herself. But resembles her own image. (184)
With all this in mind, in her total darkness, Nicola becomes a symbol of a levinasian female
subject in need of an escape from the theory that reflects the reality of women in and according to
the System. Irigay says: 
Perhaps it would be more correct to say that the feminine is not satisfied with the light
sought by the masculine subject, that it aspires to another light [...]. This light does not
correspond to its constitutive necessities. And what the feminine tries to escape is rather
the fact of being submitted to an economy not its own while its own goes unrecognized.
The  violation  with  respect  to  the  feminine  is  firstly  the  imposition  of  a  world
inappropriate to it, which deprives it of a return to self, especially in the relation to the
transcendental and to light. (76)
And Nicola seems to have this purpose; in her need to escape from all these social impositions over
women, she has a goal which is the actual origin of her self, which resides outside of her body: “Her
project had been to get through men– to get to the end of men” (189), and she finds only one way to
do so: death. Curiously, or ironically, Levinas calls death “the end of virility”; in his theory “death
becomes the limit of the subject's virility, the virility made possible by the hypostasis at the heart of
an anonymous being, and manifested in the phenomenon of the present, in the light” (74). Therefore
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Nicola wants to symbolically finish with both the conception of the male subject in the System, and
the image that has been imposed on women too; and because she seems to find no other option to
escape from them, suicide presents itself as a powerful move against the absurd, as Levinas himself
contemplates  in  his  theory:  “a notion  of  being  without  nothingness,  which  leaves  no hole  and
permits no escape. And this impossibility of nothingness deprives suicide, which is the final mastery
one can have over being. One is no longer master of anything –that is, one is in the absurd. Suicide
appears as the final recourse against the absurd. [...]The power to die is still a triumph over fatality
(50)”. For this rebellious act, she needs to die on her own terms, which Baudrillard (among others)
considers an effective move towards freedom from the System. Our characters' ideas of escapism
throughout both novels have in common that they seek for disappearance in one way or another.
According to Baudrillard, “The object, the individual, is not only condemned to disappearance, but
disappearance is also its strategy” ("The Masses...": 213). Nicola is a player and she is used to
winning; she also at all times takes extreme positions, being an extreme simulation in a hyperreal
world:  “Things  have  to  be  pushed  to  the  limit,  where  everything  is  naturally  inverted  and
collapses”;  therefore  she  needs  to  die  to  make  a  symbolic  move  and really  win  the  game by
effectively leaving the System: “ The play of simulation must therefore be taken further than the
system permits. Death must be played against death. A radical tautology. The system's own logic
turns into the best weapon against it” ("Symbolic...": 123).
Nicola  might  be  searching  for  affirmation  through negativity  as  a  woman,  which  some
female characters by feminist  writers such as Toni Morrison, Angela Carter,  Octavia Butler,  or
Donna Haraway have used before: self destruction for freedom (Berger, J: 391), a relationship we
find beyond feminism too:
Negativity is the negation of identity. Human beings are truly free or really human
only in and by effective negation of the given real. Negativity, then, is nothing other
than human freedom. The freedom which is realized and manifested as dialectical or
negating action is thereby essentially a creation. What is involved is not replacing one
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given by another given, but overcoming the given in favour of what does not (yet)
exist. (Sarup: 21)
And here is a clue that could be helpful in order to clarify Amis's intentions, because, as we will see,
Nicola is not sacrificed for any other women in the novel, but in favor of the only being that inspires
hope for  mankind in  Young;  the  baby:  “The eyes  of  certain  faces,  children's  faces,  made him
wonder whether this whole adventure of his, so agitated and inspired, and so climactic, wasn't just a
way of evading the twentieth century or the planet or what the one had done to the other” (430).
Therefore, towards the end of the chapter, we will consider whether Kim Talent might constitute a
creation out of Nicola's death.
But  against  this  hopeless situation for  womanhood,  we must  remember that  many other
women remain alive in London Fields after Nicola's and Young's death as apparently the apocalypse
does not occur on the expected date:  ‘real’ women exist  in the novel although their  voices are
almost never heard and they do not intervene in the story  (real in that they do not embody or
correspond to male fantasies about women, as they are all neverthelesss fictitious). ‘Real’ women in
Amis are nevertheless under the constraints of other social stereotypes for women, like for example
Hope Clinch, a classic preppy gold digger: “She liked [Guy's] curly-ended fair hair, his house in the
country, his shyness about his height, his house in Landsdowne Crescent, his habit of hooding his
eyes against a low sun, his title, his partiality to cherries (specially ripe ones), his large private
income” (87). All of the female characters are defined by their relationship with a male referent, an
idea that even Auster briefly reflects upon in the Trilogy: “whatever future [Sophie] might want to
build for herself would be tainted by the role she had to play: the official widow, the dead writer's
muse, the beautiful heroine in a tragic story. No one wants to be part of a fiction, and even less so if
that fiction is real” (221). In order to avoid this list of female stereotypes, Nicola rejects any kind of
deep relationship with men and she is categorically designated by the tag: “nobody's babymamma”
(173). She has escaped every type of relationship with men beyond her sexual business and every
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opportunity of being a mother by having practiced seven abortions on herself (192). Relationships
are  summed  up  by  a  bunch  of  undesirable  possibilities  for  her:  “He  Refuses  To  Make  A
Commitment. She Has A Problem Giving Him The Space He Needs. He Is Too Focused On His
Career  At  This  Time.  They  Think  They  Love  Each  Other  But  Given  Their  Temperamental
Differences, How Will They Ever Connect?” (281). By all this labeling we can see Levinas's point
that it is impossible to ever obtain a successful connection with the other through relationships,
most of all for women: 
Can this relationship with the other through Eros be characterized as a failure? Once
again, the answer is yes, if one adopts the terminology of current descriptions, if one
characterizes the erotic by ‘grasping’, ‘possessing’, or ‘knowing’. But there is nothing
of all this, or the failure of all this, in eros. If one could possess, grasp, and know the
other it would not be other. (90)
Nicola is, however, not the only beautiful woman in  London Fields; at the beginning the
narrator identifies two very beautiful women among all he has met in London: “They both turn
heads, these girls I squire. Lizzyboo by day. Nicola by night. They both embody whatever it is that
men have to look” (283). Because Lizzyboo is a real woman who keeps herself in  ‘the light’ she
soon changes her attitude towards one of total defeatism, and she also finds “a strategy for getting to
the end of men. Her strategy is this: Weigh two hundred pounds” (325) as “she eats too much when
she  is  unhappy”  (262).  Lizzyboo  (whose  name  kind  of  sounds  like  ‘lazy  bones’)  is  Nicola's
counterpoint in the novel,  but the fact that she is real and not a simulation has her frustrated–
remember a woman is unable to self-identify under those terms–, and it has her ignored by the
narrator and the other males. But there is a feeling that motivates men to turn to simulations over
women. Let us see Irigay's proposal: “Levinas makes the feminine bear this alteration of the self
that the voluptuous entails, but he challenges it for himself. He doubtless fears losing his ego in it.
Or he fears entrusting the safeguard of his ego to the feminine?” (79). 
Because of this ancestral fear towards alterity, the subject has ultimately taken control of the
other by taking control of the representation of her: “Within a patriarchal society, woman becomes
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represented  as  the  Other,  necessary  to  the  constitution  and recognition  of  identity,  but  always
threatening to it. Sexual difference is thus locked into a structure of power where difference, or
otherness, is tolerated only when represented” (Cixous in Sarup: 110).  Amis no doubt reflects the
fear of the feminine in each and every one of his  male characters. These men deeply fear real
women in their imperfection and natural strength and alterity, a reality they try to ignore at all times:
“I was afraid of her body and its vigour, of her flesh, of her life. […]. Actually the nails on her big
toes are beginning to lose symmetry, she has a stepped-sided mole on the back of her neck, and
generally her skin (when compared to someone like Kim Talent) is definitely showing signs of
wear, of time, of death” (232); this is why they turn to the fantasy. But as it turns out, a fantasy that
transgresses the level of the imagination is also uncontrollable and ultimately scary to the male
subject: “it wasn't desire that Nicola Six aroused in Keith Talent. Not primarily. I would say greed
and fear came first” (23); so much so that Keith does not even wish to rape her  –“There was no
money in rape. [...] But there was money, it seemed, in Nicola Six” (169). Nevertheless, the male
mind is always trying to figure out new ways of taking possession of the other, which historically
has led to atrocities such as human trafficking: “He wandered if there was any way he could sell her
to Guy Clinch” (110).
This is  no doubt the perfect scenario for the death of love,  which Irigay blames on the
exclusively male philosophical tradition at the bases of our civilization and, as we said before, she
advocates  a  new vision of  femininity,  yet  to  be  constructed.  Taking Levinas  as  a  referent,  she
explains: 
No place remains available to permit an encounter between two who do not simply form
a whole, even if the duality of kinds constitutes the unity of the human species. There is
a pre-given, natural unity, but whose accomplishment between two subjects escapes, is
still and always to be constructed, and cannot be won through a complementarity, since
duality would thereby be annulled. (72)
By having her own self terminated, as a ‘redemptor mulieris’, Nicola symbolically sacrifices herself
for the opportunity of this new female philosophical subject that Irigay and all feminist writers
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would like to see represented: a more natural and fair vision of womanhood, one that is built by
women themselves. Amis is a satirical writer, though, and has a liking for the grotesque and black
humor, therefore it is difficult to obtain this message, so noble among so much disarray. We cannot
say for certain that Amis has any hope in the future of mankind whatsoever, but we can say that this
hope is manifested by Samson Young himself, and Amis puts it in him: after killing Nicola in cold
blood,  he turns  to  the baby for hope in  the future.  We have seen that  although Keith believes
“Babies, infants, little human beings: they're a skirt thing. The only blokes that love babies are
transvestites, hormone-cases, sex-maniacs” (80). However, Young is empathic to kids naturally. He
reflects on why this is the case throughout the book, concluding that the best of kids is their purity, a
purity that resides in them not being  corrupted  by the rules of social interactions: “Only babies
frown and flinch. The rest of us just fake with our faces. […] She laughed. No she didn't. We laugh
about twice a year. Most of us have lost our laughs and now make false ones” (241), which is
something  Lacan  himself  observed:  “unlike  the  child,  the  adult  merely  translates  his  old
translations,  so to  speak,  turning out  ‘rehashes’ of  them” (in  Laplanche:  160).  Therefore,  what
Young sees is that the baby can still be given a different education and lead a different life. He
believes that the System can be changed, but that it only admits one way out: “the idea of absolute
peace is the idea of absolute violence” (Hägglund, 49), which is why he has killed Nicola.
As we commented at the beginning of the chapter, not only the actions of Nicola and her
murder are shocking for the critics of the book, but so is this apparently paradoxical paternalistic
move by Young at the end. A last letter by Samson Young is included in the novel; he writes it on
his deathbed and it is addressed to Kim Talent, Keith's baby girl: “With fingers all oily from being
rubbed together, in integration, vigil, glee, fear, nerves, I cling to certain hopes: hopes of you. I hope
that you are with your mother and that you two are provided for. I hope your father is around –
controllably. Your beginning has been hard. Your continuation, not so hard. I hope” (469). Amis
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here, in a Dickensian move, humanizes the narrator, who aspires to a better life for the child. To
ensure  the  girl's  upbringing,  he  has  Guy  Clinch  take  care of  the  baby  after  he  dies:  he  will
economically and emotionally support her. This way the idea of a possible future through progeny is
introduced in  London Fields, a last glimpse of hope that Young shares with Levinas, but always
with a twist. The Subject experiences frustration over total alterity, unable to self-define because he
is unable to grasp the other half of human experience, the other sex; as we have seen, sexual and
emotional relationships are mediated by pre-conceived ideas which lead only to frustration. The
subject  is  also  doomed  by the  certainty  of  a  meaningless  death,  figuratively  and  literally,  but
Levinas  himself  presents  an  escape:  “The  meaningful  continues  beyond  my  death.  It  is  still
necessary to call this non-in-difference of responsibility for the Other by the name  relationship”
(116). Levinas sees connection between the sexes as impossible, although there is one relationship
he contemplates as truly revealing: the subject can see himself in his offspring, while Young sees a
representative for all the human race in a child that is not even his own: “Nevertheless, I ask you to
survive me” (469).
In a twisted game of logic, Levinas's philosophical subject, who is unable to connect with
the mother,  can nonetheless expect  a  grasp of self-recognition in  the  son –however,  a  possible
daughter  is  never  mentioned,  as  the  language  used  is  always  markedly  masculine  both  in  the
original in French and the translation:
This can happen only in one way: through paternity. Paternity is the relationship with a
stranger who, entirely while being Other, is myself, the relationship of the ego with a
myself who is nonetheless a stranger to me. The son, in effect, is not simply my work,
like a poem or an artifact, neither is he my property. Neither the categories of power nor
those of having can indicate the relationship with the child. Neither the notion of cause
nor the notion ownership permit one to grasp the fact of fecundity. I do not have my
child: I am in some way my child. (91)
Of course, Irigay criticizes this absolutely biased idea, insisting on the conscious undermining of the
mother as an essential element in fecundity; she has to be the carrier of the son as well as being the
other half of it genetically! The feminine must be present in him too, and the statistics say he could
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be a she too, which Levinas simply omits (70). By this second negation of the feminine, woman is
literally left  out of the philosophical  experience and the immemorial  journey of self-definition:
woman is the darkest other. Here, we can again establish a parallelism between the theory and the
plot of London Fields, because Amis is, like Irigay, deconstructing it and substituting it for a new
scenario where the  son is not a desirable successor: “Oh, the little boy was perfect in every way.
And he  was  a  monster”  (28).  Marmaduke is  the  only child  Guy has  with  his  wife  Hope,  but
paradoxically he is absolutely unable to see himself in the child. He finds it difficult to love him as
he knows the boy does not love him. Marmaduke is described as the closest to Keith actually, who
he almost sees as a paternal figure because he also presents the symptoms of an extreme and violent
masculinity:
Turn your back for ten seconds and he's in the fire or out the window or over in the
comer, fucking a light socket (he's the right height for that, with a little bend on the
knees).  His chaos is  strongly sexual,  no question.  If  you enter  his  nursery you will
usually find him with both hands down the front of his diaper, or behind the reinforced
bars of his playpen leering over a swimsuit ad in one of the magazines a nanny has
thrown in to him. (158)
Nevertheless, (this is an aside) the narrator insists that he has struggled to soften Marmaduke, the
character: “Of course I keep trying to tone Marmaduke down” (158); which implies his behavior is
so  extreme  that  not  even  Amis  wants  to  be  so  politically  incorrect  as  to  portray  a  child  as
unscrupulously as he does with Nicola. On the other hand Kim Talent is described as an intelligent,
calm, pure and loving being:
Little  Kim was asleep,  seated more or less upright on her  mother's  lap.  The baby's
powerful face, fully formed but in miniature, with its collection of glassy roundnesses,
its  crescents and half-moons,  lolled forward on the white trim of her jumpsuit.  The
cheeks broadened at the base, pushing out the lower lip, as brightly succulent as a slice
of sushi, the likes of which neither Keith nor Kath had ever seen. (107)
Of course for Keith it is impossible to connect with his daughter as for him femininity is the darkest
thing: “There was something wrong with the baby, something seriously wrong. The trouble with the
baby was that it was a girl” (7). He does not connect with the daughter as he could with Marmaduke
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and he struggles even before her birth, which sometimes creates hilarious situations like him trying
to figure a female version of his name to give to the baby: Keithette, Keithene, Keitha, Keithinia
(7). Nevertheless, contrary to the levinasian/derridian/lacanian approach to paternity, Samson Young
is able to naturally empathize with the creature, which gives him the only last  ray of hope for
mankind and the future. Like looking in a lacanian mirror, which were the eyes, he is captured by
the eyes of this other and reaches a hint of meaning, but this happens despite two facts that imply,
theoretically, an impassable amount of alterity: she is female and on top of that, she is neither his
daughter nor his relative:
What impresses and stays with me is the power of the baby's face– the power. It is knit
tight like a tautly prominent navel, chockful of possibilities, tumescent with potentiae,
as if the million things that could happen to her, the essences of the million Kims there
might  one day be out  there,  are  concentrated in this  powerful  face...  But  I  wonder.
Nicola's face is powerful too. The very thinness of the skin that coats her closed eyes is
powerful. Perhaps with her the effect is reversed or diametrical. Because Nicola's face,
Nicola's life, contains only one future, fully shaped, fully designed, toward which she
now moves at steadily climbing speed. (138)
Young, who sees two completely different female others in Nicola and Kim, decides, as a man, that
the power of Nicola, the simulation, must be suppressed so that Kim and the other “million Kims”
have a chance to develop a new language of the feminine, so that a female philosophical subject has
the opportunity of actually empowering herself over all the man-made images that dominate the
imagery of society. As Young will not survive, it is Guy Clinch who assumes a huge deal of what
paternity (and maternity) means (as Young had been doing before), therefore also connecting with
his needs for love and philanthropy towards the poor; also it complements perfectly with his hope
for the future, represented by this early dream that he first mistakenly related to Nicola: “In his
dream Guy Clinch edged closer to the bare body of a faceless woman. For a moment of dream time
she  turned  into  a  thirteen-year-old  baby,  smiling,  crooning,  then  once  more  became  a  woman
without a face. Not even a baby face. This wasn't a sex dream. It was a love dream, a dream of love.
He edged towards an oozing  yes...” (82). Marmaduke is not completely lost either, as he totally
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changes his attitude the moment Guy Clinch is forced to leave his household. He has rejected his
male role-model since birth, but accommodates smoothly with his mother now, having improved in
every sense: 
Marmaduke stepped aside, with some formality, and Guy entered the room. The little
boy followed, and then moved quietly past his father to the side of the bed, where Hope
lay, on her barge of pillows. 
‘Where is everyone’ For the house was eerily staffless.
‘All gone. There's no need. He's different now.’ 
‘ What happened?’ ‘It was quite sudden. The day after.’ (450)
Therefore there is hope in the people that remain alive in London Fields: when we get to this point,
it is Hope who survives to raise her child alone; she is a woman who has left behind her dependence
on men. Of course, Nicola dies (she has to) but she is not the only female stereotype that does so;
Faith, who was the president's wife and a symbol for the System will die as the ‘last lady’, a passive
token used by males in power, in government and the media to gain votes or to blurry the reality of
the affairs of the world:
Two main stories [on TV]. The first is all about Faith, the First Lady: a remarkably full
account,  in  fact,  of  her  recent  activities.  I  was  baffled;  but  then  I  remembered  the
speculation earlier in the summer about Faith's health. Presumably all this stuff about
hospice world, White House redecorations and anti-pornography crusading is offered in
courteous rebuttal.  And as  reassurance.  Everybody knows how totally the  President
loves his wife. He campaigned on the issue. (163)
Therefore, both metaphorically and literally H/hope in a new future remains while F/faith in the
system is dead in our times. Nicola herself knew her death was a sacrifice; she “felt death in its full
creative force” (195), and this creative force stays through Kim Talent and a new kind of woman yet
to grow, yet to be built on her own terms and with the help of the people around her. Certainly
Nicola or, better yet said, the images that she embodies, would project a horrible representation of
femininity if that was Amis's intention; nevertheless we truly hope to have thrown a new light over
this issue in order to clarify Nicola's being a symbol not for femininity, but for the grotesque and
stereotypical monster that the System has created and imposed over women; this vision is male,
thence the critique is on male fantasies, not on actual women. That there is a future for womanhood
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and therefore for mankind constitutes Young's only expectation and his death wish; Samson Young
believes there is an alternative and maybe Nicola did too; but we do not know about Amis himself,
as this is how he expresses his point of view on hope and the way it is not present in his novels:
I have strong moral views, and they are very much directed at things like money and
acquisition. I think money is the central deformity in life, as Saul Bellow says, it’s one
of the evils that has cheerfully survived identification as an evil. Money doesn’t mind if
we say it’s evil, it goes from strength to strength. It's a fiction, an addiction, and a tacit
conspiracy that we have all  agreed to go along with.  My hatred for it  does look as
though I’m underwriting a certain asceticism, but it isn't really that way: I don't offer
alternatives to what I deplore. (Groes: 181)
Although Amis professes that he does not offer alternatives to what he deplores (and it is suggested
that it is this grotesque image fabricated by society that he satirizes), he makes it clear that woman
is other and Kim Talent offers the hope that Society might one day come to accept that. With all we
have said about Nicola as the “darkest other” it should now be clear that, just as with all other
identities and with the notion of authorship in all the novels we have considered, both Auster’s and
Amis’s, as readers we are only aware that these are other than they appear to be, always displaced,
always deferred, always beyond our reach.
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5. Conclusion
We know that Auster and Amis are occasionally mentioned together when contemporary
postmodernist novelists are cited and have even been the object of study in order to consider, for
example,  their  use  of  the  strategies  of  the  roman noir  in  some of  their  novels.  But  here  and
throughout this study we have seen how these two authors, rarely compared in any depth,  also
coincide, in particular, with regard to their representation of identity and, as it has been shown, how,
for both of them, the individual subject has ceased to be something fixed or stable but can only be
understood in terms of alterity. We have seen that both share a strong interest in bringing to the page
the inevitability of alterity as the only postmodern alternative to earlier notions of ‘self’, and they
do so throughout their literary careers, as we pointed out in the second chapter. However, both
achieve distinction by presenting characters whose identities inevitably remain inaccessible and that
are beyond both their own and the reader’s reach. Both present characters who are obsessed with
discovering and taking control of who they and others are. We have seen how detectives take on the
job of following and keeping watch on others; others puzzle over the enigma of who someone (like
Fanshawe or Nicola) is. As we can see here and elsewhere in the novels, the characters often find
themselves involved in this kind of search to discover who the other is and it almost inevitably turns
out they are other than what they had believed, even what the narrator believes and even what the
reader understands by who they are. In this kind of search there can be no sense of discovery or
arrival as truth and identity are always displaced, always deferred, always other than we think. More
than that, during their search for the other, they begin to doubt and even lose their sense of self.
While they seek something to relate (themselves and the other) to, to discover what is true, which is
required for a stable idea of their (and others’) identities, their attempts show that some Romantic
notion of an essential self is now out of the question; certainties have disappeared. Even so, we have
seen  how  they  all,  conventionally,  attribute  themselves,  and  one  another  with characters,
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apportioning a role for each and every one (sometimes this is done even by the narrator himself in
London Fields or by ‘chance’ in the Trilogy) but the truth of their characters will remain elusive to
the point that they even lose sight of themselves (this is true also for the reader and the author that
has assigned them their role, too), for, as often as not, they are unaware of the role they have been
assigned. This search leads to the discovery that a sense of self does not come from within ourselves
but requires another to present that self to, to put their identity to the test, even to discover that self
in the other. After all, for many of the characters their sense of self depends on the recognition of
others; they can only see themselves as they think others see them. Alternatively, as is the case with
Blue, he finds that by looking into himself he is able to anticipate, to know what Black is going to
do; in this case the notion of the other derives from his notion of self, although, significantly, in the
end, Blue attempts to destroy this shadow, this dark reflection of himself. 
These detectives, following or keeping watch on someone, begin to see themselves reflected
in the other, or, unexpectedly, with so much time on their hands and nothing outside themselves to
relate to, they begin to look within themselves. However, even their given identities are not enough;
identity is elusive, escaping the individual. Nationality, their city, their class, all identify them at
some point, but some will intuit that they are not like that; others will remain oblivious to the role
they have been given (the murderer, the foil/fall-guy). Others play their part to perfection but still
without knowing who they are because they do not know the other. Authors/narrators and even we,
as readers, apportion roles to their characters but the characters slip out of their roles, away from
them and us. We also considered towards the end how, for both Auster and Amis, Woman is elusive;
the  ‘darkest  other’ remains  unknown  to  these  narrators  and  that  is  why they  present  us  with
stereotypes: Auster’s female characters are almost inevitably someone’s wife (or future wife in the
case of Blue) and conveniently disappear from the narrative; Amis assigns stereotypically literary
feminine roles to Nicola Six only to murder her and all the false notions of female identity that she
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represents. From all of this, it has become clear that the one and the other are always beyond our
reach.
Even so, our authors have reflected the prevalent notion that in postmodernity and, up to a
point (or perhaps never), in their novels, identity is discovered in or through the other/s (mirror
images/reflections/dark reflections); as Thomas Docherty has put it,
[Postmodern character]  moves the assumed homogeneity of identity [...]  towards  an
endlessly proliferating heterogeneity [;] identity is deferred and replaced by a scenario
in which the “character” or figure constantly differs from itself, denying the possession
of and by a self and preferring an engagement with otherness. (63)
However, in these novels the subject cannot be found in the other, just as it cannot be found within;
these characters seek identity in the other but the other also eludes them just as identity does. Even
the construction of the self as discourse fails as when the pages run out and the ink runs dry, so too
do our protagonists. In these novels, the end of the story is the end of identity/everyone. At the heart
of the matter, there is nothing; hence, perhaps we are dealing with a theory of identity, not only
based on alterity, but on absence.
In order to lead us into these cul-de-sacs (which is precisely where Nicola Six is murdered),
we  have  pointed  out  how  Auster  and  Amis  have  revisited  and  revised  existing  modes  of
categorizing the self, making use of, but at the same time contesting our notions of identity and,
under  the  prism of  postmodernism,  they  aim  for  the  representation  of  fragmented  subjects  in
fragmented settings and times.  They show their awareness of  predecessors like the Modernist or
Romantic writers, but are also deeply influenced by the overall intellectual discomfort shown by
specialists  in  all  the  fields  of  human  knowledge  from  philosophy  to  physics,  not  forgetting
psychology, anthropology, even religion, all of which struggle to find a reconciliation among the
different spheres of experience and experimentation, awareness and understanding of the self, as we
have seen in each of our chapters. One of the main points that can be extracted from this study is
therefore that identity, as it is generally understood , as a stable homogeneous self, is inaccessible to
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the characters in our novels —just as it is for the postmodern person as well. However, this is not
restricted to current times at all, as we saw in chapter two, where even the earliest definitions of
identity refer to and are dependent on the other; there is no identity without diversity; it is a feeling
humanity manifests throughout history; see how uneasy Thomas Carlyle sounds when he reflects on
this issue in the 1800s: 
With men of a speculative turn, [...] there come seasons, meditative, sweet, yet awful hours,
when in wonder and fear you ask yourself the unanswerable question: who am I; the thing that
can say ‘I’ ...? The world with its loud trafficking, retires into the distance; and, through the
paper-hangings, and stone walls, and thick-plied tissues of Commerce and Polity, and all the
living  and  lifeless  integuments  (of  Society  and  a  Body),  where  with  your  existence  sits
surrounded, —the sight reaches forth into the void Deep, and you are alone with the Universe,
and silently commune, as one mysterious Presence with another.
It is striking here that Carlyle could easily be referring to the characters in our novels as they also
turn speculative and ask themselves the same question; 
Who  am I;  what  is  this  ME?  A Voice,  a  Motion,  an  Appearance;  some  embodied
visualized Idea in the Eternal Mind? Cogito ergo sum. Alas, poor Cogitator, this takes us
but a little way. Sure enough, I am; but lately was not: but Whence? How? Where-to?
The answer lies around, written in all colours and motions, uttered in all tones of jubilee
and wail,  in thousand-figured, thousand-voiced, harmonious Nature: but where is the
cunning  eye  and  ear  to  whom  that  God-written  Apocalypse  will  yield  articulate
meaning? (39)
Sartor Resartus takes some time to give voice to an answer to these questions —“Whence? How?
Where-to?”— , but Carlyle eventually turns to (N)ature, which is exactly what our characters do in
the novels. But for Carlyle, behind Nature he finds God; however, in a postmodern world where the
ultimate logos is the ‘word’ perhaps Nature will not provide the answers we seek.
“In my beginning is my end…. In my end is my beginning”. And so, we inevitably return to
the beginning of this study, where we contemplated the sky and argued that the contemplation of the
sky is present almost always in these novels as a trigger for self-contemplation (or the other way
around). When left without a definite answer, characters look at the sky in the hope for connection
with their true nature. For instance, this happens to Fanshawe, a character who has lost and rejected
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his  identity  but  is  nevertheless  “preoccupied  by  the  landscape,  and  he  keeps  returning  to  it,
endlessly watching it. Endlessly recording its changes. His patience before these things is never less
than remarkable, and there are passages of nature writing in both the letters and the notebooks as
luminous as any I have read” (NYT:  272). Hence, the landscape, and particularly the sky, gives
Fanshawe a bit of connection with himself and meaning, just as it does to Quinn, who discovers in
the alley that he always missed this contemplation before: “He spent many hours looking up at the
sky [...] and as the days passed he began to take pleasure in the world overhead. He saw that, above
all, the sky was never still. Even on cloudless days, when blue seemed to be everywhere, there were
constant little shifts” (114). For these characters, as for Carlyle, Nature (or what's left of it anyway)
is the only “world overhead” because they cannot find any answers within. However, we have noted
in the Trilogy that Auster’s characters find nothing stable overhead, only a sky that is continually
shifting and changing (just as there is never any stable or fixed notion of who they are).  For the
characters in London Fields though, there is not even nature to escape to as “the sky was falling”
(394). For Amis’s narrator, Samson Young, the sky presages the Apocalypse, the end of everything.
Therefore, as Carlyle and many of the authors referred to  in this paper suggest,  ‘Who am I?’ is
bound to be an unanswerable enigma; it only brings in more questions, and they are not easy to
respond to either. For the authors, who have certainly revisited similar sources to the ones we have,
some of these inevitable questions which can spring from the matrix  ‘Who am I?’ are basically,
never mind the order or the concrete words: ‘What is reality?’ and ‘What are the others?’ 
The narrators and the characters of our novels inevitably have to broach these questions but,
to begin with, each character seems sure of who they are, and who everyone else is, too; at the
outset, their roles are given, inherited, or assumed and, of course, accepted. But at the same time,
the messages that they read in the sky begin to take on significance as everything begins to shift and
change and, eventually, some will even come to the end of themselves; this is marked initially by
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how their roles and situations and even their names change. At first, one might think that the authors
fully believe that ‘I’ is a construct, that ‘I’ is nothing, but can later reconsider the bigger picture of
‘self’ that they are creating: duplication, bifurcation and deception are experienced by the subject in
both the Trilogy and in London Fields. The authors compromise characterization, plot, the figure of
the narrator, and their very agency as authors in the novels, as we have seen, while all the time
doubting language itself as a safe carrier of meaning, which, ultimately, is a call for a new kind of
literature, as we will conclude; but let us not anticipate. All meaning is assumed as preexisting or
pre-imposed in the atmosphere that these authors create in their novels, and we find, as we have
discussed  previously,  characters  that  are  always  reenacting  preexisting  and  pre-imposed  roles,
which, according to the sociologist Stuart Hall, applies to people in society just as much:
Individuals as subjects identify (or do not identify) with the ‘positions’'to which they are
summoned; as well as how they fashion, stylize, produce and ‘perform’ these positions,
and why they never do so completely, for once and all time, and some never do, or are in
a  constant,  antagonistic  process  of  struggling  with,  resisting,  negotiating  and
accommodating the normative or regulative rules with which they confront and regulate
themselves. (Hall "The Question...": 14)
Therefore  what  we  are is  never  ourselves  but  the  roles  we  perform; Laclau  calls  this  process
“articulation” (Hall: 14). We, like our characters, depend on how others see us, which is why you
will find us, like them, performing in accordance to these outer rules. 
We have seen that ‘Who am I?’ has no easy answer, nevertheless ‘What is the Other?’ is the
main question that Levinas, Lacan or Derrida, among many others quoted here, identify as one of
the most important in the process of self-definition and their own answer to it, as we have argued
before, is inconclusive to say the least, as their discourse tends to reduce the other to a dark entity
that is impossible to grasp, which again means the actual self, who needs others to self-identify, is
an unreachable concept too.  This is Derrida’s  différance;  identity derives from difference but is
ultimately and always deferred.  We have seen how Auster and Amis take this implication to the
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literary flesh through the representation of characters that are at once other among themselves and
other to themselves, Nicola Six being the most extreme of the examples, as she is nothing but a
dramatic representation of various male-made female roles, as we saw in chapter 4. 
From this, then, it has become clear that we are nothing but what others perceive, and we
perform by rules that come directly from without, although we still live in a social context that
operates through and for the people in ‘real life’. The space that we have left for relationships with
others and the origin of these rules are the same: our identity and self depend on our interactions
with the rest of the System; this took us in chapters 2 and 3 to bring in such authors as Baudrillard,
Mumford, Foucault, Debord and others in order to bring an ideological frame to what our characters
experience as a complete detachment from a System that, once they look closely, is neither related
to nor based on nature. According to such thinkers, fragmentation and incoherence prevail while,
ironically, the  intention  of  globalization  never  recedes.  This  shows  Auster,  Amis,  and  many
contemporary postmodernist authors, as well as their characters, and their readers, that we must be
subject  to  some  greater  scheme, a  construct  we  have  been  assuming  as  natural  since  nobody
remembers when, but which reveals itself as more and more artificial as we, as human beings, try to
unravel the secret mechanics of reality. Because nature is not accessible to the characters in our
novels anymore, they find themselves wondering: what is the nature of the world we are forced to
contemplate? What kind of reality do we face and, for that matter, and more importantly, what is
reality? They learn reality is not real, but a game, which some embrace as players and others reject,
as hermits. 
Pure alienation from the System is the seed from which our postmodernist  Waldens and
Quixotes ultimately blossom.  Hegel first reflected on alienation as a problem of modernity:  Men
have created a society that they no longer belong to, not based on true needs or intuitions, which
takes them to utter alienation, even from God. Marx related this idea to the alienation from the
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product of our own labor, and so on. So the  answer to the question  ‘Who am I?’ which is asked
directly or indirectly an insurmountable amount of times throughout our novels, is always deferred.
It always takes us to other distressful questions we do not have answers to in the present; this is
basic for the uncomfortable and infinite or spiral ending of our novels: in the Trilogy, neither the
narrator nor any of the characters satisfy their apparent quests and are left literally in the dark, while
death reigns at the end of  London Fields, with the narrator entrusting a doubtful future into the
hands of the baby girl, who is nevertheless the product of generations of human decay and the decay
of nature under the pressure of the endless city without fields: “since it will not matter where this
center is, the last reason for the great city's existence will vanish at the very moment that it takes the
form of  a  boundless  conurbation.  At  that  point  the  stage  will  be set  for  ‘Post-historic  Man’  ”
(Mumford: 554).
Even so, some characters do live in the novels, and we also continue to survive as a species,
and we will have to cope with the reality we have left to experience, be it a simulacrum or not.
According to Mendilow, the fact is  that  “The twentieth century’s pace of living is  menaced by
disintegration constantly” (6), which is a difficult situation for a stable self to assume. Somehow
though, we have managed to overcome apocalyptic fears: “Millennial feeling, for the first time, was
almost entirely severed from apocalyptic urges and fears [...] the apparent prosperity created by
global  capitalism has made the millennium seem irrelevant” because “apocalypse has,  in  some
sense, already happened [...]. We know how the end of the world looks like” (Berger, J.: 377-388).
In both novels this is true; in the Trilogy, the narrator's experience with Fanshawe in the closing
pages symbolizes a micro-apocalypse, the end of both characters' identities, while in London Fields
death takes Young and Nicola the day of the apocalyptic eclipse: 
Will it reach the conclusion it appears to crave —will the Crisis reach the Conclusion?
Is it just the nature of the beast? We'll see. I certainly hope not. I would lose many
potential readers, and all my work would have been in vain. And that would be a real
bitch. (LF: 64)
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This is the  world as Young, Clinch and Talent  imagined it  would  end, because it basically never
existed outside TV, literature and their own invention. There is certainly no place left for the kind of
realist fiction the narrator had in mind: M. A., Nicola, and the System itself took control from his
hands. If there is no such thing as “Progress, or Providence or Manifest Destiny” —Meeter says —
(216), or in Cohen’s words, the project of the Enlightenment and such concepts as the greater good
“are fake” (103), then “The finalities have disappeared; we are now engendered by models. There is
no longer such a thing as ideology” (Debord: 120), and there is no place for the Truth. This is a
philosophical  position that  many criticize as  it  “leads  to  moral  and political  nihilism” and “no
notion of project” (Sarup: 167-168), but that does not make these affirmations any less convincing
for us. 
Some characters against all odds survive, so does literature and even a certain notion of
identity remains inevitably a part of our everyday-life experience (how could it not?). Moreover, it
is the notion of identity as alterity that allows this to continue to happen, in our opinion. Levinas
proclaims, after walking right into his own theory's trap, that we must embrace alterity as the only
mode of identity: “The novelty of the modern is not, to be sure, the end of everything unknown, but
an epoch where the un-known to be discovered can no longer surprise thought with its new alterity.
Thought is  already fully conscious of itself  and of all  the dimensions  of what  is  reasonable in
reality” (127). Along these lines, Lyotard coins the term ‘post-history’, which “urges dispossession
of rules, of identities, of simple opposition, of blind affirmation”, a revision of History based on
referents  for  self-definition  that  do  not  come  from  radical  opposition  with  the  other  but
characteristics and common perceptions (Cohen: 104). Hall also calls for other ways; he rejects the
term identity for “identification” (6) 40 and we believe this is exactly what our novelists have shown;
40 Hall proposes 'identification', a self-proclaimed construct, always in the making, supported "on the back of some
common origin or shared characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure
of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation". Identification is not passive, it implies the subject to
participate and self-define according to the options given. ( "The Question...": 2-6)
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they explore new possibilities regarding identity and agency in the novel, even if it implies killing a
good bunch of stereotypes with the viciousness Young kills Nicola.
To finish with this argument, we would like to add that, clearly, these novels do not represent
the death of the novel, the author, character or subject, author or plot whatsoever, but constitute a
rebirth,  entirely based on alterity as the only constant possible.  Auster and Amis,  through their
baroque interweaving of story lines that end up in inconclusive nothingness, unbearable for some
readers and critics, give us no apparent moral opinion on the facts they describe in their fictions
(particularly in the case of Amis and his Nicola), and above all, they give the characters (or the
reader!)  no definite  resolutions  for  the  forever  sought  answer  to  the question:  ‘Who am I?’,  a
question that spirals into itself like these fictions do. A stable self can only be inside one's own
brain;  it  is  a  creation  of  the  subject  even  if  it  can  only  be  a  fiction  or  a  construction,  a
characterization, as our authors have suggested. That is certainly an intricate logic that results in the
self-referentiality  we  find  in  our  novels,  a  grotesque  and  alienating  picture  that  nevertheless
resembles  our experience of  the world.  According to Thiher,  there is  a need for  postmodernist
literature to incorporate alterity as a fundamental part of its natural renovation:
The jubilant energy of postmodern fiction arises, in a nearly dialectical fashion, when
the postmodern accepts this contradiction as a challenge, and pursuing his alienation,
hyperbolically assumes the otherness of language, its schizoid structure, and its pop
dementia. By assuming these voices in their most grotesque and delirious forms, he can
attempt to explode language from within  —and with language the limits of selfhood
that humanism has assigned as the limits of reason since at least the Renaissance. In
this way arises the postmodern alternation of voices, of silence and madness, loss and
jubilation, deadpan realism and irrational exaltation. Within this oscillation one finds
nearly all the voices that make up the range of contemporary fiction. (Thiher 154)
We have seen clearly that our authors are in tune with this. Therefore, although detached from
our experience as they might feel, these novels do create an original and honest picture of the
world (with its climatic, consumerist, emotional issues) in order to introduce the reader to
today's biggest paradox without conditioning their interpretation: 
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This  is  a  necessary function  of  modern  literature.  We  must wipe  out  the  irrelevant
answers, and, at this point, we have no new ones. The school of the absurd, the styles of
black humor and pop art, and even the existence of our empty technocratic society, all
combine to demonstrate abundantly that, on a real plane, man at this point on his way to
his ultimate destiny, doesn’t know what that destiny is. (Wood: 149)
We believe that these novels do represent a situation that is unbearable to our hidden, now
forgotten nature, and, as a consequence,  we are bound to  have seen a series of behaviours and
images that  have perhaps disgusted and confused the readers; but we do not believe any of them
constitute an apology of the way of life at the end of the twentieth century in any sense. However,
they have given us no real hope or solution, no clues as to how we might be able to reverse the
process that we can observe in the novels and all around us. But among the disarray, and although
words are to be distrusted, we can still write, we can still represent our experience through texts.
Our  authors,  as  part  of  a  bigger  movement  that  could  be  called  postmodernism,  although  not
necessarily, try and succeed in innovating by creating a new kind of novel, as the narrator of the
Trilogy acknowledges in The Locked Room: 
If words followed, it was only because I had no choice but to accept them, to take them
upon myself and go where they wanted me to go. But that does not necessarily make the
words important. I have been struggling to say goodbye to something for a long time
now, and this struggle is all that really matters. The story is not in the words; it’s in the
struggle. (287-288)
We can infer that the thing he is trying to say goodby to is identity, and all certainties, answers and
truths must be dismissed along with it. After all, the work that prevails as the most praised within
the whole Trilogy is Fanshawe's: “He had answered the question by asking another question, and
therefore everything remained open, unfinished, to be started again” (307), and this is precisely one
of the characteristics that makes the Trilogy such an ingenious work, the inconclusiveness and self-
referentiality that Auster builds from nothingness. The same thing goes for Samson Young and his
intentions as a writer; he begins by stating: “I must have the truth. There just isn't time to settle for
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anything less than the truth” (43) but ends up admitting: “Her story worked. Mine didn't. There's
really nothing more to say” (466). He knows now that this is Nicola's/Asprey's/Amis's story, not his,
and they do not care for the truth; they do not believe in it. 
Summing up, in this study we have accepted the literary challenge we believe the authors
present to the readers, which is to question the disposition of preconceived identification categories
(that are supposed to be representative) but that have given way to a more open disposition of the
facts, identities, and, ultimately, words themselves. Auster and Amis invite us to open our eyes and
look through the glass to see the implications of the city as a way of living, as symbol and System
disconnected from true nature, and the horrible consequences of giving in to its simulations (and the
consequences  of  trying  to  escape  from them).  They invite  us  also  to  take  a  close  look at  the
characters who inhabit it, who have, similarly, become disconnected from any clear notion of who
they are (or anyone else, for that matter). These novels are a call for change but towards which
direction? That is for the reader to decide, as our authors believe they have no authority to impose
meaning on the fiction or facts within the fiction that they invent. As Mark Asprey proclaims, “You
don't understand, do you, my talented friend? Even as you die and rot with envy. It doesn't matter
what anyone writes any more. The time for it mattering has passed. The truth doesn't matter any
more and it's not wanted” (452).
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